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1 Introduction: Illegal migration and gender in
a global and historical perspective
Marlou Schrover, Joanne van der Leun,
Leo Lucassen and Chris Quispel
The differences between men and women involved in migration have
been studied from various angles in the last decades (Sinke 2006).
However, study of the ‘illegal’ side of migration has remained relatively
sparse. A special issue of International Migration Review on gender and
migration offers an impressive overview of what has been written on
gender differences in migration in recent years (Donato, Gabaccia,
Holdaway, Manalansan & Pessar 2006), but the focus has mainly been
on legal migration. Not much light is shed on the historical roots and
global differences within illegal migration. In this book we therefore
use a historical and global perspective to look at illegality – one of the
leading subjects of current debates on migration – and the way the
construction of illegality can help us understand migration from a gen-
der perspective. Since the construction of migrant illegality is related to
the construction of citizenship, research into the construction of
migrant illegality clarifies how citizenship is defined and how mechan-
isms of inclusion and exclusion work out differently for men and
women.
Much of the literature on migrant illegality is recent, has little eye
for historical developments, focuses on the United States and is
predominantly concerned with policy aspects (De Genova 2002; Van
der Leun 2003). This book looks at changes in the construction of
migrant illegality from an interdisciplinary, socio-legal and historical
perspective. The chapters of our book cover a long period of time – the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries – and a large geographical area
(Germany, the Netherlands, Britain, the US, Mexico, Malaysia, the
Middle East, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, the Soviet Union and Pakistan).
Our leading question is: how has illegality been constructed over time
and space and to what extent was this different for men and women?
1.1 Literature on migrant illegality
Several authors have strongly criticised the use of the term ‘illegal mi-
grants’ (for a summary see Koser 2005). Migrants can never be illegal
themselves, only their activities can be regarded as such. Because of
the association of illegality with crime, authors have suggested repla-
cing the term ‘illegal’ with ‘undocumented’, ‘unauthorised’ or ‘irregu-
lar’. However, these alternative terms are as problematic as the term
‘illegal’. ‘Undocumented’ is ambiguous, since sometimes it is used to
denote migrants who have not been documented and sometimes to
describe migrants without documents. Neither situation applies to all
illegal migrants. Furthermore, undocumented migrants who apply for
asylum are not illegal. Similarly, not all illegal migrants are necessarily
unauthorised, and so this term, too, is often incorrect. The term ‘irre-
gular’ is problematic since it is not clear to which rules or regulations
it refers. Furthermore, the term ‘irregular migration’ leads to confu-
sion, because it is also used to describe migration that takes place at ir-
regular time intervals, as opposed to regular (seasonal) migration. The
term can also be understood to mean disorderly, which again has a
criminal association. Replacing the term ‘illegal’ because of its negative
connotation does not help, since any new term will acquire a similar
connotation in the light of how the topic is generally discussed. We
therefore choose to use the term ‘illegal’ despite its disadvantages (cf.
Ngai 2004). It has the advantage that it refers to the way in which mi-
grants relate to the construction of what is legal (Samers 2001: 142).
The illegal exit, entry and residence of migrants are often associated
with other illegal activities (Jandl 2007). The underlying assumption is
that one illegal activity will lead to another. In our view, the construc-
tion of what is legal and illegal in migration should be restricted to
exit, entry and residence. Work should only be included when permis-
sion to work, and the permission to leave, enter or stay are intercon-
nected.
Currently, Western states define illegal migration as: 1. crossing bor-
ders (leaving or entering a country) without the consent of authorities;
2. crossing a border in a seemingly legal way though using false docu-
ments or using legal documents in a false way, or by making use of bo-
gus marriages or impostor relatives; 3. staying in a country after the ex-
piration of legal status (cf. Heckmann 2004: 1106). In reality, however,
the meaning of illegality shifts across time and space, as we will show.
It is a fluid construction and is the result of increased state control over
mobility.
The construction of illegality is related to the idea that control over
its territory is a task of the state (Abraham & Van Schendel 2005). A
distinction can be made between what states consider to be legitimate
(‘legal’) and what people consider to be legitimate (‘licit’). Many trans-
border movements of people are illegal because they defy authority, but
they are quite acceptable, ‘licit’, in the eyes of participants. The state
controls who occupies, uses or crosses its territory. Individuals who sys-
tematically contest or bypass state controls are not simply flouting the
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letter of the law. They are also bringing into discussion the legitimacy
of the state by questioning its ability to control its territory. For reasons
of scale and logistics, not all states have the ability to control their peo-
ple and territory, and this is perceived as a threat by other countries
(Abraham & Van Schendel 2005).
Illegality has been addressed from a gender perspective before, but
mainly from a very specific angle: past literature focuses on the traf-
ficking of women (Phizacklea 1998). It is as trafficked women that ille-
gal women migrants gain a high visibility in academic, public and poli-
tical discourse. In these discourses, trafficking is used as a synonym
for prostitution (Agustin 2005: 108). Men are often spoken of as being
smuggled and women as being trafficked. The definition of trafficking
emphasises that people are transferred against their will, while the de-
finition of smuggling stresses illegal entry to which the migrant agrees
and for which he usually pays (Koser 2005: 7). In the distinction be-
tween trafficking and smuggling, men are depicted as in control while
women are portrayed as dependent and docile victims.
The assumption that women are trafficked has resulted in stronger
monitoring of migrant women, as opposed to men (Erel 2003). It has
also led to the generalisation that all migrant women are portrayed as
being at risk of rape and other sexual harassment (Okin 1999). The
narrative of victimhood and the assumption that women are forced to
migrate and work in prostitution has brought about protective mea-
sures, which sometimes help women but also restrict their choices.
There are countries today – like Bangladesh, Indonesia, Myanmar
(Burma) and Nepal – that have banned or restricted the emigration of
women in an attempt to protect them (International seminar 2004;
Siddiqui 2003; Moors & De Regt in this volume). In recent years, the
discourse on prostitution and trafficking has dominated conferences
on women’s rights, and this usually leads to more restrictions for wo-
men (Soderlund 2005: 65). Since women are cast as victims, these re-
strictions on their rights are justified by claiming to protect them.
Several authors have tried to explain why there is such an emphasis
on trafficking and prostitution when it comes to women and illegal mi-
gration. Chapkis (2003) has shown how this discourse combines fe-
male powerlessness and childlike sexual vulnerability. A distinction is
made between ‘violated innocents’ and ‘illegal immigrants’ that is
based on sex and gender. Trafficked victims are described as vulnerable
women and children who were forced from the safety of their homes
into gross sexual exploitation. They are distinguished from economic
migrants – male – who have wilfully violated national borders for indi-
vidual gain. The state offers protection to the former and punishment
to the latter. It relies on moral panic about ‘sexual slavery’ supported
by ‘slippery statistics and sliding definitions’. The protection that is of-
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fered to the ‘innocent’ helps reinforce the suggestion that the punish-
ment meted out to the ‘guilty’ is justified (Chapkis 2003: 924).
Berman (2003) has shown how the European trafficking discourse is
related to globalisation, the end of the Cold War and the expansion of
the European Union. Governments currently feel they are losing con-
trol of borders and issues of migration. The current sex-trafficking
discourse, involving innocent victims, violated borders and criminality,
can be seen as a means of problematising immigration and justifying
anti-immigration policies (Berman 2003: 57). The discourse tends to
focus on the ‘white-ness’ of the ‘victims’. All migrant Eastern European
sex workers are portrayed as a group of innocents who need the
protection of the state. The discourse shows great similarities to the
White Slavery Scare of around 1900, with its emphasis on youth, inno-
cence, ‘whiteness’, corruption and foreignness (Doezema 2005). While
Eastern European women are portrayed as victims, Eastern European
men are associated with crime.
Immigrant women are not only restricted by this victimhood dis-
course. Women who work in prostitution may also benefit from this si-
tuation if they emphasise suffering and stress that they are victims
who are doing this work temporarily in order to support their children
or siblings (Brennan 2004). This approach increases their incomes
and their opportunities, including that of being ‘rescued’ from prostitu-
tion and being offered subsequent migration to the rescuer’s country
of residence through marriage.
There are thus two rather separate literatures on illegality. Firstly,
there are studies that deal with the construction of illegality in connec-
tion with the role of the state. Secondly, there are numerous publica-
tions on women and illegality that almost exclusively discuss prostitu-
tion and trafficking. In this book we combine these two literatures, but
we shift the focus from the trafficking discourse to other, under-
explored differences between men and women in illegal migration.
1.2 Illegality from a historical perspective
The construction of illegality has changed considerably over time. The
chapters in this volume deal with the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, but the roots of the construction of illegality can be traced back to
earlier centuries. Although the term ‘illegal’ dates from the 1930s (see
Van Eijl in this volume), the concept of being illegal is much older. It is
closely linked to the process of state formation and systems of local
poor relief (Feldman 2003a). In the following we will give a brief over-
view of some key developments in the relationship between state for-
mation, mobility control and exclusion since the Early Modern period.
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We will demonstrate that illegality is not as ‘new’ as many scholars as-
sume, and that current manifestations of gendered illegality can be bet-
ter understood when placed a historical perspective.
For centuries, authorities have formulated rules on the exit, entry
and residence of subjects and aliens (Torpey 2000; Caplan & Torpey
2001; Hoerder 2002; Moch 2003; Higgs 2004). Mobile groups are of
interest to states when they move between politically significant terri-
torial units (Abraham & Van Schendel 2005). The strengthening of
national states in the nineteenth century made the crossing of national
borders more important than that of other territorial boundaries.
Before the nineteenth century the central state was weak and not very
active in formulating rules on exit, entry and residence. States only for-
mulated rules regarding the small number of people who wanted to be
naturalised (Sahlins 2004). Any discussion of illegality pertained to the
crossing of municipal and not the national boundaries (Fahrmeir
2007).
In large parts of Europe, including the United Kingdom, citizenship
was defined locally, and the rules on in- and exclusion were developed
at the municipal level. Crucial for the decision to admit ‘aliens’, defined
as migrants coming from another municipality, was whether they were
believed to be able to earn their own money and not burden the local
poor relief funds. When the local economy slumped, alien policies be-
came restrictive, especially towards poor migrants. Migrants who had
been admitted but not granted local residency could be sent back to the
municipality that was responsible for their poor relief, often their birth-
place. This principle formed the basis of the English Poor Laws and
the German and Austrian Heimatrecht (Lucassen 1996; Lees 1998;
Gosewinkel 2001; Komlosy 2003; Feldman 2003a), though was also
applied in the Netherlands (Van Leeuwen 1992). Differences were
made between migrant men and women within the system of poor re-
lief. All poor migrants had to prove that they were deserving, but wo-
men more often than men had to also show that they lived up to a
certain moral standard (Van de Pol & Kuijpers 2005).
The ‘foreign’ poor were deported regularly, but that did not always
mean their residence was illegal. They were not deported because they
did not have permission to enter a country or stay there, but because
they could no longer support themselves. Illegality may lead to deporta-
tion, though not all deportations resulted from illegality (see Van Eijl
in this volume).
In the Early Modern period authorities tried to restrict the move-
ment of people who were not tied to the highly organised labour mar-
ket and who could avoid taxation and regulation (Lucassen 1997; Eltis
2002). Vagrants were accused of avoiding regular employment and
using itinerant occupations as a cover for begging and theft. It is inter-
INTRODUCTION 13
esting that some of these vagrants, like illegal immigrants today,
moved in and out of illegality, depending on their ability to find work.
These European vagrant policies were reproduced in the colonial em-
pires of the nineteenth century. People who refused to follow the
highly repressive rules of the labour market were branded as vagrants
(Singha 1998). When they were put to work in other parts of the em-
pire, breaching contracts or scalloping could render them illegal
(Mohapatra 2007; see also Garce´s-Mascaren˜as’ chapter in this volume).
The regime of the Early Modern period could lead to various forms
of ‘illegality’. Poor migrants could circumvent local restrictions and set-
tle in a town without permission until they were caught and deported.
Migrants who had been admitted but who had not yet gained local citi-
zenship (often granted only after ten years of residence) refrained from
applying for poor relief since this could lead to expulsion. They kept a
low profile and accepted low wages and bad working conditions
(Komlosy 2004). Although their presence was not illegal, their situa-
tion has much in common with the situation current illegal immi-
grants find themselves in. In the eighteenth century, when the eco-
nomic situation deteriorated in large parts of Europe, the ‘hunt’ for
‘illegals’ intensified. When poor migrants had trouble proving their
identity, it was not clear who should be held responsible for their sup-
port. For ‘gypsies’ and ‘vagabonds’ this led to extreme measures in
Germany, the Netherlands, France and the UK. Their illegal presence
was punished by banishment or death (Fraser 1992; Lucassen, Willems
& Cottaar 1998).
In the Early Modern period there were few restrictions on immigra-
tion at the state level. Many states welcomed large groups of immi-
grants, often for religious and political reasons. This was the case with
the Huguenots from France after 1685 in Geneva, Brandenburg and
the Dutch Republic, Protestants from Salzburg around 1730 in
England and foreign revolutionaries in France after 1789, to mention a
few examples (Bade, Emmer, Lucassen & Oltmer 2007). Furthermore,
from a mercantilist perspective people were considered an asset. Some
states, like Russia and the German states, tried to lure migrants to
their territory. For the same mercantilist reasons, emigration was often
regarded as undesirable. Until the middle of the nineteenth century,
many states, especially in Central Europe, forbade people to emigrate
without permission (Torpey 2000; Green & Weil 2007). States viewed
emigration as a loss of money (taxes) and men (soldiers), or feared that
they would become responsible for those who were left behind (women
and children). Restrictions on movement were clearly gendered. France
and Germany, for instance, prohibited and restricted the permanent
emigration of men who had not fulfilled their military duty (Torpey
2000; Moch 2003), while some German states forbade the temporary
14 MARLOU SCHROVER, JOANNE VAN DER LEUN, LEO LUCASSEN AND CHRIS QUISPEL
migration of women who intended to leave their children behind
(Schrover 2001).
In the nineteenth century local autonomy broke down and was trans-
ferred to the central state level. Local authorities remained responsible
for poor relief but lost the right to refuse internal migrants who were
likely to become a public charge (Komlosy 2004). With the spread of
industrialisation and the rapid growth of cities, central states increas-
ingly switched from a mercantilist to a liberal policy and stimulated
the free mobility of their citizens and foreigners (Torpey 2000;
Fahrmeir 2000). Some of the restrictive and immobilising local poor
relief legislation was abolished, creating a de facto national labour mar-
ket and allowing workers to settle in centres of industrial activity like
Lancashire and the Ruhr area (Lucassen 2005).
In the middle of the nineteenth century the redefinition of aliens in
national terms coincided with an international relaxation of migration
controls, at least in the Atlantic region (Noiriel 1991; Fahrmeir 2000;
Caplan & Torpey 2001; Hoerder 2002). In this first phase of globalisa-
tion, passports were abolished and exit restrictions lifted, resulting in a
spectacular increase in the volume of international migration (William-
son & O’Rourke 2002). As long as liberal night watchman states did
not provide welfare or other social goods and services to their citizens,
states welcomed cheap labour in the hope that this would boost the
economy (Fahrmeir, Faron & Weil 2003). This made the period be-
tween 1850 and 1914 the heyday of free migration, with some 50 mil-
lion international migrants travelling across the Atlantic and an equal
number moving within Europe (Moch 2003).
In Asia there were similar developments, with large numbers of mi-
grants flocking to centres of capital in Northern and South-East Asia
(McKeown 2004; Manning 2005; Lucassen 2007). At the same time,
however, Asian migrants were excluded as much as possible from the
Atlantic world and white settler colonies, creating a global, racially mo-
tivated migration regime which aimed at keeping Asians in Asia, ex-
cept for relatively small numbers of indentured migrant workers,
mostly in the Caribbean.
The exclusion of people who were seen as racially inferior produced
forms of illegality. Chinese men who migrated to California and
Australia at the time of the Gold Rush in the 1850s were resented by
white workers and after much pressure were excluded from the terri-
tory and the labour market altogether. The American Chinese Exclu-
sion Act of 1882 – in effect until 1943 – forbade the immigration of
Chinese, except for those who were ‘honest’ merchants and business-
men (Chan 1991; Gabaccia 1997; McKeown 2001; Zolberg 2006).
Chinese men who were found to have entered under false pretexts or
with forged papers were declared illegal and were deported (Wong &
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Tong 2005). The Chinese Exclusion Act did not mention women, since
it was assumed that all Chinese women who attempted to enter the US
were prostitutes and the 1875 Page Law barred prostitutes from the US
(Calavita 2006). Racial arguments also influenced the restrictionist US
quota acts of the early 1920s (Zeidel 2004).
Within Europe, cultural and racial notions of inferiority also influ-
enced state practices. At the end of the nineteenth century states became
more sensitive to demands for the restriction and exclusion of foreign
migrants by various political pressure groups, such as unions and nati-
vist movements. This is illustrated by the regulation of Polish-speaking
Russian agricultural workers in the Prussian countryside from the
1890s onwards. These workers, both men and women, were admitted
temporarily and could only work in Prussia’s agricultural sector. Russian
Poles had to leave Prussia on 20 December and could only return on
1 February of the next year (the so-called Karenzzeit). This rotation sys-
tem was meant to discourage migrants from settling permanently.
Dodging the rotation system and shifting to other economic sectors
was forbidden and resulted in a form of illegality. An elaborate moni-
toring system was developed, which gradually extended its reach to all
foreign workers in Prussia. These migrant workers could only evade
regulation by migrating to other German states or engaging ‘illegally’
in occupations outside the agricultural sector (Bade 2000: 222-223).
The Prussian policy foreshadowed a more general development that
occurred in Western Europe and the US from 1914 onwards. The
changes after 1914 were the outcome of developments that had started
almost a century earlier. After 1914 the urge to control became the abil-
ity to control. It was part of what Rosenberg calls the bureaucratic fan-
tasy of achieving total control over society (2006: 7). The origin of this
desire can be traced back to the beginning of the nineteenth century,
when state officials developed sweeping visions of the benefits of tech-
nical and scientific progress applied to all fields of human activity as a
means of simplifying a messy, ‘illegible’ world (Scott 1998). The cho-
lera epidemics of the nineteenth century and greater awareness of how
contagious diseases spread contributed to this overall perceived need
for control (Rosenberg 2006: 24).
Laws that were introduced in the nineteenth century in order to con-
trol mobility faded into oblivion soon after having been introduced, as
had been the case in the Early Modern period (Fahrmeir 2003). In the
nineteenth century governments made no serious effort to enforce laws
since they knew they did not have the ability to do so. Laws were thus not
introduced in order actually to control mobility, but rather to create an
impression of being in control (Schlumbohm 1997). The states’ success-
ful monopolisation of the legitimate means of movement had to wait for
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the creation of elaborate bureaucracies and technologies, which began to
develop at the end of the nineteenth century (Torpey 1998: 240).
The urge to register people, however, sprang not only from increased
possibilities. A changing conception of nationhood was also important.
Before 1900, few efforts were made to register people by nationality,
and many people did not know what nationality they had (Schrover
2002; Rosenberg 2006: 24). Changed ideas about nationality and be-
longing, and the failure of states to identify enemy nationals in their
midst at times of war, increased the tendency to register people by
nationality (Brubaker 1992; Rosenberg 2006: 44). With the rise of
nationalism it was considered increasingly important – in terms of na-
tional security – for states to be able to identify their citizens. Too many
foreigners on a nation’s territory made it difficult for the state to identi-
fy its populations, to legitimise its government and to maintain its
sovereignty (Hollifield 1998; Fahrmeir 2007).
In around 1900, concepts of nationhood became mixed with racism
(Van der Linden 1988; Lucassen 1998). The aim of the controls was
not to limit the number of migrants entering a country, but to mini-
mise the perceived impact of specific peoples on a nation’s ‘health’ and
security. Notions of race and nationality did not inevitably lead to exclu-
sions; rather they provided a palette of ideas that influenced both popu-
lar and governmental thinking about the place of ‘aliens’ (Triadafilo-
poulos 2004). Changing ideas on nationhood led to a different percep-
tion of who ‘the people’ were.
The first decades of the twentieth century saw two contradictory
developments. On the one hand, there was an apparent immobility
(Langewiesche & Lenger 1987). In Germany, migration rates had al-
ready started to drop before the First World War (Hochstadt 1999: 217-
250). Overall, immobility came to be seen as the norm (Cresswell
2006: 26). On the other hand, in the midst of this declining trend in
mobility, the First World War and its aftermath were an unprecedented
period of flux. The number of people displaced by the war was greater
than ever before (Baron & Gatrell 2003). The war led to a reconfigura-
tion of power and territory and the shifting of territorial borders.
People fled from states that ceased to exist. Redefinitions of citizenship
and the creation of new states left some people stateless. The number
of displaced persons and the sense of displacement were far greater
than in any earlier period. Governments felt, and were forced to feel,
that they had to deal with this displacement. The urge towards restrict-
ing mobility was in part a response to this period of flux within an
overall declining trend in mobility.
The increased number of restrictions and controls after the First
World War were also the result of a rise in political participation and
the extension of social rights (Lucassen 1998). Workers urged that the
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labour market be protected from foreign labourers. The extension of
voting rights made politicians sensitive to these demands. The prefer-
ential treatment of non-migrant workers was only possible, however, if
they could be distinguished from foreigners. As a result, workers and
their unions started to press for more registration. After the First
World War this ‘revolution identitaire’ (Noiriel 1991) increasingly led to
attempts to shield the labour market from foreign labour (Noiriel 1991;
Van Eijl 2005; Hahn, Komlosy & Reiter 2006). More money became
available for registrations, which led to more elaborate systems of ad-
ministration (Rosenberg 2006: 46-49).
After each political crisis in Europe – such as those in 1812, 1848,
1866 and 1870 – there was an increase in the attempt to control mobi-
lity. The First World War was no different in that respect. A crucial dif-
ference, however, was that Russian revolutionaries were more success-
ful than those of 1848, for instance. As a result, controls that were put
into place during and after the First World War slackened only gradu-
ally and partially and became more institutionalised.
Furthermore, the arrival in England (Bland 2005) and France
(Camiscioli 2001) of immigrants from the colonies in Asia and Africa
led to a stronger urge for control. These migrants, all men, had served
in the merchant marine during the war, and now claimed their right to
stay in the mother country as citizens. Their arrival and claims, and
their marriages to white women, were cause for alarm and a reason for
an intensification of registration (Rosenberg 2006).
From the 1880s onwards, mobility from Europe was affected by US
restrictions on migration. The US authorities initially had no intention
of restricting the entry of migrants to the country, but they did want to
prevent paupers and criminals from coming by introducing controls
and barriers at the frontier (Ellis Island in 1892) as well as in the coun-
tries of departure. This idea of ‘remote control’ had already been devel-
oped earlier but became increasingly important after the First World
War (Zolberg 2006). After the First World War in Germany it was pri-
vate shipping companies rather than the state that played an important
role in exercising this remote control (Feldman 2003b; Brinkmann
2008). The shipping companies not only organised the transport by
train from the Russian border to German ports, but also carried out
tasks that now commonly fall to the state, such as checking passports
at the Russian border and denying entry onto German soil. German
authorities were not only unwilling but also unable to exercise this
control.
The so-called White Slavery Scare, in which European women were
believed to be exported to the colonies and elsewhere and forced into
prostitution, preceded the US move to increase restrictions on mobility.
Novels, pamphlets, newspaper articles and a box office success film
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Traffic in Souls (1913) inflamed the White Slavery Scare (Haynes 2004).
The protection of ‘innocent’ foreign women was used to legitimise re-
strictions on mobility.
In the early twentieth century in the US, the authorities made use of
the Likely to Become a Public Charge provision (LPC) to exclude or
evict women who were suspected of immoral behaviour (Moloney
2006). The LPC provision functioned in a way similar to that of the
poor relief system in the Early Modern period. Although men could
also be excluded or deported under the LPC provision, between 1892
and 1920 women were by far the main victims, especially those who
travelled alone. They were considered either to be more likely unable to
support themselves or to be immoral. Van Eijl’s and Reinecke’s chap-
ters (in this volume) support the findings of other researchers that the
sexual behaviour of migrant women alone was monitored and not that
of men, and that only women were threatened with expulsion on moral
grounds.
Over time we thus see continuities when it comes to illegality. In the
first place, poor migrants were never welcome and were often de-
ported, although not all deportations sprang from illegality. Both men
and women were evicted if they lacked visible means of subsistence,
but women were more often expelled than men on moral grounds and
these grounds almost always had a sexual connotation (Henkes 1995;
Mak 2001; Lucassen 2002; Moloney 2006). Deportability was not ne-
cessarily the same for men and women.
Secondly, state control on mobility increased with the state’s interest
in welfare and labour market regulation. This principle was more
strongly enforced in highly developed post war welfare states (espe-
cially in North-Western Europe), which tended to rely more on a pro-
tected labour market, a high level of migration control and other types
of regulations that created barriers for migrants (Esping-Andersen
1990; Faist 1997; Jordan & Vogel 1997; Van der Leun & Kloosterman
2006). Stronger links between mobility control and labour market ac-
cess worked out differently for men and women since the labour mar-
ket is highly segregated according to gender (De Groot & Schrover
1995).
In the third place, the desire to control migration predated the ability
to do so. The gap that occurred between the desire and the ability to
control was on some occasions filled by private institutions. Restric-
tions on mobility were frequently put in place without the ability or
wish to enforce them. They were not meant to actually impose control,
but rather to create the impression of being in control. The idea that il-
legality poses a security risk was reinforced in later years, as we will
discuss below. Both the nature of the risk posed by their migration and
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the risks they ran as illegal migrants were perceived differently for
men and women.
1.3 Illegality from a global perspective
Illegality is related to the state’s wish and ability to control mobility
and is not confined to any migration regime in particular (Ghosh
1998). In liberal Western democracies, however, illegality is con-
structed differently (see Castan˜eda’s chapter). Garce´s-Mascaren˜as
makes it clear in her chapter that the absence of liberal democratic tra-
ditions in South-East Asia leads to different kinds of illegality for men
and women. Ahmad and Moors and De Regt emphasise in their re-
spective chapters the importance of cultural norms, not only for decid-
ing who is illegal, but also for the agency of the people involved. In this
section we will first discuss the various options available to migrants to
legalise their stay and how these are different for men and women.
Secondly, we will look in more detail at how illegality is constructed
per region and how this works out for men and women.
Differences between illegal and legal migrants are not the same in
all countries. In US literature, the boundaries between legal and illegal
migration are often depicted as blurred. Many illegal immigrants im-
prove their position over time (in terms of job mobility and income)
and eventually legalise their residence (Chavez 1991, 1994; Massey &
Espinosa 1997). Legal migrants are more or less in the same unfavour-
able position as many illegal immigrants (except for their legal status),
as long as they are newcomers at the lowest rungs of the social ladder
(Mahler 1995).
The possibilities of becoming legal are not the same in all countries.
Italy, France, Spain and Greece have recently granted large-scale
amnesties (Ruspini 2000; Apap, De Bruycker & Schmitter 2000).
Other states have gone in the opposite direction. Countries such as the
Netherlands and Germany stay away from large-scale regularisations.
In fact, they are increasingly looking for ways to take away residence
rights from unwanted immigrants, such as those who are considered
to be a threat to public order. Sometimes, states actively adapt their
rules to illegalise certain categories of people (Van der Leun 2003). Un-
til 1997, migrants from the Czech Republic to Canada, for instance,
did not require a visa. Although the arrival of Czech Roma was consid-
ered undesirable, the Canadian government could not label them ille-
gal (Kernerman 2008). The increasing number of Czech Roma, how-
ever, led to a policy change. In 1997 the Canadian government intro-
duced visa regulations for migrants from the Czech Republic. The
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Roma were unable to acquire a visa, making the arrival of those who
came after 1997 illegal.
In recent decades as well as in the more distant past, people became
illegal when the countries they lived in ceased to exist or when citizen-
ship in their country of origin was denied – as happened to the Muslim
Rohingyas, who were made stateless by the Myanmar government in
the 1970s (Kaur 2007). When the Soviet Union in 1991 dissolved into
fifteen independent states, mobility that had previously been internal
became cross border migration. Since people from Chechnya could
very seldom acquire permission to move to many of the other former
states, their mobility became illegal. People became illegal migrants
when they fled without papers to countries that had not signed the
1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees – such as
Malaysia – and thus could not make an asylum claim. In countries that
had signed the 1951 Convention, ‘undocumented’ implied reduced de-
portability but not illegality. In countries that had not signed the con-
vention, illegality and failure to prove an identity are the same. This re-
sembles the fate of some migrants who were described in the historical
overview.
In Asia illegality is not countered by large-scale amnesties, but rather
by large-scale deportations. Thailand and Malaysia are currently the
two main destinations for illegal migrants in Asia (Hedman 2008). In
the late 1970s, during the Indochina refugee crisis, the Malaysian and
Thai governments engaged in so-called push-backs of refugees. In
Malaysia a task force was established with the official assignment to
stop landings by Vietnamese boat people. Vessels were pushed back
into the sea and assisted out of Malaysian waters. Thailand sent back
refugees over the Thai-Cambodian land border into the Cambodian
mine fields, killing several thousand of them.
The Malaysian government declared periods of amnesty, during
which illegal migrants were encouraged to return ‘voluntarily’ followed
by crackdowns on the illegal migrants who remained. Deportations are
routine and large-scale in Thailand and Malaysia, though they are also
on the rise in European countries. In 2006, for instance, the UK ‘re-
moved’ 29,040 individuals, the vast bulk of whom had applied for asy-
lum (Gibney 2008). It was the largest number of deportations ever in
the UK. A huge gap exists between the number of foreigners eligible
for deportation and the numbers actually deported. Deportation has in
recent years become more of a symbolic than a practical power for lib-
eral states. States are reluctant to use public displays of force, particu-
larly against women and children. As a rule, the deportability of wo-
men and children is less than that of men. Rather strikingly, the expan-
sion of deportations in Britain is based on reducing the number of
people receiving asylum, not on reducing the level of illegal migration.
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The explanation lies in registration. Both asylum applications and re-
movals are officially registered. These registrations can be used pub-
licly to monitor the adequacy of government performance. The number
of illegal migrants cannot be determined, and thus the failings of the
government are less obvious.
As this section has made clear, migrants can become legal or illegal
in various ways. Options are not the same for men and women. Here
we will look at five areas in which differences occur: marriages, asylum
procedures, work, giving birth to a legal baby and special programmes
for prostitutes.
In the first place, governments in sending and receiving societies as-
cribe different rights to migrant men and women regarding gaining or
retaining nationality after marriage (De Hart 2003; Fahrmeir 2007:
126-133). In the past, women could more easily acquire a new national-
ity through marriage, generally speaking, and thus legalise their resi-
dence, than men (Boris 1995). Such differences have disappeared in re-
cent decades, but they did exist in many countries well into the second
half of the twentieth century.
Secondly, migrants can legalise their residence via asylum proce-
dures. So far, it is not clear if the refugee recognition rate is different
for men and women, although some authors have shown that under
certain conditions, women are much less frequently granted refugee
status than men (cf. Spijkerboer 2000; Calavita 2006; Van Liempt’s
chapter in this volume). Currently, the discussion is not only whether
the grounds are the same, but whether they should be, and whether
gender-related violence should be a ground for asylum. According to
the 1951 Convention, the ground for asylum is defined as a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion. Gender or
gender-related harm is absent as a category of persecution. Gender-
related violence is seen in current discussions as something that can
happen only to women. If reference is made to men, it is to homosex-
uals (Oxford 2005). It is much more common for women than for
men to be the victims of sexual violence, and those who have been vic-
tims of what is called accidental or arbitrary rape (which is seen as a
sad but common part of regular warfare) are not regarded as perse-
cuted. Women who were raped in order to retrieve information about
their families (such as the whereabouts of husbands or sons) were not
granted asylum in the past. In recent years there has been a change in
asylum policies and laws. In the US, immigrant women can gain asy-
lum and legal entry by proving they are being persecuted on account of
female circumcision, honour killings, domestic violence, coercive fa-
mily planning, forced marriages or repressive social norms (Oxford
2005). This is also true for some European countries such as Germany.
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Asylum seekers in the US stand a better chance of having their request
approved if they mention female circumcisions at the hearings rather
than explaining their role in a resistance movement. Stories about re-
sistance are almost never acknowledged as a ground for asylum for wo-
men (while they are for men), whereas the mentioning of female cir-
cumcision is (Oxford 2005).
A third option for legal migration is through work in the formal
economy. This is problematic since much of the work that can be
regarded as typical immigrant women’s work, such as the work of do-
mestics, au pairs, prostitutes, cleaners and women working in restau-
rants and the domestic industries, is informal (Schrover, Van der Leun
& Quispel 2007). Immigrant men are more successful than women in
finding work in the formal economy. Yet, recently there have been
situations in which domestic work does offer opportunities for legal re-
sidence. One of the few ways to enter Italy or Spain legally, for in-
stance, is through annual quotas established in sectors of the economy
where labour shortages appear to exist – primarily agriculture, con-
struction and domestic service. A simple note from an employer in
these sectors is sufficient to apply for legal status. For those who enter
illegally or reside past the period of their initial employment on these
quotas, legalisation programmes are periodically launched. However,
the effect of this policy is that women who want to migrate to countries
such as Italy or Spain, and subsequently want to legalise their status,
are confined to domestic work (Calavita 2006: 120).
A fourth way to legalise residence, described in this book in Castan˜e-
da’s chapter, is by giving birth to a so-called anchor baby. This is an op-
tion open to women who are illegal residents in the US. According to
the jus soli principle, babies born on US soil are US citizens from birth.
In the past mothers have received permanent residency status as
mothers of US citizens. In countries that follow the jus sanguinis princi-
ple, such as the Netherlands and Germany, this in not an option. In
Germany, women residing illegally who give birth have to acquire a
birth certificate for their children. Reporting to the authorities in order
to get this certificate puts them at risk of deportation. Still, if they do
not acquire this birth certificate they run the risk of not having any par-
ental rights over the child, who becomes not only an illegal resident
but one whose mother is not legally recognised as its parent. The child
can be ‘legalised’ if a German man or legal resident of Germany ac-
knowledges paternity. Castan˜eda reports on fake acknowledgements of
paternity and situations in which these were sold and bought.
Whereas giving birth is a legalisation option today in the US, in the
past it has been a reason for eviction. In her chapter, Reinecke de-
scribes how in 1900 Polish women who were found to be pregnant
were routinely evicted from Germany. Today in Malaysia, all immigrant
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women, including those whose residence is legal, must submit to an-
nual gynaecological tests, and if they are pregnant they are immedi-
ately deported. If they manage to evade deportation, they become ille-
gal migrants (see Garce´s-Mascaren˜as’ chapter).
A last option for legalisation has to do with programmes that some
countries have for women who testify against traffickers (Andrijasevic
2004). A 2004 EU Council Directive provides for the issuing of resi-
dence permits to migrants who are victims of trafficking in human
beings and who cooperate with the authorities. Countries like Italy,
Belgium and the Netherlands already had these arrangements before
2004 (Truong 2003). Women receive temporary residence and work
permits if they take part in legal proceedings. These rights are usually
granted only for the duration of the criminal procedure, but women
have regularly been granted permanent rights on humanitarian
grounds after the end of the procedures.
Overall, it is difficult to say whether illegal women stand a better
chance of legalising their residence than men. What is clear is the fact
that options are different for men and women. For a long time, legali-
sations via work in the formal economy favoured men, but recently
there have been developments that favour women. Likewise, asylum
procedures originally seemed to create more options for men, but in
recent years options for women seem to have improved. Legalisation
via marriage, childbirth or testifying against traffickers offers more pos-
sibilities to women.
1.4 Regional differences
We now look in more detail at differences and similarities between re-
gions. The responses of governments towards illegal migration are of-
ten contradictory. The US, for instance, polices the Mexican border in a
spectacular manner but does not take action to dampen the demand
for illegal immigrants on the US side of the border. As a result, the
policy is highly ineffective (Zolberg 1990; Abraham & Van Schendel
2005: 14). One reason for the failure of the state to control illegal mi-
gration is that both employers and governments profit from the cheap
labour. The repression of illegal migration is expensive for states and
employers alike (Djaji 1997).
The willingness to reduce illegal migration is thus influenced by the
demand for cheap labour. Debates on illegal migration and protection
of the labour market from foreign workers tend to broaden out to is-
sues of security. This was not only true for Westerns societies before
the Second World War, but also for other societies in recent decades
(see for example Morita & Sassen 1994 on Japan).
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Another reason why the US policy of controlling illegal migration
persists long after its ineffectiveness has become apparent is to con-
vince the general public that politicians have not lost control over
immigration (Cornelius 2005). More than half of the US public be-
lieves that the government should be spending more to end illegal im-
migration along the US-Mexican border. Furthermore, in the post-9/11
era, immigration control and anti-terrorism efforts are conflated, and a
continuing show of force on the border symbolises the nation’s resolve
to fight terrorism even if it does nothing to enhance security. Similar
security claims are made in other regions, as when borders moved east-
ward after the enlargement of the EU (Mitsilegas 2002). Illegal migra-
tion was also associated with security in earlier decades, as our histori-
cal overview showed. The association between illegality and security is
highly gendered (Chock 1991). The discourse on illegality along the
US-Mexico border – which was frequently described as a zone of dan-
ger, darkness and violence, with illegal migration that was referred to
as a ‘crisis that will not go away’ – never mentioned women. The asso-
ciation between security and illegality did not increase continuously
over time. Rather it slackened during economic upturns.
The difference between action and effect has been observed in the
historical overview above. It has to do with creating an impression of
being in control rather than actually exercising control. Political and
public discourse tends to revolve around the number of illegals in a
country (Van der Leun 2003). The inability to assess the numbers of il-
legals creates the feeling that the government is not in control
(Geddens 2005; De Haas 2007). Often, the actions undertaken by
authorities are not the most effective in terms of reducing the numbers
of illegal migrants. Governments today spend a lot of money in an at-
tempt to stop illegal migrants from entering their country. Efforts by
the British government, for instance, to stop migrants entering the UK
via the Eurotunnel are extremely costly. In reality, most illegal migrants
enter in legal ways – as tourists or exchange students, for instance –
and overstay their visas. Britain is not the only country where most ille-
gal migrants enter the country legally. In Japan many illegal migrants
originally entered the country legally as unpaid trainees in large firms
or students at Japanese language schools (Spencer 1992).
In our historical overview we showed that a gap develops between
the desire to control and the ability to do so. When and where this gap
forms depends on the power of states and thus on the process of state
formation. Delegating control to private institutions can fill the gap. In
recent decades in Malaysia, private ‘volunteer vigilantes’ have played a
prominent role in exercising control (Hedman 2008; Garce´s-Mascare-
n˜as’ chapter in this volume). They round up illegal migrants, often in-
cluding refugees who have been recognised by the UNHCR. Since
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2005 the vigilantes have had the right to bear firearms and use them.
They can stop suspects, and search them and demand documents, and
they do not need a warrant to arrest or enter premises. They track
down illegal immigrants and seek them out in places where they con-
verge over weekends, such as shopping malls.
A similar development occurred in South Africa (Landau & Monson
2008). In recent decades the South African government has allowed
for the emergence of a semi-parallel authority system responsible for
monitoring illegal migrants. The system did not emerge in a total ab-
sence of state control. It is to some extent used – but not controlled –
by the state.
Australia has developed a different method of outsourcing control in
recent decades (Hyndman & Mountz 2008). The so-called Pacific Solu-
tion means that Australia refuses migrants arriving by boat to land on
its shores. The detention and processing of unwanted migrants is sub-
contracted out to small, poor islands north of Australia (Manus, Papua
New Guinea, Nauru, Christmas Island and the Cocos Islands). The
Australian government pays millions of AUS dollars to these islands
for the processing and detention of illegal migrants.
Whether governments profit from reducing illegality depends on
how they gain from illegal migration both economically and politically
(as was also true in the past). For migrants it is sometimes more ad-
vantageous to remain illegal. In Greece, for instance, migrants find
work more easily if they are illegal than after legalisation (Lazaridis &
Poyago-Theotoky 1999). Especially for certain types of employment,
such as seasonal work in agriculture and tourism, employers are un-
willing to pay the relatively high costs that come with legal employ-
ment. For this reason, migrants in Greece who had already been lega-
lised but still had to confirm their status by showing they had worked
legally for a certain length of time, lapsed back into illegality (Glytsos
2005). Furthermore, people do not migrate illegally only when legal
channels are unavailable. In Asia, legal migration is complex and costly
and illegal migration is cheaper and faster (Skeldon 2000).
The chapters in this volume show that there is no clear distinction
between legality and illegality, neither in Western societies nor in non-
Western societies, and neither in the period before the Second World
War nor in the period after the war. The various chapters show that as
far as migration is concerned, there is no such thing as a legal-illegal
dichotomy. Furthermore, in the literature a certain linearity is as-
sumed: illegal becomes legal or vice versa. However, in reality people
move repeatedly in and out of illegality, as Moors and De Regt’s chap-
ter shows. This is supported by other research. For instance, asylum
seekers on their way to Europe who received asylum, and thus a legal
status, in Ukraine migrated onwards to Western Europe, and as such
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became illegal once again (Uehling 2004). In the same vein, legalised
immigrants in Italy have been found to keep working in jobs illegally
or sometimes even to revert to an illegal status again some time after
an amnesty (Ruspini 2000; Reyneri 2001).
Moors and De Regt’s chapter also shows that legal organisations fol-
low illegal practices, and what is legal in one country is illegal in an-
other. Labour contracts signed in one country are invalid in another
country, making migration to that country illegal. Similarly, Van
Liempt shows in her chapter how legality and illegality can intertwine;
people enter countries with the required papers after having provided
false information in order to get those papers. Women lie about their
income in order to meet visa income requirements, or they lie about
their marital status and about having children for the same reason.
Ahmad points out that there is relatively little independent migration
of women from or within Pakistan, even without it being explicitly for-
bidden. Women’s mobility (leaving the house for school, work or to at-
tend rituals) has become highly restricted in Pakistani society. At the
same time, increasing numbers of middle and lower middle-class men
from the rural Punjab set off for Europe, in spite of the extensive laws
in place to prohibit it. This underlines the importance of cultural and
social norms above purely ‘legal’ or bureaucratic forms of control.
From the neo-classical perspective, the cost-benefit analysis of illegal
migration is believed to work out differently for men and women be-
cause high-risk illegal migration is expensive. The assumption is that
families and networks are more likely to invest in the migration of
men rather than in the migration of women, because the migration of
men is believed to be more profitable for families left behind. Ahmad’s
chapter shows that the decision to migrate illegally is not necessarily a
product of collectively made, rational, economic calculations. In some
cases it is an individual decision made outside of and against the wishes
of the household. Fostered within communities of often youthful men,
it is borne out of a lust for adventure, which is associated with locally
entrenched masculine ideals.
As has been pointed out above, research and debate on the illegal
migration of women are dominated by a victimhood approach. Migrant
women and their spokespersons tap into this discourse. However, mi-
grant women are often much less victims than they are made out to
be. Moors and De Regt show in their chapter how women use the vic-
timhood discourse to avoid accusations of selfishness. It seems that for
women, economic migration (legal or illegal) can only be legitimised
by extreme hardship.
The effects of migration on those who stay behind differ according
to the specific context. Earlier research has shown that the migration
of men offers advantages to the women who stay behind, since they
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profit from an increased income and gain independence in the absence
of their husbands (Brettell 1986; Reeder 2003). However, Ahmad
points out that the consequences of the emigration of men for the wo-
men who stay behind are ambiguous at best. It seems not uncommon
for women to experience greater seclusion and confinement to their
homes once their households are lifted out of poverty by remittances.
Some migrant men use their resources to impose stricter purdah and
to increase their own social position within the communities, in which
confining women to the home confers honour and prestige to the
household.
In her chapter on foreign workers in Malaysia, Garce´s-Mascaren˜as
shows that illegality is not always a disadvantage. Domestic workers, as
‘non-workers’, are not included in the Employment Act. This is also
true for domestic workers in many other countries (Schrover et al.
2007). Since they are regarded as ‘family members’, domestic workers
are the only foreign workers in Malaysia who are not obliged to leave
the country after five or seven years. They can reside in Malaysia al-
most interminably as perpetual temporary migrants, while men can-
not. Illegal migrants to Malaysia also do not have to pay recruitment
fees, exit costs, annual levies and insurance and do not have medical
check-up expenses. They have more freedom than legal migrants to
change jobs and to negotiate wages and labour conditions. Similarly,
Moors and De Regt describe how domestic workers in the Middle East
who work illegally – without a sponsor and thus without a permit to
stay – are better off than those whose residence is legal. They are less
dependent on their employers, earn higher incomes and have more
freedom. In the case presented by Moors and De Regt, legal migrants
do not have more rights than illegal ones. The same is true for the
many women from Latin America who work as domestic servants in
Israel. It is almost impossible to migrate legally to Israel as a non-
Jewish labour migrant. The rights of those who do are so severely re-
stricted that it is more advantages to migrate illegally, despite the draw-
backs (Raijman, Schammah-Gesser & Kamp 2003). Because illegality
offers certain advantages, some migrants may prefer to become or stay
illegal. The ‘cost’ of illegality is influenced by the chances migrants run
of being discovered, arrested and deported (Todaro & Maruszko 1987).
We have shown that the chances of being found out as well as deport-
ability are different for men and women.
1.5 Conclusion
Going back to the questions first posed in this book, we can conclude
that illegality is constructed differently for men and women across both
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time and space. The historical overview clarifies two issues. Firstly,
even if the term ‘illegal’ is a modern one, and if national laws on entry,
exit and residence are recent, restrictions on mobility are not. Secondly,
legality and illegality have less to do with borders and states than with
work, potential poverty and potential public disorder. We can see a re-
markable continuity regarding these two points. Over time and space,
migrants in general have been perceived as poor. The likelihood that
they will become a public charge (and for women this is clearly linked
to morality) has always been an important argument in the call for re-
striction and control.
The studies in this book show the importance of the contexts within
which the forms of illegality are produced, both for men and women.
The historical and global perspectives demonstrate that the distinction
between legal and illegal is not always clear, and it is only relevant
when and where migrants who stay or enter legally have more rights
than those who do so illegally. In many Western countries, there is a
huge difference between legal and illegal migration, whereas in other
parts of the world this is not always the case.
The ways that migrants and states respond to illegality depend on
how the costs and benefits of both legality and illegality are perceived.
In analysing these, a distinction must be made between the effects on
migrants, on the sending societies and on the receiving societies. Send-
ing and receiving societies will have different interests in the construc-
tion of illegality, and these interests work out differently for men and
for women.
For migrants, it is not only relevant to look at how the rights of ille-
gal migrants compare with those of legal migrants, but also at how the
rights of men and women in the sending society compare with the
rights of illegal migrants in the receiving society. If there are substan-
tial differences between the rights of illegal and legal migrants in the
receiving society, migrants will gain from legalisation programmes or
from migrating legally. If men and women have few rights in their
sending society, their illegal position in the receiving country can be an
improvement, or at least can be perceived as such, despite the disad-
vantages associated with an illegal status. Women who have very few
rights in their sending societies, with no access to formal labour parti-
cipation and a strong restriction of movement, have little to lose from
becoming illegal through migration. Their illegal position in the receiv-
ing societies may have its disadvantages, but their position is not worse
or may even be better than that in their sending society. The ‘costs’ of
illegal migration are not the same for men and women. Men engage
more in high-risk, expensive migrations, but the profits from these en-
deavours are likewise assessed to be high. Women engage in low-risk
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migrations that are less costly, while their low visibility and smaller
chance of deportation reduce these costs even further.
As we have explained, illegality is not always a disadvantage. It de-
pends on the opportunities men and women have in the sending and
receiving societies, and the difference that legal or illegal migration is
going to make in this respect. The advantages or disadvantages that
migrant women and men encounter have to be contrasted with their
position prior to migration. This differs according to gender, but it also
depends on the country the migrants come from and on the period
during which the migratory process took place.
Sending states do profit from the remittances sent by legal and ille-
gal migrants. This means that they have little or no incentive to control
emigration, even when it is illegal. Still, a difference in the amount of
remittances sent by men and women can lead to different approaches
in their attempt to control illegal migration. Sending states can also be
held responsible by NGOs and other institutions for the risks, actual
and perceived, that illegal migrants run. These risks are seen as being
different for men and women. The idea that migrant women run a
high risk of ending up as prostitutes has led to the restriction of their
movement. Nevertheless, these bans have not stopped, nor have they
reduced the migration of women. What they have accomplished is to
drive women into illegal forms of travel.
The responses to illegal migration in receiving states are influenced
firstly by the nature of the poor relief or welfare system. Receiving
states with elaborate poor relief or welfare systems will put more em-
phasis on the control of migration. As we have shown above, states as-
sess the likelihood of men becoming a public charge differently than
that of women. Secondly, a highly regulated labour market will lead to
a higher degree of migration control. If migrant women are more
likely than men to be found in the informal sectors of the economy,
there will be less pressure on the receiving states (by unions, for in-
stance) to control their migration. Thirdly, receiving countries (and em-
ployers, more precisely) do profit from the labour of illegal migrants,
who are cheaper, more flexible and more docile than legal workers. In
labour markets that are highly segregated according to gender, this will
affect men and women differently. Fourthly, if migrants are perceived
as a threat to public order, this will lead to strong migration control. In
the past, both migrant men and women have been perceived as social
threats, but the nature of this threat is regarded very differently. In the
case of women, we see an emphasis on the protection of the receiving
society against vice. This is not so for men. Fifthly, we have shown
above that the state’s response to illegal migration is strongly influ-
enced by the chances that migrants have to migrate legally and to ac-
quire legal residence. As we have shown, the possibilities to acquire le-
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gal residence via asylum, work, legalisation programmes, marriage,
childbirth and witness protection provisions for those who report on
their traffickers are not the same for migrant men and women.
Overall, it can be said that the chances, opportunities and advantages
of legal and illegal migration are different for men and women, who
make their choices accordingly. The construction of what is legal and
illegal also differs according to gender, as do the responses of sending
and receiving states towards illegal migration. The illegal migration of
men is associated with fears of losing control over the labour market.
That of women is strongly associated with questions of morality. Both
associations can lead to restrictions on exit, entry and residence. The
threats linked to the illegal migration of women have frequently been
used to legitimise these restrictions and to make them appear humani-
tarian.
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2 Tracing back ‘illegal aliens’
in the Netherlands, 1850-1940
Corrie van Eijl
Regulation of migration is not a recent phenomenon in the Nether-
lands. The conditions for the entry and deportation of aliens were laid
down in the first Dutch Aliens Act of 1849. Although illegality is
strongly related to this kind of lawmaking, with its mechanism of in-
clusion and exclusion, the Aliens Act did not result in a clear distinc-
tion between legal and illegal immigration. Many aliens were ‘un-
wanted’ and they were deported, but it took almost a century before the
term ‘illegal’ entered the policy documents and public debates on mi-
gration. The main aim of this chapter is to trace and explain this pro-
cess of ‘illegalisation’.
Migrant illegality has been a topic in migration studies for some
time, first in the US but recently also in Europe. Thanks to this re-
search, we are better informed about illegal migration, although most
studies concentrate on immigration policy in the last decades and pay
very little attention to historical developments (De Genova 2002).
The term ‘illegal migrants’ has been criticised in migration studies
and has been replaced by other terms when it became more and more
politically charged (Koser 2005; see also the introduction to this vo-
lume). Despite the objections of many researchers – and immigrants –
the term ‘illegal’ will be used in this chapter. Apart from problems with
alternative terms, it is appropriate to use the term ‘illegal’ here since
our aim is to trace the history of the concept ‘illegal alien’. Further-
more, as Mae Ngai does in her work on the history of illegal immigra-
tion in America, I use the term ‘alien’ to indicate someone who is not a
citizen (Ngai 2004).
Aliens have been deported from the Netherlands for a long time.
These migrants were referred to as unwanted or undesirable. It was
only after a certain point in time that specific groups of aliens were
considered ‘illegal’. This change of terms is important since it is indica-
tive of changes in the relations between aliens and the state. Migrant il-
legality is not a fixed category, but it is the result of changes in legal
regulations and is connected to processes of differentiation and exclu-
sion. The construction of migrant illegality is related to increasing state
intervention, lawmaking and border control. It is also related to in-
creasing inequality between citizens and non-citizens and more strict
immigration regulations protecting access to residence and citizenship.
Immigration laws, which formulate restrictions on the entry and stay
of aliens in the country, define what is legal and consequently generate
an area of illegal practices. Recent studies indicate that these processes
of categorisation and ‘illegalisation’ were not the same for men and wo-
men. Citizenship is a gendered concept. In many countries and for a
long period of time women have been at best provisional citizens who
lost rights when they married and were deprived of their nationality
when they married a foreigner. Regulations on the entry and residence
of immigrants sometimes distinguished between men and women as
well. Even when migration regulations and laws on citizenship seem to
be gender-neutral, they have often been applied differently to men and
women (Bredbenner 1998; De Hart 2003; Van Eijl 2005; Moloney
2006). In tracing the history of the concept of migrant illegality, in
which citizenship and immigration regulations are important aspects,
a gender perspective is essential.
Initially, immigration laws such as the Dutch Aliens Act of 1849
were short and uncomplicated, and did not differentiate between aliens
in a detailed way. When these laws evolved into increasingly more com-
plicated pieces of legislation, differentiation increased and various cate-
gories of aliens were constructed, such as refugees, labour migrants
and immigrants who entered the country for family reunification.
When tracing the history of immigration policy and exclusion in the
United States, Ngai (2004) has demonstrated how the construction of
migrant illegality in the US was firmly based on racial difference. The
ban on the immigration of Chinese labourers imposed in 1882 and the
special programmes for Mexican migrants generated large-scale illegal
migration from both these countries. In the US, Chinese and especially
Mexican immigrants became the embodiments of the ‘illegal alien’.
In other countries immigration laws also differentiated between var-
ious categories of aliens, which resulted in specific forms of exclusion
and the ‘illegalisation’ of more and more aliens. In the German empire,
for instance, specific rules were laid down for Polish migrants in the
decades before the First World War in order to to prevent the ‘Polonisa-
tion’ of the eastern part of Prussia (Bade 1984). Poles were only al-
lowed to work in the agricultural sector in the eastern part of Germany,
and a rotation system forced them to leave the country each year for se-
ven weeks. Although they were not labelled as ‘illegal’, the anti-Polish
measures reduced the Poles to second-class immigrants.
In a recent study on immigration control Rosenberg (2006) tells
how the Paris police took over the immigration service in the 1920s
and how they made distinctions between people according to citizen-
ship and national origin. By means of intensive police surveillance
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such as door-to-door checks, periodic raids and the creation of millions
of files with detailed information on the whereabouts of the foreign
born, the police controlled immigrants’ lives and most of all the lives
of colonial subjects. Rosenberg’s work shows the importantance of
gaining insight into the categorisation and exclusion of immigrants via
both policymaking and the implementation of these rules.
Migrant illegality is closely related to ‘deportability’, as De Genova
(2002) has argued. Many ‘illegal’ migrants may never be deported, but
the threat of deportation determines their status. This does not neces-
sarily mean that the deportation of aliens was always a matter of illeg-
ality. No single state was keen on aliens who were likely to become a
public charge (see also Moloney 2006), and in many countries they
were either not admitted or were deported as soon as they began beg-
ging or became penniless. States were responsible for their own sub-
jects and were expected to take them back when other countries turned
them away. Such forced removals were also possible within states. In
nineteenth-century England, the Poor Law enabled the authorities to
send poor people back to the town responsible for their maintenance.
This was also done with Irish migrants, although they were British
subjects. Between 1824 and 1831 more than 50,000 poor Irishmen
were sent back to Ireland (Feldman 2003: 51). Nevertheless, these de-
portations or forced removals of migrants were not a matter of illegal-
ity. It is not useful to stretch the concept of ‘illegal alien’ to such an ex-
tent that all poor and deported aliens are included. It must be noted
that they were not deported because they lacked the necessary permis-
sion to enter or stay in the country, but rather because they could not
support themselves. The migrants concerned were not entitled to relief
in the town or state where they lived, and a job or another source of in-
come would have prevented their deportation.
The distinctive characteristic of ‘illegality’ is that the status of aliens
is defined by laws that lay down the rules for entry and stay. Aliens
who lack a legal status due to the way they entered or are staying in
the country depend on the authorities to change their status. Many re-
cent ‘illegal’ migrants do actually succeed in supporting themselves,
which often enables them to stay in the country for a considerable
time. Nevertheless, their illegal position and the threat of detection and
deportation make them vulnerable (Van der Leun 2003). The power of
the state to define the legal status of aliens in the country is the deci-
sive factor in the construction of ‘illegal aliens’. The construction of im-
migrant illegality is a long-term process that is generated by immigra-
tion regulations. These regulations are of course influenced by various
factors such as political and economic developments, public debates on
immigration and border control. It is precisely this process of deliber-
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ate intervention, differentiation and exclusion that is interesting when
trying to understand illegality (see also De Genova 2002).
Although deportations are not in itself indicative of illegality, the his-
tory of deportation policy and the implementation of these rules can re-
veal when and how inequality between citizens and aliens, and be-
tween various categories of aliens, emerged or increased, and how
these processes of exclusion took shape.
In this chapter I look at the construction of immigrant illegality in
the Netherlands in the period between the introduction of the first
Alien Law (1849) and the outbreak of the Second World War. To trace
this history of debates, lawmaking and implementation, I have looked
closely at legal regulations, the archives of the Department of Justice,
parliamentary proceedings, police records and publications. The main
purpose is not to determine whether or not illegal aliens were present
in the Netherlands before 1940, but to trace the construction of illegal-
ity in legal regulations and in its implementation.
Many studies on migrant illegality distinguish between illegal entry,
stay and work (see for example Du¨vell 2006). Aliens who enter the
country legally can become ‘illegal residents’ by overstaying their visa,
for instance, or working without the necessary permits, thus becoming
illegal labourers. Sometimes other domains are taken into account as
well, such as the use of social security or housing facilities by immi-
grants without a residence permit. When tracing the history of illegal-
ity in the Netherlands I will concentrate on entry and stay. Unlike na-
tionals, aliens can be confronted with the charge of illegal entry and
stay, and it is their illegal stay that makes them ‘deportable’. Illegal
work by immigrants was not a major issue in the Netherlands between
1850 and 1940, but there were some special regulations for immigrant
workers that will be discussed below. Other activities that are against
the law, such as engaging in illegal trade or making use of illegal hous-
ing, are activities in which citizens are more frequently involved than
aliens. For this reason they are left out of the analysis.
The chapter starts with an overview of immigration regulations be-
tween 1850 and 1940. When and how did illegality appear in the aliens
legislation and when did illegal immigration enter the migration de-
bate? To what extent was the construction of illegality in the Nether-
lands gendered? Did borders create different barriers for male and fe-
male immigrants? In the next section I will trace the processes of dif-
ferentiation and categorisation of aliens in the implementation of these
rules and have a closer look at deportation practices since 1850. Jewish
refugees are the subject of the last part of the chapter. When they en-
tered the country in the 1930s, strict regulations were issued to prevent
their arrival and the terms ‘illegal refugees’ and ‘illegal entry’ entered
the political debate.
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2.1 Entry regulations in the Netherlands
Regulations restricting the entry or stay of aliens have long been in ef-
fect in the Netherlands. Initially these were local regulations – until
the Aliens Act was passed in 1849, laying down the conditions for the
entry and deportation of aliens on the national level. This might sug-
gest that the concept of ‘illegal immigration’ dates back to this period,
but in reality the situation was more complex, as we shall see.
The main purpose of the Dutch 1849 Aliens Act was to prevent the
entrance and stay of poor aliens who were liable to become a public
charge (Van Eijl 2005). According to this act, all aliens with means of
subsistence and a valid passport (at that time: a passport with a visa)
had the right to enter the country. They received a permit to stay in the
Netherlands, which was valid for three months and could be extended
repeatedly. During the period of validity of this residence permit they
could not be expelled from the country, even if they lost their means of
subsistence. Those who did not meet the requirements for a residence
permit could enter the country as well. However, without this permit
the police could easily deport them if it was found that they could not
support themselves or if they posed a risk to public order.
Aliens without a residence permit were not officially admitted, but
that did not mean that they were illegal. It was not illegal to enter the
country without identity cards or money, nor was it illegal to return
after deportation. Almost anybody could cross the Dutch border with-
out any difficulty. In fact throughout the nineteenth century the border
control was too primitive to stop even the most undesirable aliens,
such as gypsies. Once inside the country, aliens did not have to ask for
a permit to stay in the Netherlands. In 1849 the Minister of Justice or-
dered the local authorities to register all aliens staying in their commu-
nity, but aliens themselves were not obliged to report to the police.
Although there was no reference to ‘illegal’ immigration, the Aliens
Act did distinguish between aliens who were admitted and those who
were not. A strict enforcement of the law could have resulted in a more
rigid distinction between these two groups, and as a result the second
group could have been labelled ‘illegal aliens’. In practice the opposite
happened. The enforcement of the Aliens Act eased up soon after it
was issued due to vague statements and an arbitrary administration. At
the same the time as the bill was passed, the Minister of Justice issued
his first instructions on the administration of the Aliens Act. He urged
caution and stressed that the act was not meant to restrict the entry of
‘hard-working men’ (no mention was made of hard-working women).
Hard-working men should be allowed to enter the country to look for
employment. However, the police should not give residence permits to
migrants without steady jobs and income. The Minister feared that the
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foreign poor would receive residence permits and that it would not be
possible to deport them if they were found to be penniless or begging.
Since at least seven similar orders were issued in the months after
the introduction of the law and still more in the next two years, the en-
forcement of the Aliens Act slackened. The issue of residence permits
gradually disappeared, although practices were not the same through-
out the country. In The Hague and Rotterdam the police issued only a
few hundred permits each year and stopped doing so altogether in the
1870s, while Amsterdam issued many more residence permits (900-
1500 yearly) and continued this practice until the beginning of the
twentieth century (Po¨ckling & Schrover 2002; Van Eijl 2005). Never-
theless, the number of permits gradually decreased in Amsterdam as
well and more and more foreign residents did not have official resi-
dence permits. The disappearance of the permits blurred the distinc-
tion between those who were officially admitted and those who had no
such legal approval. Consequently, the 1849 Aliens Act lost most of its
effectiveness in practice, but it was not officially abolished.
After the First World War new regulations were issued. The large
numbers of foreign soldiers and refugees in the country, and fear of
the arrival of communist agitators, caused the government to tighten
the control of aliens. All foreigners were obliged to report to the local
police within 24 hours of their arrival, and all foreign residents in each
municipality were registered. After a few years – when peace had re-
turned – these regulations were repealed, and starting in 1922 aliens
were no longer required to report to the police or to be registered. Yet,
especially in larger cities, the local police often continued this practice
of alien registration (Lucassen & Vermeulen 1999).
Despite these new regulations and practices, the 1849 Aliens Act
was still valid and remained in force until 1967 when a new Aliens Act
replaced it. This meant that the entry and exit (deportation) of aliens
continued to be regulated according to the 1849 act, which did very lit-
tle to limit the freedom of movement of foreign residents and gave lit-
tle indication of further categorisation and ‘illegalisation’. However, not
everyone was treated in accordance with that law and for some groups
special rules were laid down. The research by Lucassen (1990) on
Dutch policy with respect to gypsies makes this clear. Although gypsies
were only a small minority of all the foreigners entering the country,
the Minister of Justice frequently issued secret instructions on how to
deal with these bear tamers, coppersmiths and other ‘gypsies’. From
the end of the 1880s onwards, mayors of towns and chiefs of police re-
ceived orders not to grant permits to gypsies who wanted to put on a
show or to set up camp. If they were found at the border they were fre-
quently sent back (mostly to Belgium), even if they proved to have
means of subsistence. Gypsies were considered to be unwanted aliens:
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their itinerant way of life aroused suspicion and they were associated
with petty theft, fraud and begging (especially by women and children).
The special orders concerning gypsies were also the result of the regu-
lations being passed in neighbouring countries where these itinerant
groups were increasingly excluded.
Other migrants who received special treatment were Chinese immi-
grants. They were mainly sailors and ex-sailors who lived in concen-
trated areas in the port cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Their
numbers increased in the 1920s because there was little employment
in the shipping trade and few succeeded in signing on as a sailor. Since
this group often gambled or violated the opium law, but also out of the
Dutch’s own ignorance of Chinese language and culture, the police
watched them more closely than other immigrants and kept a separate
‘Chinese registration’. They could not be deported, however, because
deportation would involve considerable costs and long negotiations
with China.
Although they were considered unwanted, gypsies and Chinese im-
migrants were not characterised as illegal in the Netherlands. Apart
from the deportation of some 225 Chinese immigrants in 1922 after
disturbances in Amsterdam, they were mostly left in peace (Van Eijl
2005). The measures taken with regard to gypsies were often tempor-
ary and were frequently ignored by local authorities, but gypsies were
increasingly categorised as a specific group and treated accordingly.
The most far-reaching policy, however, was not aimed at gypsies or
Chinese immigrants but was formulated upon the arrival of Jewish re-
fugees, and in 1938 we come across references to ‘illegal entry’. How-
ever, a closer look at the sizable group of aliens who were deported
after 1850 shows that the processes of differentiation and categorisation
of aliens had started much earlier.
2.2 Not illegal but unwanted: Deportations after 1850
Traces of ‘illegalisation’ are not only to be found at the level of legisla-
tion, but also at the level of implementation of the regulations. There
have always been aliens in the country whose stay was not or no longer
desirable. One might even argue that all the people who were deported
from the Netherlands were more or less illegal aliens, since they did
not meet the requirements laid down in the law. Yet the term ‘illegal’
was never used to describe them or their position and, although they
were finally expelled from the country, neither their entry nor their stay
was seen as illegal. It is worthwhile to take a closer look at the deporta-
tion practices: who was liable to deportation by the police?
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The 1849 act was mainly aimed at reducing the number of alien poor,
and it therefore enabled an easy and rapid deportation of all those who
were not able to earn their living. This would not only reduce begging
and vagrancy, but would also lessen the demand on the government’s
poor relief coffers. It is hardly surprising that the overwhelming major-
ity of the aliens were expelled because they lacked means of subsis-
tence.
In order to find out who was deported I made use of the Algemeen
Politieblad, the official weekly journal of the police, which first ap-
peared in 1852. The journal provides a description of all deported aliens
and includes name, age, occupation, place of birth and residence and –
at least in the first decades – reason for expulsion. Most of these de-
scriptions of deportations refer to one person, but an entry could also
refer to a couple, a family or sometimes a whole group. In 1910, for in-
stance, nine entries on the deportation of several gypsy families com-
prised 44 persons: nine couples, two sisters, one adult son and 23 chil-
dren aged between one and seventeen years. These multiple registra-
tion under one heading indicate that the number of expelled aliens
was higher than the number of entries in the journal. Furthermore,
comparison with other sources shows that not every deportation was
reported in the journal.1
According to the Algemeen Politieblad, an average of 2,500 people
were deported yearly between 1852 and 1940. For further analysis of
the deportation practice, a sample was drawn for the years 1870, 1900
and 1930. Since many more men than women were deported, the sam-
ple included all deported women and 10 per cent of all deported men
registered in the Algemeen Politieblad (Van Eijl 2005). This sample
forms the basis of the following analysis.
The numbers of deportations fluctuated between 1,000 and 3,500
yearly, with an exceptional peak of 5,500 in 1930. Almost all of these
aliens were deported because they had no means of subsistence; some
were found wandering and begging. The majority came from a neigh-
bouring state, which reflects the overall pattern of migration to the
Netherlands. In 1870, 1900 and 1930 Germany and Belgium were the
countries of origin of 60 to 83 per cent of the deported men and 73 to
88 per cent of the deported women.
From the Algemeen Politieblad it is clear that the Aliens Act, which
did not discriminate according to gender, was not applied equally to
men and women. Between 1850 and 1940, roughly 85 to 90 per cent
of all the deportees were men, mostly single. During most of this peri-
od only 10 per cent of all deportations involved women, a percentage
which rose to 20 or 25 per cent in the 1930s. This rise is probably the
result of the many German women who had come to the Netherlands
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to work as domestic servants, some of whom did not succeed in find-
ing a job during the economic depression in the 1930s.
These figures show that men ran a much higher risk of deportation
than women. However, to estimate the risks, these figures should be
related to the total numbers of men and women who passed the Dutch
border in these years, and these are not available. The only thing we do
know is the sex ratio among the aliens in the ten-year censuses. Ac-
cording to the censuses, the number of foreign men was initially some-
what higher than the number of foreign women in the Netherlands,
but after 1900 their numbers did not differ much, while in the 1930s
the number of foreign women was much higher. The problem is that
the census only registers resident foreigners, not those who travel
around and leave after a short period of time. This latter group possibly
included more men than women. Still, it’s unlikely that the sex ratio of
the deportees corresponds to that of all men and women entering the
country. It seems safe to conclude that alien men did indeed run a
much higher risk of deportation than alien women.
This high proportion of male deportees is probably characteristic of
other aliens policies besides that of the Netherlands, but there are few
studies from those contexts to provide us with comparable details. Re-
inecke surprisingly mentions the same ratio (10 per cent female depor-
tees) for the German Reich between 1890 and 1914 (see Reinecke’s
chapter in this volume). However, this figure only refers to those who
were forced to leave the country as a consequence of their being con-
victed by court order (with some 500 records yearly). In this case a
much higher proportion of men is to be expected since in general men
were brought before court much more often than women. It is unclear
whether the ratio was the same amongst the much larger group of peo-
ple who were deported by the police, not because they violated the law
but because they lacked means of subsistence.
It is difficult to account for the high percentage of male deportees in
the Netherlands. Probably the opportunities for employment were bet-
ter for women, who could rather easily find jobs in domestic service
and the catering industry. Perhaps women were also more certain of
their employment before they migrated. Another possibility is that wo-
men tended to return of their own volition if they were without em-
ployment or money, whereas men were more often expelled by the po-
lice. And of course the police may have concentrated their surveillance
on foreign men because they considered them to be more inclined to
theft and other criminal activities than women. It was probably a com-
bination of all these reasons that accounted for the high rate of male
deportees.
The number of women deported was smaller than the number of
men, and the grounds for expulsion were also different. The most
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striking example is the deportation of women because of their ‘moral
behaviour’, which means their deviant sexual behaviour. Foreign men
were judged and deported on moral grounds as well, but in these cases
it had to do with poverty, crime or illegal ways of making a living, such
as running a gambling joint. Men were never expelled because of their
sexual behaviour. The only case in which alien men were associated
with sexual morality had to do with a small number of Chinese men
who were suspected of selling condoms in the 1930s. They were moni-
tored by the police but not deported, since the costs of deportation to
China would have been too high (Mak 2000: 140-142).
The treatment of foreign prostitutes illustrates the gendered nature
of the aliens policy during the earlier period. The 1849 Aliens Act re-
quired that aliens be able to support themselves, but there was no re-
ference to moral or immoral ways of making a living. Prostitution was
not illegal and many foreign women worked as prostitutes in Dutch ci-
ties. The liberal attitude towards prostitution changed in the last part
of the nineteenth century, when brothels in several cities were closed.
From 1911 onwards, when the law on public morals came into force
and prostitution was forbidden, there were grounds to deport foreign
prostitutes. Nevertheless, many foreign prostitutes were deported be-
fore 1911, even if they earned more money than many other foreign
women (or men) did. Between 1890 and 1900 – in a period with a
great deal of debate on public morals – prostitution was the most com-
mon reason for the deportation of women. In 1895 half of the 257 de-
ported women were prostitutes or were suspected of being prostitutes
(Van Eijl 2005: 227).
The gendered nature of the deportation policy in the Netherlands
was not unparalleled. Moloney (2006) analysed the US deportation
policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and came
across similar cases. She shows that the ‘moral turpitude’ clause in US
immigration law was often inconsistently applied and intertwined with
ideas about women’s economic role. Although few women were actu-
ally deported on these grounds, Moloney concludes that efforts to ex-
clude or deport immigrants based on concerns over sexual morality
had more profound effects on women. In Germany, gendered deporta-
tion policy and practices existed as well. According to Reinecke (in this
volume), immigrant women were more likely to be deported because
of suspected indecent behaviour.
The surveillance and control of sexual behaviour by the aliens police
was not restricted to prostitutes. The police (and others) also interfered
in the moral behaviour of foreign women who earned their living in
other occupations, such as domestic service. In the interwar period,
German domestic servants formed one of the largest groups of mi-
grants in the Netherlands. There were considerable concerns about the
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‘moral’ (sexual) behaviour of these girls and young women, which was,
on the one hand, visible in regulations to keep them out of harm’s way,
most of all to protect them from ‘white slave traders’ and other hidden
dangers. On the other hand, their sexual behaviour was easily called
into question. It is not difficult to find references in the press and in
police reports to domestics, many of them German, who were accused
of having affairs with married men or living an indecent life (Henkes
1995: 122-124). This tendency to interfere with the private lives of
German domestics differed widely from town to town, and not all local
police officers were as harsh as the head of the aliens police in The
Hague was, for instance. Besides, as Lucassen (2002) rightly points
out, not many German domestic servants were actually deported be-
cause of indecent behaviour. Nevertheless, the effect of this monitoring
should not be underestimated. The aliens police kept records on do-
mestic servants and monitored their behaviour. Simply the knowledge
that a foreign domestic could be deported if she did not behave well
meant that she was vulnerable to gossip and threats by employers or
others to inform the police. Henkes (1995: 123), who interviewed
German domestics, found that many women experienced this risk of
deportation as a very real threat.
Opinions on the correct sexual behaviour of women influenced the
deportation policy in the Netherlands. In the nineteenth century many
prostitutes were deported on these grounds, and in the interwar period
domestics frequently felt threatened because of their ‘deportability’. Yet
even the foreign prostitutes who were deported because of their sexual
morality and illegal trade (after 1911) were not referred to as ‘illegal’
aliens. This term only entered the debates after the arrival of Jewish re-
fugees in the 1930s.
2.3 Jewish refugees: The first ‘illegal’ aliens
From 1933 onwards, and especially after 1938 when persecution in
Germany intensified, Jewish refugees fled the country, and 40,000
Jewish refugees crossed the German-Dutch border between 1933 and
1940. Most of them came from Germany; others were so-called ‘East
Jews’ who had migrated to Germany from Poland or Russia. As in
most other countries, such as Belgium and France, new rules were
drafted to prevent their entry. These rules only applied to ‘refugees’ or,
in other words, to ‘those who were forced to flee from their country by
local circumstances’.2 Since Jews were persecuted in Germany, all Jews
who entered the Netherlands were assumed to be refugees, whether or
not they wanted to be labelled as such. In May 1938 the government
decided that ‘refugees’ (by which they meant Jews) could no longer en-
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ter the country, even if they had passports, employment and money.
The fact that these new rules were not in accordance with the Aliens
Act was tacitly ignored. The German-Dutch immigration treaty of
1904, which stated that all German citizens who did not pose a risk to
public order and who could provide for themselves had to be admitted
to the Netherlands, was ignored as well. Remarkably, very little atten-
tion was paid to these violations of the law.
In May 1938, crossing the Dutch border became an illegal activity
for refugees. Initially policymakers did not focus on the distinction be-
tween legal and illegal immigrants, but on the distinction between
aliens (which referred to immigrant workers) and refugees. Aliens
were treated according to the Aliens Act and to the law regulating the
employment of foreigners. Refugees, on the other hand, were seen as a
specific group of aliens who were subject to special directives. Today re-
fugees also constitute a specific group. The Refugee Convention of
1951 gives them the right to apply for asylum, and they can enter the
country if the border is closed to immigrant workers. Jewish refugees,
however, were put into a category not with more rights – as is true of
refugees today – but with fewer rights and fewer chances than ‘regular’
(non-Jewish) aliens in the 1930s (Van Eijl 2005: 196-199).
After the Kristallnacht in November 1938 many Jewish refugees en-
tered the Netherlands despite restrictions and border controls. Docu-
ments in the archives of the Department of Justice reveal that at this
time, with a rising number of Jewish refugees, the term ‘illegal’ was
used by policymakers and police officers. Tenkink, a high civil servant
in the department, repeatedly wrote about ‘illegal refugees’ in his letter
of 14 December 1938 to the Minister of Justice, referring to the Jewish
refugees who had recently entered the country (Berghuis 1990: 44-46).
The next day the Minister ordered that ‘every refugee who has entered
the country illegally after 10 November shall be brought to a special
camp’. Those who could be associated with ‘illegal border-crossings’
after 17 December 1938 were liable to deportation to Germany.3
From that moment on, terms like ‘illegal refugees’ and ‘illegal entry’
were used frequently by ministers, civil servants, police officers, jour-
nalists and others, always with reference to Jewish refugees (Van Eijl
2005). This did not happen only in the Netherlands. The term ‘illegal’
was also being used in other countries at this time, probably as a result
of entry restrictions and international debates on the ‘Jewish refugee
crisis’ (Caron 1999; London 2000). However, most studies on Jewish
refugees do not explicitly refer to the use of these terms in debates and
letters. When the studies refer to ‘illegal refugees’, that may not be the
term used by contemporary policymakers; it may be the author who
uses this term to indicate a group that was referred to as ‘irregular’,
‘unwanted’ or ‘undesired’.4
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The severe entry restrictions and border controls ordered by the Minis-
ter of Justice in 1938 were of major importance in the process of differ-
entiation and the construction of Jewish refugees as a specific group of
aliens. Not only was their flight labelled an illegal activity, but Jewish
refugees in the country – whether ‘legally’ present or not – were also
seen as being prone to other illegal activities including illegal employ-
ment.
Although entry was restricted for both male and female refugees,
Jewish men and women were not treated equally. In general, policy-
makers and policemen showed more consideration for female refugees.
In his order to deport ‘illegal’ Jewish refugees, the Minister, for one,
was willing to make an exception if the deportation would be very
harsh and involved ‘single women and children’. Men who crossed the
border illegally were sent to one of the special camps for ‘illegal’ refu-
gees. Women and children who entered the country illegally were ac-
commodated in private houses outside these camps.5 In addition, the
official ban on employment for refugees was less strictly enforced for
women. Male Jewish refugees rarely succeeded in getting work per-
mits, while female refugees were sometimes allowed to work as domes-
tic servants because of the shortages in this profession. Small groups
of female refugees even received permits to enter the country to work
as domestics (Van Eijl 2005: 201).
In the Netherlands, Jewish refugees were the first group of aliens
who were referred to as ‘illegal’ in public discourse, government docu-
ments and ministerial orders. This was the result of specific regula-
tions that categorised Jewish refugees as unwanted aliens who had to
be refused at the border. All those who still managed to get through en-
tered ‘illegally’ and were threatened with deportation.
2.4 Conclusion
The 1849 Aliens Act could have been the starting point of the process
of ‘illegalisation’ in the Netherlands, but due to a lack of implementa-
tion the law did not result in a clear distinction between legal and ille-
gal aliens. Rather the opposite happened: entry regulations were hardly
ever applied and after some decades only a few aliens still received offi-
cial residence permits. Although certain categories of aliens were con-
sidered unwanted, there was no concept of ‘illegal’ immigration for a
long period after 1849.
Still, processes of exclusion were evident in the nineteenth century
aliens policy. Not all aliens were treated equally and their treatment
was not always in accordance with the Aliens Act. The special policy
on gypsies that went into effect at the end of the 1880s is an early ex-
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ample of differentiation and exclusion. However, at this stage the policy
was too fragmented, the implementation too defective and the group
too small to lead to ‘illegalisation’. This observation indicates that the
concept of migrant illegality did not simply arise as the result of stric-
ter immigration regulations, but that it also depended on the opportu-
nities and willingness to enforce these laws. The use of the term ‘ille-
gal’ in relation to immigration dates from the end of the 1930s. In
1938, the entry restrictions for Jewish refugees were so severe that in
effect they constituted a closing of the border. The refugees who ig-
nored the ban and entered the country had the dubious honour of
being the first ‘illegal aliens’ in the Netherlands.
Before the 1930s there was no concept of immigrant illegality. When
the term ‘illegal’ appeared towards the end of the 1930s it was re-
stricted to entry and stay. Illegal work by immigrants was not a major
issue in the Netherlands before 1945 (and even before the 1970s).
Apart from a very short period in the beginning of the 1920s and in
the years after 1934, when immigrant labour was bound by regulations,
aliens were free to work wherever they wanted. When migrants worked
without a permit at the end of the 1930s, it was not the alien worker
but the employer who broke the law. Working without a permit did not
make them ‘illegal aliens’, nor did it make them ‘deportable’.
The categorisation and exclusion of immigrants existed long before
the 1930s, mainly in the form of a deportation policy. Throughout the
period of 1849-1940, poverty was the main reason for deportation.
Alien men ran a much higher risk of being deported than alien wo-
men, either because they were more often without means of subsis-
tence or because the police targeted alien men more than women. Pol-
icymakers and the police had more compassion for women, something
that was also apparent in the policy regarding Jewish refugees. Another
important conclusion is that women were deported on different
grounds than men. Many foreign prostitutes and some foreign domes-
tic servants were expelled because they were suspected of indecent sex-
ual behaviour. There were no controls placed on the sexual behaviour
of foreign men, nor was this considered a reason to deport them.
This policy on control and deportation illustrates a connection be-
tween the sexual behaviour of women and legal stay. Few studies have
concentrated on illegal migration in the period between 1945 and the
end of the 1970s, and there is no indication of any further develop-
ment of a gendered concept of migrant illegality. Studies on migrant
women in recent decades often concentrate on trafficking and prostitu-
tion, which suggests that illegality is still (or once again) strongly re-
lated to female sexual behaviour (see also the introduction to this vo-
lume). More research is necessary to find out when and how this con-
nection between sexual behaviour and migrant illegality reappeared in
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the post-1945 period, both in migration policy and in public and scho-
larly debate.
Although differentiation and exclusion had been apparent in Dutch
aliens policy since the late nineteenth century, the terms ‘illegal entry’
and ‘illegal stay’ did not enter the debate until 1938. This change of
terms – from unwanted or undesirable to illegal – is not just a matter
of changing fashion, but signifies real changes, both in immigration
policy and in the conceptualisation of aliens. The use of the term ‘ille-
gal aliens’ indicates increasing differentiation between citizens and
aliens and between various groups of aliens. This discrimination is
based on an immigration policy that is highly exclusive: rigid legal reg-
ulations for entry and stay (at least for specific groups), a strict enforce-
ment of the laws and the threat of deportation for those who ignore
the rules. Several developments fostered this process of illegalisation.
Since the nineteenth century, state interference and state control had
increased considerably. It became even stronger after the First World
War. An important example is the interference with unemployment
benefits and the labour market. A process of centralisation and a rapid
growth of the bureaucratic system accompanied the process of state for-
mation. The administrative machinery and the growth of the local
aliens police enabled much more control of the entry and residence of
aliens.
But changes in the role of the state and in legal restrictions were not
the only decisive factors in the process of illegalisation. This example
of the Netherlands illustrates that ‘illegal’ aliens only appeared when
there was concern about too many foreigners entering the country and
when further immigration was considered undesirable. The economic
depression had resulted in high unemployment, which was still high
when the Jewish refugees started coming to the Netherlands, and there
was considerable pressure in the 1930s to restrict immigrant labour.
Although the ‘illegalisation’ of Jews was not the immediate result of
the economic depression and high unemployment, processes of cate-
gorisation and exclusion of immigrants intensified during these peri-
ods (cf. Rosenberg 2006). Another indication of this connection is the
process of illegalisation during the post-war period, which stagnated in
the first decades that were characterised by labour shortages while it ac-
celerated after the oil crisis and increasing unemployment in the
1970s.
Immigration regulations and control have always concentrated on
specific groups of aliens such as gypsies and Chinese immigrants. It is
hardly surprising that the concept of illegal immigration was not
shaped in relation to immigrant workers but in relation to Jewish refu-
gees. Unlike other groups who had migrated to the Netherlands, such
as the ‘other’, non-Jewish Germans and Belgians, the ethnicity and cul-
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ture of the Jewish refugees, and especially of the ‘East Jews’, were per-
ceived to be very different from that of the Dutch (Van Eijl 2005). In
this respect there is a similarity with the much smaller groups of gyp-
sies and Chinese immigrants, who were also portrayed as exotic people
with aberrant behaviour and odd habits. Although anti-Semitism cer-
tainly existed in the pre-war period in the Netherlands, the illegalisa-
tion of Jews was connected to a more general aversion to immigrants
with aberrant looks and aberrant behaviour. The threat these ethnic
groups represented to policymakers was not only based on their sup-
posed aberrant behaviour, but also, or mainly, on the fact that they
could not be deported. They were stateless or belonged to states that
would not take them back. The lack of bilateral treaties or diplomatic
relations (and large distances) hindered their deportation. Since the
aliens office and the aliens police would be stuck with them once they
were inside the country, these institutions were keen to prevent their
entry. Accordingly, it was not only ethnicity or anti-Semitism that con-
tributed to the construction of illegality of Jewish refugees, but also the
fact that they were not deportable.
The distinction between legal and illegal immigration that entered
the debates in the 1930s would not disappear thereafter, although dur-
ing some periods there was more discussion and more policy formu-
lated to fight illegality than in other periods. Since the economic de-
pression in the 1970s, and especially since the considerable increase in
the number of asylum seekers in the late 1980s, concern about the ille-
gal stay of refugees and migrant workers has increased. The process of
illegalisation during this period is usually related to the welfare states.
Exclusionary policies should prevent too many immigrants from mak-
ing use of welfare provisions that have been planned as a system of
mutual solidarity. Yet there is little research on the construction of il-
legality in the post-1945 period, and it is not clear if and how illegalisa-
tion is related to the development of the welfare state. Recent studies
on illegal immigration in the Netherlands that deal with this period
(Engbersen, Van der Leun, Staring & Kehla 1999; Staring 2001; Van
der Leun 2003) are mostly concerned with the dimensions of illegal
immigration, mechanisms of survival and incorporation of illegal im-
migrants, and pay less attention to the concept of illegality. The find-
ings in this chapter on the pre-war period indicate that the emergence
of illegality was connected to the development of the state, but also to
gender, ethnicity and deportability. Further research will be necessary
to see if these mechanisms still played a role in the construction of mi-
grant illegality in the post 1945 decades.
54 CORRIE VAN EIJL
Notes
1 Especially in the first half of the 1920s, many more Germans were deported than the
number recorded in the Algemeeen Politieblad suggests (see Van Eijl 2005: 230).
2 Letter from the Minister of Justice to the Council of Ministers, 17 March1938
(National Archives, 2.06.001, no. 5185).
3 Circular from the Minister of Justice, 15 December 1938 (Amsterdam Municipal
Archives, 5225, inv. no. 4312).
4 This also applies to Rosenberg’s study of Paris (2006). He frequently refers to ‘illegal
aliens’ or ‘illegal workers’ in Paris in the 1920s and 1930s, but it is not clear whether
those terms were used in contemporary sources. See also the papers from the confer-
ence ‘Refugees from Nazi-Germany’ in 2004 (Caestecker & Moore, in press) and the
discussion on H-net on the use of term ‘illegal immigration’ in historical debates,
papers and public discourse, started by Franck Du¨vell in March 2004 (http://h-net.
msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=lm&list=H-Migration).
5 Camp Westerbork, which was build in 1939, was meant to accommodate both legal
and illegal Jewish refugees (including single women and families), though the trans-
fer of refugees had hardly started when the war broke out.
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3 Policing foreign men and women: Gendered
patterns of expulsion and migration control
in Germany, 1880-1914
Christiane Reinecke
I have problems supporting my mother and my child – and I
have no relatives who can help me. Since I was born a Prussian
citizen, I beg you to issue a residence permit to my husband.1
Addressing her letter of 1882 to the Prussian Minister of the Interior,
the Russian citizen Marie Gad was petitioning for the readmission of
her husband to the country so he would be able to help her. The
Russian-Pole Israel Meyer Gad, to whom she was married, had been
forced to leave Germany after being expelled by local Prussian authori-
ties. His wife, originally a Prussian citizen, was now struggling to sup-
port her family and was afraid of being deported herself.
Whether they were immigrants or former German citizens, foreign
women living in late nineteenth-century Prussia found themselves in a
vulnerable position. Every non-German citizen could be expelled from
the German Reich. But according to their particular legal, economic
and social status, foreign women and men were treated differently at
German borders and on German territory. They were evicted for differ-
ent reasons and encountered different problems in their confrontation
with state regulations. Concentrating on the practice of expelling for-
eign citizens from Prussia and the German Reich, this chapter investi-
gates these differences and how they emerged in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.
States employed forms of immigration control in order to draw a line
between welcome and unwelcome foreigners (Lucassen & Lucassen
1997; Bo¨cker 1998; Brochmann & Hammar 1999; Fahrmeir, Faron &
Weil 2003; Oltmer 2003). Administrative measures like border controls,
work permits or expulsions helped to foster the distinction between ‘us’
(native citizens) and ‘them’ (foreign citizens). In response to diverse and
often conflicting economic, social or national interests, they also erected
hierarchies of exclusion that granted varying forms of access to different
migrant groups. As a result, late nineteenth-century immigration policy
was not only ethnically coded, but also classed and gender-specific. In
the following, practices of exclusion will be investigated with a particular
view to gender ethnicity and class. More specifically, the analysis focuses
on the question of how gendered conceptualisations of citizenship, na-
tionality and morality influenced the German politics of expulsion and
the way in which foreign men and women were policed.
In late nineteenth-century expulsion policy, the exclusionary logic of
migration controls and the legal framework of citizenship law were in-
tertwined. Only foreign citizens could be expelled and had to be ac-
cepted back by their official country of origin, whilst native citizens
could not be compelled to leave. Citizenship implied a protection
against deportation from a state’s territory (Fahrmeir 1997, 2000).
Therefore, the question of who belonged legally – the question of citi-
zenship – became crucial in the context of expulsions. In the German
Reich, women achieved citizenship either as children of their fathers
or through marriage (Gosewinkel 2001: 294-303). But how this princi-
ple of dependent citizenship actually affected both men and women liv-
ing in the Reich has barely been investigated. Even though scholars
have begun to analyse the gendered nature of citizenship in other
countries, most notably in the United States (Bredbenner 1998; De
Hart 2003; Gardner 2005), the situation in Germany has hardly been
touched. What has been researched, however, is how notions of nation-
alism and racism influenced the definition of citizenship in nine-
teenth- and twentieth-century Germany. In his influential study on citi-
zenship in Germany and France, Brubaker (1992) has argued that an
ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood, which derived from the
belated process of state-building in Germany, led to the imposition of
the jus sanguinis as the leading principle of German citizenship law. Ac-
cording to Brubaker’s teleological and at times overly contrastive narra-
tive, the French state-centred conception of nationhood resulted in a
broad definition of citizenship which permitted the automatic transfor-
mation of immigrants into citizens. Contrary to that, the German volk-
centred understanding of citizenry required a law that was expansive
toward ethno-cultural Germans and restrictive towards non-German
immigrants. This ignores the fact that citizenship law treated women
and men differently. And while Gosewinkel and others have shown
that the historical process was indeed more complex and less coherent
than suggested by Brubaker, they also merely allude to the gendered
nature of German citizenship law (Gosewinkel 2001: 294-303; Trevisiol
2005: 201-208). But as this chapter intends to show, German migra-
tion policy and citizenship law were hardly gender-neutral and should
be understood rather with a view to the divergent legal, social and eco-
nomic positions that foreign men and women occupied.
Nationalism was (and is) a gendered discourse. Women, whilst tradi-
tionally being excluded from political participation, often became impli-
cated in nationalism as ‘symbolic signifiers of national difference’
(McClintock 1995: 355). They assumed the roles of the biological repro-
ducers of a nation while also figuring as reproducers of the nation’s
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boundaries; consequently, they had to be controlled in their sexual and
marital behaviour (McClintock 1995: 355). Scholars like McClintock
(1995) and Stoler (1995) have shown that the regulation of sexual prac-
tices became a central instrument of power in the hands of a white
middle class striving to guard the boundaries between itself and the
‘degenerate classes’ both in the metropolis and in the colonies. Based
on these arguments, this chapter is concerned with the gendered
policing of the nation’s boundaries in citizenship law and migration
politics.
Deportations were commonly employed by the German authorities
in order to exclude unwelcome migrants. Moreover, the authorities
used forced removal in order to penalise any non-compliance (like
clandestine entry, unauthorised stay or illegal employment) with offi-
cial regulations concerning mobility. As a result, the analysis of the ac-
tual practice of expulsion allows us to gain insight into the ‘micro-me-
chanisms’ of inclusion and exclusion, which characterised German
policy at the time. To regularly expel those who were deemed to be
‘undesired’ was a central instrument employed by the Prussian state
and the German Reich in order to regulate migration. It was one of a
whole set of practices that had been established with the intention of
controlling the entry, movement and lives of non-Germans on German
territory. While deportations had originally been used to evict those
who did not have the right to settlement in a municipality, they were
now employed to exclude foreign citizens. However, the endeavours of
the state to control the movements of foreigners, far-reaching as they
were, did not go unchallenged by those subjected to them. Whilst
some – like Marie Gad – attempted to question the orders with the
help of letters and lawyers, others managed to remain clandestinely in
the country or came back secretly. Migrants were agents in their own
right who could challenge or circumvent exclusionary practices (Scior-
tino 2004). So in order to fully understand what impact the Prussian
and German policies of expulsion had, these strategies will have to be
taken into account.
In the federal German Reich, the various German La¨nder possessed
far-reaching powers regarding the admittance, naturalisation or expul-
sion of immigrants. Foreigners thus could be expelled from the Reich
or evicted from one of the German states. Depending on which
authority ordered the removal, the evictions had different implica-
tions. When investigating the politics of expulsion in late nineteenth-
century Germany, these differences between the state level and the
federal level should be taken into account. In the following, the inter-
actions between state authorities and expellees are thus analysed on
three levels: 1. on the level of the Reich that expelled destitute foreign-
ers and criminals; 2. on the level of Prussia that used deportations as
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a flexible instrument in order to regulate migration; 3. and finally
with a view to the actual contacts between state officials and expellees.
The first part deals with the practice of expelling and deporting for-
eign citizens from the German Reich. Analysing the reasons that
were officially given in order to justify expulsions reveals the predomi-
nant need to expel criminals, paupers and prostitutes. Furthermore, it
becomes clear that male and female migrants found themselves at the
mercy of the state for different reasons. Concentrating on Prussia’s of-
ficial policy in the 1880s and 1890s, the second part refers to the na-
tionalist underpinning of Prussian deportations and analyses the spe-
cific concern with mixed marriages in this context. While the anti-
Polish and anti-Semitic intentions driving Prussia’s expulsions con-
cerned men and women alike, the legal principle of dependent citi-
zenship affected them differently when it came to their removal from
the country. Using the petitions against expulsion orders as a source,
these differences and the meanings that were attached to them will
be analysed in the final part of this chapter.
3.1 Forcing out the undesired: Expelling migrant men and
women from the German Reich
In the German Reich, foreigners did not have any legal right of resi-
dence. While a German citizen was entitled to live in the Reich, for-
eigners were merely tolerated (Isay 1923: 115). Therefore they could be
compelled to leave at any time. An expelled person was forbidden to
stay in or move through the state’s territory (Von Conta 1904; Isay
1923: 199-247). Hence, expulsions implied a formal spatial ban, and
everybody who circumvented the order risked being interned or being
deported again. Like border controls or passport regimes, the forced re-
moval of foreigners underlined the territorial dimension of sovereign
power. By aspiring to know about, identify and remove foreign citizens,
modern states claimed to control the movement within their territories
(Torpey 2000). In this context, the practice of removing foreigners was
employed for a variety of exclusionary aims. In the Prussian and the
German migration regime, it was primarily concerned with ‘undesir-
able’ migrants who were excluded because of their ethnicity, their
socio-economic situation or their sexual morality.
In the federal German Reich, foreigners could be expelled either
from the Reich or from the separate German states (from Prussia, Ba-
varia, Saxony, etc.). In both cases, the measures extended as far as the
sovereign power of the expelling authorities went: foreigners expelled
from Prussia were requested to leave Prussian territory; they did not
necessarily leave the German Reich. In general, the expulsions from
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the Reich (Reichsverweisung) and from the various German La¨nder
(Landesverweisung) involved different processes. The Reichsverweisung
was based on criminal law and was laid down in a handful of para-
graphs in the Criminal Code.2 Apart from advancing the exclusion of
criminal foreigners, the measure focussed primarily on the removal
of the foreign destitute and other likely public charges. A foreign citi-
zen who was brought before a court and found guilty of a criminal
offence (like theft, begging or ‘vagabonding’) could thus be handed
over to state authorities, who in turn could rule on deporting the con-
vict – instead of, or in addition to, sending him to a prison, work-
house or reformatory. In contrast, an expulsion from a German state
like Prussia was an administrative measure that did not follow any
juridical decision and implied a less formal procedure. It served offi-
cials as a flexible instrument, which allowed them to deport any for-
eign migrant deemed undesirable. Presumably because it did not re-
quire any juridical decision and was more flexible, foreigners were ex-
pelled more often from the German states than from the Reich.
Whereas expulsions from the Reich were not very frequent, expul-
sions from Prussia were.
Before commenting on the Prussian policy, it seems worthwhile to
have a look at the Reichsverweisungen first. Whereas it is difficult to es-
tablish the number of expulsions from the various German states, the
details on deportations from the Reich were published regularly, in-
cluding the name, occupation and offence committed by the deportees.
According to these data, the overall number of foreigners expelled from
the Reich was not very high: 586 foreigners were expelled in 1890,
490 in 1900 and 514 in 1910.3 The number of entries, however, was
not equivalent to the number of people who had to leave the Reich. As
men were considered to be the head of household, occasionally just
their name was given, even though their whole family was forced to
leave. Reflecting the prevailing views about women’s dependency on
male wage earners, some men were reported to be expelled ‘with their
wife’ or ‘with their family’, while the names of their ‘dependents’ (wi-
ves and children) were not given. Hence, the overall number of female
deportees is difficult to establish. However, according to the names and
orders, which were published, it was men who were expelled in the ma-
jority of cases.
This does not reflect the demographic structure of the migrant popu-
lation in the German Reich, as a high percentage of the migrant work-
ers, especially in Prussian agriculture, were women. In 1907, 27.4 per
cent of the foreign-born agricultural and industrial workers in the
German Reich were female (Roller 1994: 52f). In the same year, 41.6
per cent of the foreign labourers in Prussian agriculture and 5.9 per
cent of the foreign workers in Prussian industry were women (based
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on Bade 1979: 503). According to the population censuses carried out
every decade in December (which did not include the seasonal mi-
grants who by then had left the country), women made up about
43 per cent of the foreign citizens in the Reich (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 Foreign population in the German Reich according to the census4
Year Men Women Total
1890 244,086 189,168 (43.66 %) 433,254
1900 464,274 314,463 (43.84 %) 778,737
1910 716,994 542,879 (43.05 %) 1,259,873
However, according to the lists of expulsions from the Reich, which
were published annually, between 8.5 and 13.1 per cent of the persons
being ordered to leave were women (Figure 3.1). This percentage of
female expellees remained stable throughout the German empire.
Even if it is assumed that the actual number of women being forced
to leave was higher (see above), it seems feasible that fewer foreign
women than men were deported as a consequence of their conviction
by a court. Apparently, this also was the case in other countries. In his
analysis of the Dutch policy of expulsions in the interwar period,
Lucassen (2002: 337) concludes that female immigrants ‘were less
likely to be expelled than men’. Similarly, Van Eijl observes that, be-
tween 1850 and 1940, the risk of being expelled from the Netherlands
Figure 3.1 Ratio of migrant men and women expelled from the Reich5
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was lower for women than for men (see Van Eijl’s chapter in this vol-
ume). She also estimates that ‘during most of this period only 10 per
cent of all expulsions involved women’ – a figure that roughly matches
the findings in the German case. Why women were less likely to be
expelled than men is difficult to establish. In the case of Germany,
they may have found an occupation more easily. Since at the turn of
the century the demand for labour in the German economy, especially
in agriculture, was high and women were paid lower wages than men,
women were welcome workers. Moreover, the police may have been
more lenient towards them than towards travelling men, who were
more likely to be suspected of ‘begging’ and other offences. In this
context, the analysis of the official grounds of expulsion offers further
insight.
As the reasons given to justify the expulsions from the Reich reveal,
men and women were deported on different grounds. Generally speak-
ing, the aim of the Reichsverweisung was to remove either foreign crim-
inals or the destitute and so-called ‘vagrants’ from the country. This
measure was in line with older poor relief traditions, according to
which paupers who did not have the right to settle in a municipality
were ‘liable to be deported to their home town, the next village or any-
where else’ (Fahrmeir 1997: 726). By the second half of the century,
welfare structures increasingly became the domain of the state, and
paupers were legally obliged to leave not only the municipality, but also
the whole state if they were foreign citizens. In this context, the autho-
rities focussed particularly on itinerant groups who had no fixed place
of residence. Lucassen (1996) has described how the categorising and
policing efforts of the German police and administration resulted in
the labelling of highly mobile migrants as ‘gypsies’. Groups with an
itinerant way of life were repeatedly labelled as ‘vagrants’ or ‘gypsies’
and encountered a considerable degree of public hostility. In this con-
text, Lucassen also refers to the fact that the discriminative treatment
of the newly arriving ‘foreigners’ was closely related to the German sys-
tem of poor relief.
The overall number of expulsions from the Reich was indeed mainly
influenced by the number of migrants convicted of begging and vaga-
bonding, whereas the number of orders following up criminal offences
(including theft, fraud, prostitution or false papers) remained rather
stable and was much smaller (about 10 per cent).6 Hence in the major-
ity of cases, foreigners were compelled to leave because they were
found to be begging or ‘vagrant’. This picture changes when we con-
centrate on the reasons for deporting female migrants from the Reich.
Even though about one half (52.4 per cent) of the women who were ex-
pelled in 1905 also had to leave because they were accused of begging
or vagabonding, nearly one third (28.6 per cent) of the women listed
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were deported because of prostitution, while the frequency of stealing
and fraud among them was comparatively similar to that of male de-
portees (11.9 per cent).7 Even though the diverse German states dif-
fered in their policy, prostitution was usually not prohibited if the pros-
titutes were registered with the police and under police surveillance,
which implied regular medical examination. Hence foreign women
who were convicted and deported probably had been arrested as ‘unli-
censed prostitutes’.
Prostitution was considered a specifically female offence, whereas
procuring very seldom occurred among the reasons for men to be ex-
pelled and there was no case of a male immigrant being expelled as a
prostitute. The contemporary reformist, juridical and sociological litera-
ture seldom refers to foreign women as being specifically liable to en-
gage in prostitution (Wolzendorff 1911; Schmo¨lder 1911). The discourse
on forced prostitution and the so-called ‘white slave trade’ merely con-
nected international mobility with sexual offences. Like most other
European states, Germany had signed the international treaties on traf-
ficking in 1904 and 1910, and the issue was being publicly debated
(Henne Am Rhyn 1903; Schidlof 1904; Petters 1911; Bohne 1927). Con-
temporaries commonly presented the ‘white slave trade’ as a serious in-
ternational problem, even though they seldom considered Germany its
central destination. It is remarkable, though, that Russian Poland and
Galicia, where the majority of immigrants in Germany came from, re-
peatedly figured as major hubs of trafficking. Polish and Galician Jews
were frequently depicted as driving forces behind the trade, and the
‘Jew-as-brothel-keeper’ was an element of anti-Jewish imagery, in which
sexualised, economised and racist components overlapped (Fritsche
1893; Weihns 1899: 31-40; Wagener 1911: 18-32; Bohne 1927).
Whether this image influenced the actual policing of immigrant wo-
men or not, whether it made them conspicuous in the eyes of the po-
lice or mirrored an existing problem, is difficult to tell. What can be as-
sumed is that the deportation figures imply a gender-specific position
of women in the Reich’s moral economy. Mostly, expulsions from the
Reich advanced the removal of the actual or potential recipients of poor
relief, namely migrants who were suspected of lacking means of sub-
sistence. Men were usually evicted as ‘beggars’ and ‘vagabonds’, while
female migrants were more likely to be excluded on grounds of sexual
immorality. One third of the women expelled from the Reich were ac-
cused of prostitution. Most of these women were single. In the face of
economic and social insecurity, prostitution was an option that women
repeatedly chose – or were forced to choose by others. If they were for-
eign citizens, however, being a prostitute or being charged with prosti-
tution threatened their further stay in the Reich. Their sexual beha-
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viour or suspected sexual immorality became a factor justifying their
removal from the state.
That migrant women who engaged in prostitution were in danger of
acquiring an illegal status is suggested by the following example. In
April 1905, the Austrian migrant Karoline Bobeck faced expulsion from
the Reich and wrote a letter to the Prussian Minister of the Interior,
pleading to be allowed to stay.8 She had been living in the country for
two years when she suddenly lost her job. Soon after, she, as she put it
in her letter, ‘came into conflict with the vice squad’. Even though she
then tried everything to earn a living, she received an expulsion order.
Since she wanted to stay in Berlin, she assumed a false name and
stayed. After she was caught by the police a second time, she pleaded
in writing to be allowed to stay and seek ‘decent employment’. But
although she declared that she was not ‘immoral’ but ‘a woman driven
by misfortune’, the ministerial officials denied her request. She was ex-
pelled.
Very few documents in the files of the Prussian Ministry offer in-
sight into the individual stories behind expulsions on moral grounds.
It is thus difficult to say if Bobeck presented her ‘true story’, or if hers
was a typical fate. Her example does point to the insecure residence
status and its effects as central features of the German migration re-
gime. Migrants living in the Reich did not have any right to stay. If
they lost their employment, did not have a place of residence or for
other reasons became a potential public charge, they risked being de-
ported. This affected both women and men, with women being more
likely to be suspected of prostitution and deficient sexual morality –
especially if they were unmarried. This different moral logic did not
just apply to German immigration policy. In her analysis of late nine-
teenth-century US deportation practices, Moloney (2006: 100) has
shown how efforts to deport immigrants that referred to ‘concerns over
sexual morality’ had ‘more profound effects on women’. According to
Moloney, this focus on women’s sexual morality was intertwined with
assumptions about their economic roles as being dependent on male
wages, and clearly put single immigrant women at a disadvantage. The
fact that in the German case most of the women who were expelled
after being charged with prostitution were single at least suggests that
a similar mechanism influenced their treatment. Generally speaking,
however, the deportations from the Reich in the name of public secur-
ity threatened to punish any form of ‘deviant’ behaviour, be it so-called
vagrancy, criminality or prostitution. In this respect, the Reichsverwei-
sung functioned as an instrument of social control.
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3.2 Poles, Jews and Prussian wives: Migration control and
the expulsions from Prussia
Presumably because they were based on juridical decisions and be-
cause they required officials to institute formal legal proceedings, the
overall number of expulsions from the Reich was limited and de-
creased before the First World War. Expelling foreigners as ‘undesir-
ables’ from Prussia, however, (i.e. from a German state) was an instru-
ment frequently employed by state officials in order to regulate immi-
gration. Although expellees were legally allowed to move from one
German state to another after their expulsion, the German La¨nder often
did not accept deportees from other German states. This meant that
that in most cases to be expelled from Prussia meant to be expelled
from the whole of Germany (Gosewinkel 2001: 220). In Prussia, expul-
sions generally were deemed acceptable in the interest of ‘public safety,
peace and order’. They did not follow any juridical decision but could
be ordered by state officials, who in that respect possessed far-reaching
powers.
These deportations have to be seen in the context of an ethnically ex-
clusive nationalist policy, which aimed at excluding foreign Polish and
Jewish migrants in particular. Throughout the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, Prussian authorities repeatedly ordered the depor-
tation of foreign citizens, not for any individual reason but on account
of their ethnicity. In this context, ethnic, religious, political and eco-
nomic mechanisms of exclusion overlapped. According to the logic of
this practice, the proletarian, poor, Jewish or Polish-Catholic migrant
was looked on as the undesired migrant incarnate, especially if he or
she was politically active. Anti-Polish and anti-Semitic tendencies trig-
gered the mass expulsions of the mid-1880s, as a result of which about
32,000 foreign Poles and Jews were forced to leave Prussia (Neubach
1967). And an anti-Polish impulse characterised the elaborate system
of migration control that Prussian authorities set up in the 1890s.
Both male and female foreign citizens were affected by these mea-
sures and their racist tendencies. Their situations with regard to expul-
sion differed nevertheless. The most obvious had to do with the dis-
tinct legal positions they occupied under German law (Gosewinkel
2001: 294-303; Trevisiol 2005: 201-208). According to the citizenship
laws of 1870 and 1913, women acquired citizenship via their fathers
and husbands. When marrying, they automatically assumed their hus-
band’s nationality. Hence Prussian-born women who married foreign
citizens lost their German nationality. Because of dependent citizen-
ship they could be deported despite their being born in Germany. In
general, deportations not only concerned the deportees, but also their
partners and children. That both expellees and state officials were con-
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stantly struggling with this role of the family becomes apparent in the
case of mixed marriages.
Generally speaking, female and male migrants entering into a mixed
marriage in late nineteenth-century Germany faced different conse-
quences. A woman of foreign nationality who married a German man
immediately acquired protection from deportation, since she automati-
cally became a German national. Single women were seldom natura-
lised, even though it was possible – authorities rather expected them to
gain German citizenship via marriage (Trevisiol 2005: 208). Theoreti-
cally, immigrant women could even try to circumvent their forced re-
moval by entering into a bogus marriage. But even though contempor-
ary legal literature in fact reflected that there was such a possibility,
hardly anybody seems to have chosen it (Eisfeld 2005: 71-84). There
are very few documented cases of women marrying Prussian citizens
in order to evade deportation; officials did not suspect a potential bogus
marriage, nor is there any other indication of such a scenario. On the
other hand, men of foreign nationality who married German-born wi-
ves could still be deported and could only change their insecure resi-
dence status by naturalisation. The German naturalisation practice
tended to be rather restrictive, however, so this was hardly a promising
option. While entering into a mixed marriage in Germany offered legal
security for migrant women, it transferred an insecure status to Ger-
man-born wives. In the following section, these different positions and
the role of marriage in this context are analysed with a particular view
to the Prussian policy of the 1880s and 1890s.
The majority of the 44,000 foreign Polish and Jewish migrants who
by 1885 were assumed to reside in Prussia’s Eastern Provinces had
moved there from Russia and Galicia. They were often denounced as
‘deserters’, since many had migrated in order to escape military service.
But while several of them came for military reasons, not all of them
did by any means. The term increasingly served as a general label for
migrants from Eastern Europe. The majority of these Polish and Gali-
cian migrants were men. Many of them had been residing in the coun-
try for a considerable time and several were married to formerly Prus-
sian women. In his study, Neubach gives the example of a municipality
in West Prussia where 80 per cent of the foreign men who had a resi-
dence permit were reported to be married, and nine out of ten were
said to have married Prussian women (1967: 57). These women – or
the couples who at the time lived in a mixed marriage – were explicitly
included in the deportation orders, as a result of which the vast major-
ity of the foreign Poles and Jews had to leave Prussia in 1885-86. As
the Prussian Minister of the Interior specified in 1885, Russian or Gali-
cian Poles who had married Prussian women were even regarded as
‘elements’ that were ‘essential in causing the severe national problems’
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in the country. A mixed marriage, he claimed, was ‘no reason’ for ex-
empting them or their families from deportation (Neubach 1967: 61;
Bade 1984: 114). Overall, in accordance with the anti-Polish and anti-
Semitic tendencies of their national policy, the Prussian authorities ex-
pelled about 32,000 citizens of foreign nationality who had lived in the
Prussian Eastern provinces (Neubach 1967: 128).
Being born in Germany did not prevent Prussian-born wives from
being deported. Intent on avoiding any further strengthening of the
Polish and Jewish ‘element’, the ministerial officials deported them
along with the others. But even though the Prussian policy of expul-
sion focussed primarily on foreign Polish and Jewish migrants, these
groups were not the only ones subjected to deportation. As the Reich
did, Prussia repeatedly evicted foreigners who were receiving poor re-
lief. Van Eijl and Lucassen (2006: 187-193) have shown that Dutch
migrants who were forced to leave late nineteenth-century Prussia be-
cause they received poor relief were evicted along with their Prussian-
born wives.9 Responding to social concerns, Prussian-born women
were frequently forced to leave the country along with their destitute
foreign husbands – be they Polish or not.
The fact that Prussian-born women could be forced to leave the Ger-
man Reich points to the gendered conception of citizenship in late
nineteenth-century Germany. If, as Brubaker maintains, a volk-centred
definition of nationhood did indeed shape German citizenship law,
women were partly excluded from that conception. They did not belong
to a ‘community of descent’; rather, they became part of the commu-
nity they married into. First and foremost, marriage and the patriarchal
family served as the major institutions for transferring citizenship.
Therefore, it is not quite correct to assume that before 1913 German
law defined citizenship as a ‘community of descent’ with respect to the
acquisition of citizenship and as a ‘territorial community’ with respect
to the preservation of citizenship (Brubaker 1992: 115). Brubaker’s as-
sumption that the German understanding of citizenship was expansive
towards ethnic Germans and restrictive towards non-Germans also
needs to be rectified (Brubaker 1992: 114-137). If it was expansive to-
wards ethnic Germans, this mainly concerned German men, while
women could lose their place in the German ‘community of descent’
quite easily.
In order to avoid a situation similar to that of the mass expulsions in
1885-86, Prussian officials during the following years sought to further
reduce the chances of mixed relationships between Polish men and
German women. After having officially – though not effectively – been
banned from the country for a while, Polish workers from Galicia and
Russia in 1890 were re-admitted in response to the growing demand
for labour in the Prussian economy. But in accordance with their anti-
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Polish nationalist concerns, authorities were eager to prevent foreign
Poles from settling permanently. Therefore, they introduced a compul-
sory period of expulsion, so that Polish workers had to leave the coun-
try annually and could only return the next spring.10 Nine out of ten
foreign Polish workers left the country every autumn in order to return
the following year. Responding to the need for labour in German agri-
culture and industry on the one hand, and hoping to prevent incoming
workers from settling on the other, the Prussian state installed an in-
creasingly complex system of regulations during the subsequent dec-
ade (Bade 1979; 1980; 1984). After 1908, every foreign Polish worker
had to have a work permit that detailed the name of the employer by
whom he or she was contracted.11 They were not allowed to change
their workplace without authorisation. The Prussian officials were par-
ticularly concerned with the unauthorised and undocumented move-
ment of the foreign workers in the country: migrant labourers who
broke their contract or who did not possess a valid work permit risked
immediate eviction. Generally speaking, to deport and expel migrants
thus served as a crucial element in the strict Prussian migration re-
gime as it was established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In this context, the forced removal of Polish workers re-
sponded to the anti-Polish nationalist concerns of Prussia’s elites, while
at the same time their annual admittance to the country answered eco-
nomic needs.
The Prussian authorities were particularly concerned that Polish sea-
sonal workers would marry German women and have a family, fearing
that the women in turn would be subjected to the annual autumn de-
portations – or that the whole family would try to settle in Prussia
(Bade 1984: 114). The forced removal of the Russian-Polish and Aus-
trian-Polish migrants at the end of each year was a way to counteract
these problems. Being eager to interfere with any further settlement of
Polish families, Prussian officials hoped that the regulation would help
to prevent marriages between foreign Polish men and German women.
Moreover, the employers were only allowed to recruit single, and not
married foreign workers. This regulation was not limited to migrant
men. A high percentage of the seasonal workers employed in Prussia’s
economy were women. Especially in Prussian agriculture, female for-
eign labourers, who were paid less than their male countrymen and
who, according to contemporary gender stereotypes, were seen as more
capable of doing the monotonous work involved in Prussian hoe farm-
ing, were welcome labourers (Bright Jones 1999, 2005). Like their
male fellow workers, they had to be single. In addition, female foreign
workers were to be deported once it was discovered they were preg-
nant. Whilst officially it was argued that the pregnancy reduced their
work effectiveness and hence meant a deliberate breach of contract,
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authorities unofficially also hoped to ward off Polish women who had
entered into a relationship with German men (Bade 1984: 115). In ac-
cordance with their nationalist agenda, Prussian authorities aimed at
preventing sexual contact between German men and migrant women.
It was also feared that the children of Polish workers would increase
the number of Polish people, whose higher birth rate was a matter of
growing concern in the Reich, where the pro-natalist discourse on po-
pulation was turning increasingly racist (Weindling 1989). So the de-
sire to prevent incoming Polish workers from entering into mixed rela-
tionships clearly had nationalist implications: politicians aimed at
avoiding the ‘Polonisation’ of the Eastern provinces and were eager to
protect ‘German’ family life from any Polish influences. As part of their
nationalist ‘Germanising’ project, they attempted to regulate the sexual
practices and marital behaviour of their own and of the foreign citizens.
The foregoing passages only refer to dealings on the level of official
politics. The question of how these orders were implemented adminis-
tratively, and how migrants reacted to them, has hardly been ad-
dressed. In fact, many orders were not strictly adhered to. Employers
repeatedly hired married workers, and many workers who breached
their contracts simply changed their workplace instead of leaving the
country. Nevertheless, the official regulations reveal that state officials
attempted to influence not only the way migrants could enter, work
and stay in Prussia, but they also tried to regulate their marital lives.
In her study on the history of marriage and the nation, Cott (2000: 3)
argues that marriage as a public institution is ‘a vehicle through which
the apparatus of state can shape the gender order’. As the Prussian pol-
icy of migration control suggests, state authorities also sought to control
marital behaviour in order to maintain an ethnicised national order.
Their policy suggests an obsession with the maintenance of ethnicised
boundaries reminiscent of the dynamics that McClintock (1995) has
observed in Victorian imperial society. By requiring them to be single or
by discouraging the pregnancy of foreign women, officials claimed in-
fluence over the most tangible circumstances of the immigrants’ family
and sexual lives. Their policy was inspired by a governmental rationality
which endeavoured to ensure, rationalise and optimise the economic,
social and biological functioning of ‘the population’ (Dean 1999;
Foucault 2004). The regulation of migration became part of the bio-
political efforts that came to characterise the modern state.
When defining the conditions of their stay and removal from the
country, the influence of the state on migrants’ relationships and every-
day life became very concrete. In order to understand the migrants’
perspective in this context, the following analysis concentrates on the
way in which men and women living in a mixed marriage protested
against their expulsions in the mid-1880s.
70 CHRISTIANE REINECKE
3.3 Dearest Emperor – Dearest Empress: Different patterns
of protest
Your Highness, unconquerable Emperor, merciful and mighty
King and Lord! You Royal Majesty and highest Sovereign, who
from his high throne deigns to look upon me, his humble and
loyal subject, and who might want to pardon this unfortunate,
out of benevolence and mercy.
Following this rather extensive salutation, the Russian-Polish migrant
Joseph Konopka, who was facing deportation from Prussia in 1886, pe-
titioned the German emperor to annul the order against his family.12
He had been living in Eastern Prussia for seventeen years, was married
to a formerly Prussian wife and was protesting this deportation. On
the same day, a letter was posted to the German empress. Addressing
herself to, ‘Your highness, noble Empress, merciful Queen and Mis-
tress’, Charlotte Konopka, his wife, also requested to that the expulsion
order be rescinded.13 As their salutations suggest, Charlotte and Joseph
Konopka chose different tactics in order to reverse the order against
them. They, like many couples in their situation, showed differing
patterns of protest, which reflected their differing positions in German
society.
In general, male and female foreign citizens who were threatened
with expulsion frequently tried to have the measure revoked. They
usually wrote to the authority whose influence seemed most likely to
be successful: to the Emperor, the Chancellor of the Reich or the Prus-
sian Minister of the Interior. In fact, the latter was the right addressee,
insofar as the ministerial officials were obliged to check if a Prussian
expulsion order was to be enacted once a deportee petitioned officially.
It was not possible to take legal action and appeal to a court. An analy-
sis of the various petitions contained in the files of the Prussian Minis-
try of the Interior therefore not only offers insight into the actual ad-
ministrative practice and the individual decisions of Prussian offi-
cials,14 but it also reveals the ways in which foreign citizens reacted to
the orders made against them. To protest in writing against an expul-
sion order was just one of several strategies that people applied in or-
der either to question the order or to circumvent it. Not everybody who
had been requested to leave Prussia or the German Reich actually did
so – and many who did came back illegally. But whereas the Prussian
state commonly labelled these strategies as ‘irregular’ and criminalised
clandestine border crossings and the unsanctioned return of formerly
expelled citizens by punishing them with imprisonment or renewed
deportation, the petitions against expulsions were a legal way of pro-
POLICING FOREIGN MEN AND WOMEN 71
testing. Therefore, the letters and the official memoranda attached to
them offer valuable insight into the actual circumstances under which
foreigners were expelled and into the ‘micro-mechanisms of power’
(Foucault 2005: 113-118) which determined the interaction between
state authorities and individual foreign citizens. Generally speaking,
migration controls can be understood as an element of the rationalis-
ing and standardising processes implemented by modern states in or-
der to render a society ‘legible’, as described by Scott (1998: 2). But to
fully understand this process, it is crucial to bear in mind that power
involves a ‘two-way or multilateral process of interaction between
people who themselves have varying degrees of freedom of action to
exert power as they wish’ (Evans 1998: 3). Migrants, to be more precise,
were agents in their own right (Constantine 2006) and constantly
challenged the state’s attempt to monitor and control their mobility.
Only a particular type of migrant was likely to petition in writing.
Most of the written pleas to review an expulsion order were written by
merchants, businessmen and craftsmen from Austria-Hungary and
Russia. Protests written by foreign workers were rare. Even though
they had found various ways to circumvent the Prussian system of con-
trol, workers hardly ever petitioned against their expulsion. The social
structure of the petitioners thus hardly reflects the overall structure of
Prussia’s migrant population during the pre-war period, which was
dominated by industrial and agricultural workers. This can partly be
explained by the fact that even though foreign Polish workers were re-
quired to leave the country annually, they were mostly asked to do so
independently or were deported informally without any official expul-
sion order. In addition, not all agricultural and industrial workers could
read or write by any means, so they would not engage in written corre-
spondence (Constantine 2006: 328). Merchants, businessmen and
craftsmen, on the other hand, were probably educated enough to pro-
test in writing – or at least to pay somebody to do so. Also, it was
mostly men who wrote petitions; only a few letters were written by wo-
men. In addition, the majority of women who appealed to the authori-
ties were former Prussian citizens who had assumed their husbands’
citizenship when marrying. Despite the high percentage of female for-
eign workers in Prussia, their voices are hardly represented. Since no
sufficient statistical data exist on the actual numbers of orders or on
the petitions against the orders, it is impossible to quantify how many
petitions were successful and on what grounds. It can be said though,
that frequent petitions against expulsion orders were a rather efficient
means of prolonging the stay – if not indefinitely, then at least for a
rather long time. In numerous cases, the Prussian authorities allowed
the deportees to remain in the country for a few more months and in
some cases the orders were suspended for years.
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As the various petitions documented in the files of the Prussian
Ministry show, male and female foreign citizens tended to choose dif-
ferent addressees for their pleas. Whereas men wrote to the emperor,
the chancellor or the Minister of the Interior, women frequently ad-
dressed themselves to the emperor’s wife. Even though the empress
did not have any specific political power, they seemed to assume that
she as a woman was more likely to be sympathetic to their problems.
Like Charlotte Konopka, Hedwig Kohane was a former Prussian citizen
who had married a foreign migrant, in this case a Galician. The couple
was about to be expelled in 1886. But whereas her husband wrote to
the Prussian Minister of the Interior in order to protest against the or-
der, Hedwig Kohane addressed herself to the German empress. In her
letter, she not only pointed out that she had been raised by German
parents, but she also emphasised that her husband was to be consid-
ered ‘German in his attitude and nature’. He was honest and working
successfully. And even with a view to his education, she declared, her
husband was ‘typically German’ (‘urdeutsch’). Having thus pointed out
the exemplary integration of her husband into German culture and
economic life, Hedwig Kohane finished her letter by appealing to the
empress as ‘the eminent protector of German family life’ to help her.15
In order to prevent her family from being sent to Galicia, Kohane
presented herself as a guardian of German family life and underlined
her own ‘Germanness’ as well as that of her husband. She thus contra-
dicted the official legal status allotted to her by a citizenship law which
was based on a patriarchal concept of family and marriage. By refer-
ring to the importance of both their German identity and their status
as mothers and wives, the formerly Prussian women claimed their
own place in the national community, to which they declared to belong
by birth and irrespective of their having married a foreigner. Despite
the fact that they had lost their nationality when marrying, formerly
Prussian wives often still thought of themselves – or at least presented
themselves – as ‘being German’. They also emphasised that they were
conveying ‘German culture’ to their families and frequently declared
they were raising their children according to ‘German values’. Whereas
the principle of dependent citizenship was hardly an issue at the politi-
cal level in the 1880s and 1890s, it was by no means a matter of course
for the women who were concerned.
After having lost, through marriage, a secure residence status along
with their former nationality, these women risked being sent to a coun-
try they had never been to before – or they feared being left behind in
Germany without their husbands. Consequently, Prussian-born women
who protested against their impending expulsion referred to the hard-
ships awaiting them. They pointed out that neither they nor their chil-
dren could speak the language of the country they were being expelled
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to. They evoked the vision of a future life in poverty somewhere abroad
by arguing that their husbands would have difficulty making a living.
And they stated that they still had relatives in Germany who needed to
be cared for and looked after. Apart from the anti-Semitic and anti-
Polish agenda of Prussian policy, poor relief was indeed a central argu-
ment behind expulsions. Local as well as ministerial officials were
usually eager not to be saddled with either the deportees’ families left
behind or with other relatives in need of constant care. Due to the com-
mon assumption that women were economically dependent on male
wages, it was suspected they would likely become a public charge if se-
parated from their husbands. Therefore, during the mass expulsions in
the mid-1880s as well as later, Prussian-born women were usually de-
ported along with their husbands.16 Nevertheless, authorities were not
interested in having German relatives on their hands who were in need
of care and whose daughters or nieces had been forced to leave the
country. In those cases, officials repeatedly agreed to suspend orders
which they assumed would otherwise increase the burden on public
care. Whereas their presumed economic dependency heightened the
chance that women would be expelled along with their husbands, their
claim of having relatives to care for in some cases delayed their own
and their husband’s deportation.
Like their wives, protesting men usually presented their marriage to
a Prussian woman as a clear sign of their integration. Not only did they
declare having lived in the country for a long time, but they also
pointed out that having married a local citizen demonstrated their
near-Germanness. Several of the male petitioners assumed that their
marriage would help to promote a secure residence status, so that a
Russian-Pole who was facing expulsion in 1885 asked incredulously,
‘But Excellency, do those who have domestic wives also have to leave?’17
In addition, petitioners repeatedly presented their imminent removal
from Prussian territory as an impending loss of Heimat. Martin Kainer,
a Galician who had immigrated to Prussia as a child, described himself
as ‘a good German and Prussian’, as a ‘loyal servant to His Majesty’
and a ‘good citizen’ who had married a Prussian woman and who
owned a successful business. If he was sent back to his country of ori-
gin, he argued, he would not only lose his business, but was also likely
to encounter linguistic problems, as he did not properly understand
the Polish spoken there.18 Like him, many long-term residents who
were facing deportation declared to be estranged from their official
country of origin. Therefore, issues of identity, language and belonging
played a central role in the deportees’ pleadings. Being threatened with
the removal from the country, they reacted by referring to their Ger-
man-born wives, German education and German character. In addi-
tion, they strove to present themselves as ‘good German citizens’ by
74 CHRISTIANE REINECKE
underlining that they were paying taxes, that they had not committed
any criminal offence and that they or their sons had served in the
army. In March 1898, N. Ehrlich, a Russian Jew, addressed himself to
the Senate of Bremen. In his letter, Ehrlich described himself as a mer-
chant with a considerable annual income and produced receipts of his
donations to 23 Prussian charitable institutions in order to document
that he ‘knew the duties of a good citizen’.19 Nevertheless, he and his
sons were expelled from Berlin. Having been forced to leave Prussia,
Ehrlich now requested permission to take up residence in Bremen.
Like many other petitioners confronted with the Prussian policy, he did
not understand how he as a ‘good citizen’ could be expelled.
Being faced with their impending removal from German territory,
petitioners were likely to use those arguments that they expected to be
most successful. Rather than depicting their situation as they saw it,
they were presenting their situation as it was most likely to be ac-
cepted. Presupposing a certain ideal of a good citizen, many male Pro-
testants underlined their affinity to German culture and their high de-
gree of integration. They frequently pointed out that they were eco-
nomically successful and that they were not likely to become a burden
on poor relief. And they emphasised that they were paying taxes or that
they had served in the army. In this context, the differing situations of
men and women became evident. Men usually found it easier to prove
they could support a family and fulfil the classical military and fiscal
duties of a citizen, so they mostly cited their economic, social and poli-
tical reliability. Female petitioners (who in this case were mostly Prus-
sian-born women) usually left out their own economic situation and
rather spoke on their husbands’ behalf. They also referred to their chil-
dren or relatives in their care and pointed to the potential hardships
awaiting them if they were either left behind or sent to another coun-
try. So if they referred to their own position, female petitioners usually
alluded to those niches which contemporary middle-class ideology al-
lotted them: the family and the care of close relatives. Whether this ac-
count mirrored their ‘real situation’ is difficult to say, but at least it was
the line of argument deemed most successful by the petitioners. De-
spite having lost their former citizenship when marrying, these women
also commonly presented themselves as guardians of German values
and conveyors of a German identity. They claimed a position they did
not possess under German citizenship law. This was similarly true for
their husbands, who frequently underlined their own ‘Germanness’,
even though they were foreign citizens on paper. In the case of mixed
marriages, the citizenship allotted to the couples and the nationality
both partners identified with did not always correspond. Their concepts
of membership and belonging challenged the principles on which citi-
zenship law was based. At the same time, their predominant claim ‘to
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be German’ also mimicked the central nationalist concern with ‘Ger-
manness’ that did characterise Prussian expulsion policy at the time.
In fact, it was due to that concern that the majority of the petitioners
had to leave the country, despite their protests.
3.4 Conclusion
The expulsion of foreigners in late nineteenth-century Germany was
closely connected to the emergence of modern state structures and the
process of a ‘nationalisation of the social’, as Noiriel has described it
(1994). Nation-states were striving to strengthen the bonds between
the state and its citizens by defining the actual rights and benefits of
belonging. At the same time, they also defined more clearly who was
to be left out – excluded in the very spatial sense of not being admitted
to the country, or less literally in being denied citizenship and civil, po-
litical or social rights (Marshall 1949). The administrative practice of
evicting unwelcome foreigners illustrates how important nationality
had become as a distinctive criterion that shaped the relationship be-
tween the state and the individual. Whereas in earlier years member-
ship in a municipality or status groups had been crucial, at the end of
the nineteenth century it was citizenship that determined the access to
rights and benefits. That non-Germans in the German Empire could
be compelled to leave, whereas German citizens were protected from
deportation, points to the wide-ranging implications that belonging to
a nation could have. While citizenship law provided a legal definition
of who belonged to the nation and who did not, the expulsions revealed
how relevant citizenship had become in everyday life.
In this chapter, the practice of expelling foreign citizens has been
analysed from three aspects: 1. The differences in expelling immigrant
men and women from the Reich, 2. the different positions of male and
female foreign citizens in the context of Prussia’s nationalist policy, 3.
the strategies chosen by male and female deportees in order to protest
their imminent removal. Functioning as an instrument of social con-
trol, the Reichsverweisungen threatened to sanction any form of ‘deviant’
behaviour, be it the so-called ‘vagrancy’, prostitution or criminality. Im-
migrants who lost their employment, or for other reasons became a
likely public charge, risked being deported. In this context, immigrant
women were more likely to be expelled than men because of their al-
leged sexual immorality, especially if they were single. In addition to a
potential lack of economic means, their being suspected of prostitution
became an important factor justifying their forced removal.
As part of the ethnically exclusive agenda of their policy, Prussian
authorities in the late nineteenth century aimed at preventing Polish
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and Jewish migrants from residing permanently in the country. In this
context, mixed marriages between Polish migrants and local citizens
were a matter of particular concern. From the 1890s onwards, the
Prussian authorities tried to reduce the possibility of male Polish mi-
grants entering into mixed marriages – as well as of female migrants
either marrying or becoming pregnant. The Prussian state officials not
only endeavoured to influence the way in which migrants entered and
stayed in Prussia, but they tried to regulate their marital and sexual
lives as well. Their exclusive endeavours extended to women who were
born in Prussia but who had married a foreigner. Although they were
German-born, they were evicted along with their husbands.
While the anti-Polish and anti-Semitic intentions driving the Prus-
sian expulsions concerned men and women alike, the legal principle of
dependent citizenship affected them differently. Consequently, for-
merly Prussian wives and their immigrant husbands chose different
strategies when protesting against their imminent eviction. While men
found it easier to prove they could support a family and fulfil the mili-
tary and fiscal duties of ‘a good citizen’, female petitioners spoke rather
on their husbands’ behalf or pointed to the potential social hardships
awaiting them. Unlike their husbands, they usually did not present
themselves as ‘good citizens’ in an economic, political or fiscal sense.
Prussian-born women did, however, challenge the principle of depen-
dent citizenship by frequently claiming to ‘be Germans’ and to convey
‘Germanness’ to their families. Like their husbands, they repeatedly
emphasised that their official citizenship did not correspond to their
sense of membership and belonging. The petitioners frequently chal-
lenged the exclusionary logic of Prussian expulsions, in which citizen-
ship law and a restrictive immigration policy came to overlap.
The fact that formerly German women were evicted from the Ger-
man Reich draws attention to the gendered nature of citizenship law.
Moreover, it shows that historical interpretations of the relationship be-
tween nationalism and citizenship law have been imprecise because
they overlooked these specificities. Brubaker’s claim that a volk-centred
definition of nationhood and the principle of jus sanguinis shaped Ger-
man citizenship law leaves out the position of women. Despite their
being German ‘by descent’ or ‘by blood’, women who married foreign
immigrants not only had to change their citizenship, but they also
risked eviction from the country if they were deemed unwelcome for
social or ethnic reasons. In this respect, citizenship law in the Kaiser-
reich as well as the actual administrative practice of migration control
gave precedence to patriarchal ideas of family and marriage, according
to which husbands and fathers determined the nation to which all fa-
mily members belonged. Unlike German men, women lost their place
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in the German ‘community of descent’ easily – and literally so, as they
could be forced to leave the country.
The exclusive mechanisms at work in the field of immigration con-
trol were gender-specific, as well as classed and ethnicised. The practice
of evicting foreigners was employed to police foreigners considered to
be ‘dangerous’, ‘degenerate’ or ‘unwelcome’, as well as paupers and
prostitutes, Poles and Jews. The evictions not only concerned those
who were seen as potential or de facto burdens on poor relief, but they
also aimed at excluding non-Germans as part of an ethnically exclusive
nationalist policy. In this context, the boundaries between wanted and
unwanted foreigners were constantly being defined and re-defined
along the lines of race, class and gender. In order to understand the
late nineteenth-century policy of restricting movement, this nexus be-
tween ethnicised, classed and gender-specific mechanisms of exclusion
must be taken into account.
Notes
1 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin (henceforth: GStA), I HA,
Rep. 77, tit. 1176, 1 G, Vol. 1, Letter by Marie Gad.
2 Strafgesetzbuch, § 38-39, 284, 361-362.
3 See the data in the official periodicals Zentralblatt fu¨r das Deutsche Reich,Deutsches
Fahndungsblatt and the annual balance as it was published in the Statistisches Jahr-
buch fu¨r das Deutschen Reich.
4 Data taken from Elsner and Lehmann (1988: 25).
5 Numbers as published annually in the Statistisches Jahrbuch fu¨r das Deutschen Reich,
1890 to 1914.
6 In 1905, 7.7 per cent of the deportation orders were based on §39 of the Criminal
Code, whereas about 91 per cent of the cases were based on §362. Of the decisions
based on §39, 69 per cent had to do with vagrancy, theft or fraud, about 15.4 per cent
with prostitution and procuring and the rest with false identity papers or false
names. Of the decisions based on §362, 87.5 per cent had to do with begging and va-
grancy, 12.5 per cent with theft and similar offences, 5.5 per cent with prostitution
and 3.5 per cent with false identity papers.
7 Percentages are based on a sample of 313 orders, as published in the Zentralblatt fu¨r
das Deutsche Reich 33 (1905).
8 GStA, I HA, Rep. 77, Ministerium des Innern, tit. 1176, No. 4B, Vol. 1, letter by Karo-
line Bobeck.
9 In 1908, Germany and the Netherlands came to agree that Dutch emigrants who
were receiving poor relief would not have to be deported if the Dutch government
bore the costs for their support (Van Eijl & Lucassen 2006: 191).
10 In 1910 alone, 790,189 foreign workers came to Prussia. The majority did not stay
permanently: 498,777 left the country at the end of the year. The number of Polish
workers who came in 1910 was 253,935, 249,908 of whom left in December.
11 After 1909 this regulation was extended to all foreign workers.
12 GStA, I HA, Rep. 77, tit. 1176, Nr. 1 K, Vol. 2, 58-64.
13 ibid., 63f.
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14 The following analysis is based on a collection of petitions that reached the Prussian
Ministry of the Interior between the mid-1880s and the turn of the century. The re-
spective files concern expulsion orders against citizens from either Russia or Austria-
Hungary. All files are taken from GStA, 1 HA, Rep. 77, tit. 1176, Nr. 1 G; K.
15 GStA, I HA, Rep. 77, tit. 1176, Nr. 1 K, Vol. 2, 107f.
16 See, for example, the comments on the case of a Mrs. Gottheiner GStA, I HA, Rep.
77, tit. 1176, Nr. 1 G, Vol. 1, 10. The district president commented that she was born
a Prussian but lost her citizenship through marriage. Since it was ‘to be expected that
Gottheiner’s wife would become a burden on poor relief in Kerzlow’, the local head
of the administration decided to deport her. For a similar argumentation see also the
case of Caroline Gerning (ibid. 70f).
17 GStA, I HA, Rep. 77, tit. 1176, Nr. 1 G, Vol. 1, 92f, Letter by Michael Gutowski.
18 GStA, I HA, Rep. 77, tit. 1176, Nr. 1 K, Vol. 2, 41-44.
19 Staatsarchiv Bremen, 4,14/1-IV.D.6, Bl. 8, Letter by N. Ehrlich, 30 March 1898.
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4 Gendered borders: The case of ‘illegal’
migration from Iraq, the Horn of Africa and
the former Soviet Union to the Netherlands1
Ilse van Liempt
The smuggling and trafficking of human beings has received wide at-
tention from politicians, the media and academia. Most studies in this
field, however, are conducted by criminologists and as a result focus
specifically on crime. Much research about smuggling and trafficking
looks at the organisations involved in the ‘business’, the cooperation be-
tween different actors involved and the profits that are made (Salt &
Stein 1997; Kleemans Van den Berg & Van de Bunt 1998; Salt &
Hogarth 2000; Aronowitz 2001; Van Dijk 2002; Staring, Engbersen,
Moerland, De Lange, Verburg, Vermeulen & Weltevrede 2005; Soudijn
2006). Furthermore, the majority of the studies in this field are policy-
driven and look at smuggling and trafficking from within a security fra-
mework (see also De Genova 2002). As a result of this criminological
and policy-driven perspective, smuggling or trafficking is generally
framed and understood in terms of the legal categories that define these
issues. I will argue that we need a more actor-oriented approach that fo-
cuses on the strategies employed by migrants in response to these legal
frameworks if we want to understand what is really going on.
This chapter is based on 56 life stories of migrants (41 men and fif-
teen women) who were assisted in their migration from Iraq, the Horn
of Africa and the former Soviet Union to the Netherlands. The data
were collected between May 2003 and May 2004 for my PhD research
(Van Liempt 2007). In this chapter, I will take a closer look at the gen-
dered aspects of assisted types of migration. So far, little is known
about the differences between men and women in these migration pro-
cesses. In general, it is often assumed that most of the smuggled mi-
grants are men (with agency) and most of the trafficked migrants are
women (without agency). However, there is no evidence to support this
claim, since there are no reliable data on the numbers of smuggled or
trafficked migrants (see also Anderson & O’Connell Davidson 2006). I
will examine the different opportunities of female and male migrants
in terms of ‘illegal’ migration and the decisions they have made within
this framework. Despite its many drawbacks, the term ‘illegal migra-
tion’ is used here for the sake of clarity and coherence (see also the in-
troduction to this volume). I will use the term within quotation marks
to stress the fact that these types of migration are considered ‘illegal’ by
states but can be very legitimate from a migrant’s point of view (Van
Liempt 2007). I will argue that the type of assistance migrants need in
the absence of legal migration opportunities differs greatly from region
to region and is not easy to capture in static legal categories. It is easier
to understand how people have travelled, under what circumstances
and with what intentions, if we do not specifically label them or their
journeys as ‘illegal’. This is not only important for understanding what
is really happening on the ground, but also because legal frameworks
differ considerably over time. Assistance for people who are not offi-
cially allowed to migrate is not new. For instance, in the 1960s, many
labour migrants, from countries where guest workers were officially re-
cruited by Northern European countries, entered ‘spontaneously’, out-
side the state-guided framework. Those who were not officially re-
cruited, or who migrated after the official recruitment programmes
had stopped, often came through ‘illegal’ channels. Some of them were
helped by what we would now call smugglers (Berger & Mohr 1975).
However, the context in which such forms of assisted migration take
place has changed. Those who came ‘illegally’ to the Netherlands in or-
der to work in the 1970s did not face many obstacles in regularising
their status after arrival. It was relatively easy to obtain a national insur-
ance number with which most workers could find a legal job even
when their legal status was not secure.
4.1 Smuggling/trafficking
Since 2000, the law has made a distinction between smuggling and
trafficking (before that time the two terms were used interchangeably).
The Palermo Protocol differentiates smuggling from trafficking by the
fact that in case of smuggling, the criminal act lies in the ‘illegal’ bor-
der crossing, whereas with trafficking the criminal act is associated
with coercion and exploitation. Hardly any attention is paid to the rea-
sons why these migrants need to travel in such a way or to the lack of
alternatives they face (Van Liempt 2007). Smuggled migrants are also
often portrayed as ‘destitute’ or ‘desperate’, whereas in reality they are
often relatively well-educated and from less deprived socio-economic
backgrounds (see also De Haas 2006). Despite the fact that only smug-
glers can be convicted for bringing someone ‘illegally’ across a border,
smuggled migrants are often treated as criminals, too.
With trafficking, by contrast, international borders do not necessarily
have to be crossed. The profit does not result from the movement itself
but rather from migrant’s work in the country of destination. Traf-
ficked migrants are portrayed as victims more often than smuggled mi-
grants. They are talked about as objects of traffickers, without any form
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of agency (see also the introduction to this book for this victimhood
discourse).
However, the legal division between smuggling and trafficking over-
simplifies the demarcation between voluntary and involuntary pro-
cesses of migration. There are clear-cut cases of trafficking in which a
migrant is kidnapped and trafficked completely against her will. But
the majority of cases are much more complex and defy easy categorisa-
tion. Some trafficked prostitutes, for example, leave their country of
origin with full consent, as a strategic action to improve their situation,
but then end up in exploitative situations. The vast majority of mi-
grants have some agency, and it is unusual for them not to have any
choice or receive any benefit in the process. Migrant women working
in prostitution are, however, often framed a priori as victims of traffick-
ing without any agency, even when it was their own decision to work
in the sex industry (Doezema 2002; Andrijasevic 2004).
Smuggled migrants, on the other hand, may be deceived or mal-
treated by their smuggler even when they themselves contacted them
and consented. Smuggled migrants can become victims of trafficking
during or even after the migration process, making it hard to draw a
line between the two (Van Liempt 2006). It is therefore not very help-
ful to view trafficked migrants exclusively as having migrated against
their will and smuggled migrants as the opposite. Migrants in general
often face few choices when fleeing persecution or social and economic
insecurity. Yet this does not mean they are without agency. Migrating
with help from a smuggler may very well be the only way to escape vio-
lence, to join one’s husband or wife in another country, or to secure
one’s standard of living. The smuggling of migrants can even be re-
garded as a response to humanitarian needs. Article 31 of the Geneva
Convention explicitly recognises that asylum seekers might need to en-
ter a safe country through ‘illegal’ means. Indeed, individuals today
must increasingly adopt ‘illegal’ strategies in order to be in a position
to make a formal asylum claim (see also Morrison & Crosland 2000).
Since the 1990s the term ‘smuggling’ has started to be used more
widely in reference to ‘illegal’ forms of assistance. At that time many
‘spontaneous’ asylum seekers started to come from countries with
which no prior links existed. The level of protection these ‘sponta-
neous’ asylum seekers needed was no longer taken for granted, and
the term ‘bogus asylum seeker’ was introduced. Smugglers who used
to help refugees escape ‘bad’ regimes were once framed as heroes.
Now the same smugglers were criminalised and accused of bringing in
‘illegal’ immigrants and ‘bogus’ asylum seekers. Yet it is clear that gen-
uine asylum seekers are just as likely to have used the services of
smugglers. Article 31 of the Geneva Convention acknowledges this rea-
lity by stating that states should not impose penalties on account of re-
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fugees’ illegal entry or presence. In the new discourse, smuggled mi-
grants are perceived as rational persons (usually economic migrants)
who have taken high risks and paid enormous amounts of money to
‘criminal organisations’ in order to enter a country ‘illegally’. They are
referred to as ‘intruders’ who sneak across borders and deliberately
break the law. Smuggled migrants are thus also labelled ‘illegal’ when
only their activities are illegal (see Koser 2005 and the introduction to
this book).
According to a provision in the Schengen Agreement, human smug-
gling has become recognised in many European countries’ legal sys-
tems since the 1990s. In the Netherlands, human smuggling entered
the penal code on 31 December 1993 (before that date, smuggling of
persons was not considered a crime). In 1996, the minimum penalty
for human smuggling was raised from one to four years’ imprison-
ment. In 2005, the profit-making element was removed from the defi-
nition of smuggling (it remained intact, however, for assisting ‘illegal’
stay). This narrowing of the definition of smugglers criminalises more
forms of assistance as it classifies all smugglers equally, even the ones
who smuggle for ‘humanitarian’ reasons. Moreover, it explicitly links
migration with crime.
4.2 Methodology
Salt and Hogarth (2000) brought together data from several studies in
order to estimate the number of ‘illegal’ migrants and the role of smug-
glers/traffickers within ‘illegal’ migration. They arrived at the conclu-
sion that most of the data on this topic are unreliable. Moreover, there
is believed to be a lot of sensational over-reporting (Black 2003). The
academic literature agrees on the fact that many asylum seekers are
smuggled, but there are no precise data to back this claim. Efionayi-
Mader, Chimienti, Dahinden and Piguet (2001) say that almost all of
their respondents, male as well as female, claimed to have used a
smuggler at some stage during their migration to Switzerland. Re-
search in the Netherlands shows that asylum seekers are more fre-
quently smuggled than other immigrant groups who have entered the
country in an illegal way (Engbersen, Staring, Van der Leun, De Boom,
Van der Heijden & Cruiff 2002).
Data from the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Department
(IND) show that in 1999, an average of 95 per cent of all asylum appli-
cants were smuggled at some stage of their migration process (IND
2000: 31). The IND analyses are based on different types of statistical
data and also on first and second hearings of asylum seekers after they
made their requests. The first hearing of an asylum seeker serves to estab-
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lish his or her identity, nationality and the route he or she has travelled.
In the IND analyses, the term ‘smuggling’ is used when someone has en-
tered the Netherlands without valid travel documents and is assisted by
travel agents and has paid a sum of money in return. The term ‘travel
agent’ is used to refer to all the assistance (paid and unpaid) an asylum
seeker has had. Hesseling and Taselaar (2001) balance this by present-
ing a more nuanced picture. Not all people are smuggled from begin-
ning to end, and the quoted 95 per cent of cases are based on the wider
definition of a smuggler, namely a travel agent. They also report that
the degree to which smugglers are used varies according to ethnic
groups. Hesseling and Taselaar (2001) studied three regions in detail:
Bosnia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Southern Caucasus
and the Russian Federation, and Western Africa. They concluded that
between 10 and 60 per cent of the asylum seekers from these regions
had been smuggled. They make an important observation, however, re-
garding the quality of their data, stating that such data cannot be
trusted completely as they are based on declarations made by asylum
seekers for the purpose of a successful asylum request. It is known
that in certain cases, asylum seekers alter parts of their stories in order
to improve their chance of securing refugee status.
As far as smuggling is concerned, data from the Dutch Immigration
and Naturalisation Department do not provide many details about the
routes and modus operandi of their smuggler. Researchers tend to as-
sume that asylum seekers are advised, and often coerced, into not giv-
ing smugglers’ names or modus operandi to the police. However, con-
cealing them is also in the migrants’ own interest. An Eritrean woman
explained this as such:
I am not going to tell you the exact name of the mountain
where we were hiding; it is a famous place. You might want to
know about it, but there are more people to follow, and I do not
want to betray them.
I used the life story method as a primary source of data because perso-
nal stories reveal what it is like to be smuggled and because spending
time with people and showing interest in their experiences makes it ea-
sier to collect sensitive information. I focused on three different re-
gions. At the time fieldwork started (in May 2003), asylum applications
from Iraq and the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea) were
among the ten most common in the Netherlands. We interviewed 21
men and three women from Iraq (including one Kurdish man from
Iran who lived just across the border with Iraq and a Kurdish woman
from Syria). Interviews were in Kurdish, Arabic and Dutch. From the
Horn of Africa, we interviewed twelve men and seven women. The in-
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terviewees from the Horn of Africa came from Somalia, Eritrea, Ethio-
pia and Kenya. Interviews were conducted in Amharic, English and
Dutch.
I chose the Soviet Union as my third case because it is known that
many people from this region travel out of the country on ordinary visas
and enter the Netherlands in semi-legal ways (Engbersen et al. 2002). By
including this case, the different types of assistance given to ‘illegal’ mi-
grants that blur the categories of migrant legality could also be studied.
The interviewees from the former Soviet Union came from Ukraine,
Russia, Azerbaijan and Chechnya. Eight men and five women were inter-
viewed from this region. Interviews were in Russian, English and Dutch.
For the interviews, I made use of research assistants who had the
same geographical backgrounds as the respondents: an Iraqi man (a
Kurd), an Ethiopian man and a Georgian woman. Initially, my plan
was for them to function as translators, but we found that most of our
respondents had had unpleasant experiences with translators during
their official asylum hearings. Thus we decided that the assistants
would do the interviews on their own in an informal setting. Anonym-
ity and confidentiality were important since human smuggling and ‘il-
legal’ migration are sensitive topics. Some people were reluctant to talk
about certain aspects or particular details of their migration process,
but in general they were very open about their smuggling experience.
For them, it had simply been the only way to come to Europe. Many of
the interviewees talked about their smugglers as a ‘necessary evil’. We
tried to create an open atmosphere in which respondents had the op-
portunity to refuse to answer certain questions or to raise topics they
thought to be of relevance. This aspect was something most of the re-
spondents said had been lacking during the asylum interviews with the
immigration authorities. In general, we tried to create an atmosphere
that was the opposite of the official IND interview setting in which the
respondents had previously found themselves.
We avoided interviews with people who were still waiting for a deci-
sion on their case, which could have influenced the information given.
At the time of the interview, 49 of our 56 respondents had asked for
asylum, out of which seventeen were rejected, seven were still in (ex-
tended) process, and 25 were granted status (either temporary or per-
manent). Five interviewees did not apply for refugee status but came to
the Netherlands as labour migrants on a visa that was obtained in a
fraudulent way. Two respondents were introduced by friends or agen-
cies to a future husband in the Netherlands and applied for a visa
through the family reunification procedure in accordance with Dutch
immigration policy.
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4.3 Gendered aspects of ‘illegal’ migration
In this chapter I will take a closer look at how smuggling differs in var-
ious sending regions: Iraq, the Horn of Africa and the former Soviet Un-
ion. Within this I will focus on its gendered aspects. In each case, I will
first concentrate on how people’s migration options differed by gender
and by region. I also will look in detail at different illegal border crossings
by analysing a migrant story from each region. What are the specific gen-
der advantages or disadvantages that can be traced through these stories?
4.3.1 Step-by-step smuggling from Iraq
Because my research assistant was a Kurd, like many asylum seekers
from Iraq, most of the people we interviewed from that country were
Kurds. It is very difficult for Kurds in Iraq to get a passport, let alone a
visa. Visas are distributed by the Kurdistan Democracy Party (KDP) (in
Irbil) and by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) (in Suleimanyia),
but there are long waiting lists for these visas (Cornillie & Declercq
2003). An alternative is to apply for a darnak: a special document for
Turks living in Iraq who want to visit Turkey. Two of the people we in-
terviewed were able to get a darnak from their smuggler. It meant they
had to pretend to be Turks, which was difficult because they did not
speak Turkish. Overall, it is difficult to leave Iraq legally. People often
need smugglers not only to enter a country, but also to leave it. When
discussing ‘illegal’ migration, this lack of a legal exit is often ignored.
Because of UN sanctions under Saddam Hussein there was no interna-
tional airport operating in the north of Iraq. People leaving Iraq first
had to travel to a neighbouring country before they could continue
their journey. Which neighbouring country they chose depended on
which part of Iraq they were leaving, the openness of borders, the ter-
rain and the attitude of the authorities. Most people leaving from the
north-east area (including Sulemaniya, Ranje and Irbil) cross the Iraqi-
Iranian border. Iraqis who want to go to Iran officially need a bargai
(permission to stay in Iran) from the Iranian government, but few can
get such a permit. Smugglers provide alternatives for those who want (or
need) to leave Iraq and cannot enter Iran through the official channels.
People leaving from the north-western part of the Kurdish area (Zakhu
or Mosul) usually cross into Turkey, which also requires a visa. Some peo-
ple crossed via Syria, but according to one of our respondents, crossing
the Iraqi-Syrian border without being caught is a difficult endeavour: the
area is flat and there are few hiding places. There are also Iraqis who use
Jordan as a transit country, but this is not perceived as the ideal crossing
point among Kurdish migrants because Turkey and Iran are closer, and
moreover Kurds prefer to travel over Kurdish land (Chatelard 2002: 7).
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If most asylum seekers are smuggled, this should apply equally to fe-
male asylum seekers from Iraq. In 1999, 69 per cent of all the Iraqi
asylum applications in the Netherlands were from men and 31 per cent
from women (IND 2000: 11). Unfortunately, it is not clear whether
these women came with their partners or by themselves. My Kurdish
research assistant was convinced that there were hardly any Iraqi Kurd-
ish women travelling on their own through illegal channels, and there-
fore interviewed only one woman. I decided to look for Kurdish women
from Iraq to interview myself, but this proved difficult. I heard through
an organisation for Kurdish women that there were some women who
had come to the Netherlands alone, but they did not want to talk about
their journey. However I managed to arrange two interviews with Kurd-
ish women, one from Iraq and one from Syria. This does not prove
that there are more women who travel on their own, but their stories il-
lustrate what it is like to travel as a woman from this area in an illegal
way. It also sheds some light on the gender-specific obstacles and ad-
vantages that can be found in this type of border crossing.
4.3.2 Layla
Layla2 is a highly educated woman who has studied architecture and
worked at a technical university in the north of Iraq. At the time of the
interview Layla was 31 years old and single. Back in Iraq, she had been in-
volved in politics and was very active at the university, where she orga-
nised demonstrations. One day ‘Saddam’s people’ came to Layla’s
mother’s house and threatened her. This was not the first time this had
happened: five of her eight children had already had to escape from the
country. Layla has brothers and sisters in Germany, Denmark, Sweden
and the Netherlands. In 1998 she decided to flee, too. The first problem
that she encountered was the fact that she did not have a passport and
thus could not leave Iraq. Secondly, as a woman and a Sunni Muslim it
was difficult to travel alone. Muslim women in other regions must simi-
larly travel with their fathers, uncles or brothers, or at least pretend to do
so (Schoorl, Heering, Esveldt, Groenewold, Van den Erf, Bosch, De Valk
& De Bruin 2000: 60). These attitudes towards women restrict their pos-
sibilities and shape their migration processes. Still, Layla found a solu-
tion for her lack of a passport and the fact that she could not travel alone:
I used the identity card of my cousin to leave Iraq. She lives in
central Iraq, so I could travel freely through ‘Saddam areas’. I
told the driver who was bringing me to the Iranian border that I
was going to visit my brother in Iran. If they know you are flee-
ing as a woman alone, they will not take you.
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If Layla had not invented a brother waiting for her on the other side of
the border, the taxi driver would probably not have taken her. In a bor-
der village in Iraq Layla met a family who was also fleeing. Layla
decided to continue with them because she did not want to travel on
her own, and they found a guide who was willing to bring them to Iran
for $400. It was a deal with a guarantee, which meant they had to pay
only upon arrival. Before she left, Layla had asked her mother to sell
her engagement jewellery in order to pay for the trip. The group con-
sisted of seven men, four women and two children. They were lucky to
have found a guide willing to take them.
There are guides who refuse to take women and children be-
cause they slow down the group. I had heard of a route from
Turkey to Greece that takes twenty days. Guides refuse to take
women and children there because they say that would increase
the journey to 40 days. Our guide was used to having women
and children in his group. There were six horses with us to carry
the women and the children.
By refusing to take women, smugglers obviously limit their options
and thus create a gendered difference in migration patterns.
It was November when Layla and the others made the crossing from
Iraq to Iran. It had snowed and the paths they took were very icy. Three
other factors made this crossing dangerous. First, there was the danger
that they could step on landmines left over from the Iraq-Iran war of
1980. Second, Layla could have been raped or maltreated by her smug-
gler. She was lucky that her smuggler treated her well: rape is a gen-
der-specific type of violence that may discourage women from travel-
ling this way. Smuggled men can also become victims of violence, but
of a different kind. Thirdly, Layla could have been robbed or sent back
to Iraq by the soldiers checking the border area. To avoid being robbed
Layla made an extra pocket in her underwear in which she stored a
large sum of her own savings and some of the money from other
group members. ‘In our culture women are not searched easily,’ she
said. In this regard, she had an advantage over the men who tried to
cross borders illegally.
The next stop for Layla was Istanbul. According to Layla, the smug-
gler had a crush on her and therefore had given her the address of a
house where other Iraqis were staying. She would be safe there and
would be able to find ‘good’ smugglers. Layla shared this information
with the other travellers. So in Istanbul the whole group stayed in the
‘Iraqi’ house recommended by the smuggler. From there they planned
the next stage of their journey. They found out that it was not safe for
men to leave the house because they would run the risk of being
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stopped in the streets. Only Layla and another woman went outside to
look for a new smuggler who could take them to a European country.
They also bought food and drinks for those who stayed in the house.
The women had the advantage of not easily being suspected of being
‘illegal’ immigrants. Research shows that this is also true on the border
between Mexico and the US, where the police are less likely to stop wo-
men (Donato & Peterson 2004).
Eventually Layla and the other woman found a smuggler who knew
a truck driver who could take them to Europe. The trip was expensive –
US $1,200 – and the contact was risky since there was hardly any in-
formation about the man. Not everybody from the original group went
along; some decided to take other routes. New people were added to
the group. There were 30 people in the truck, hidden behind jeans,
and nobody knew where they were going.
It was a long and difficult trip. We had to be quiet. There was
very little food and drink, and the most important thing was that
there was little oxygen. Before we entered the truck the driver
asked explicitly whether there were people with asthma because
they would not be allowed to enter the truck. This truck driver
also refused children. According to him, they make too much
noise.
After spending four days in the truck they were let out at a gas station.
There they were put in a taxi and dropped in front of a police station.
It was only then that they found out they were in the Netherlands.
From the police station they were sent to an asylum seekers’ reception
centre where they asked for asylum. Layla’s involvement in politics was
not considered grounds for asylum and she did not get refugee status.
This is not uncommon, since women’s political activism is often not re-
cognised in the asylum procedure. Women frequently receive status be-
cause they are the wives or daughters of male refugees, not because
they were politically active themselves (Spijkerboer 2000; Oxford
2005). Layla then applied for humanitarian status (as many more wo-
men do than men). At the moment of the interview Layla still did not
have status, or any guarantee as to whether she would be able to re-
main legally in the Netherlands.
The insecurity of her situation has caused Layla serious psychologi-
cal problems. While in the Netherlands, she married an Iraqi man. Un-
like her, he was given refugee status soon after his arrival. According
to Layla, this was because he had come to the Netherlands earlier, at a
time when Iraqi refugees were accepted more easily. Indeed, admission
rules not only vary from country to country, but also from time to time.
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Even though we do not know much about women migrants smuggled
from Iraq, Layla’s story shows that there are women from that region
who do migrate on their own through ‘illegal’ channels. This is not
talked about openly because travelling alone as a Muslim woman is not
condoned in general, let alone through ‘illegal’ means. Interestingly
though, Layla’s story also shows that while being a woman can be dis-
advantageous at certain points, it may turn out to be beneficial at
others.
4.3.3 Women travelling on their own from the Horn of Africa
Most of the people we interviewed from the Horn of Africa first tra-
velled within their region of origin before coming to Europe. It is im-
portant to point out that there is a lot of regional migration and that
very few of these migrants come to Europe. Most of the people who
move within the region stay there. Since we interviewed people in the
Netherlands, we were only able to look at the minority of people who
continued their journey. Our respondents from the Horn of Africa had
first travelled to neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya,
Sudan, Djibouti and Yemen, and some had also spent time in refugee
camps.
One legal migration option besides a refugee camp is resettlement.
Access to resettlement differs for men and women. Those refugees
who are perceived as being most ‘vulnerable’ can officially apply, and
as a result women and children are resettled more often than men
(Horst 2003). Lately, since receiving states have grown reluctant to con-
tinue open-ended resettlement programmes for refugees, it has be-
come more difficult for migrants to pursue this option. The resettle-
ment criteria have also become more restrictive. In the late 1970s there
were over 200,000 resettlement cases a year worldwide, whereas in
2006 there were only 53,813. The US used to accept the largest num-
ber of refugees by far for resettlement, but after 9/11 its resettlement
programme was particularly hard hit (UNHCR 2006). As a result of
the reduced legal migration options, many asylum seekers turn to alter-
native possibilities.
At first glance it may seem that the legal option of resettlement and
the ‘illegal’ option of travelling with a smuggler are complete opposites.
However, in reality this is not the case. We spoke to people who spent
time in a refugee camp and who had already been accepted for resettle-
ment but still decided to contact a smuggler in order to continue their
journey. They felt unsafe in the camp and did not want to wait a long
time for the final decision on their resettlement. Others did not want
to register with the UNHCR because they feared that their claim would
be rejected and they would be deported back to their country of origin.
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Some people believe that UNHCR shares information with the authori-
ties in their country of origin. These biased attitudes toward UNHCR
are confirmed by a study among Iraqi refugees in Jordan (Chatelard
2002: 12), which states that there are also people who do not want to
register with the UN representatives because they want to move to a
specific country and therefore plan to seek asylum directly after arriv-
ing through ‘illegal’ channels.
It is a common assumption that men, more often than women, are
pioneers who take the initiative and arrange to be smuggled. However,
out of the nineteen smuggled interviewees from the Horn of Africa, se-
ven were women. This is not the majority, but still it represents a sub-
stantial proportion. These women were the first in their families to
come to the Netherlands, leaving their husbands behind. Most of them
gave as an explanation for their migration choices the fact that it was
safer for them to migrate than to stay behind. This shows that what is
considered ‘dangerous’ and ‘safe’ can vary from country to country and
may even differ according to gender. Danger is also relative: what is
seen by some as dangerous migration may be considered less so when
the place of departure is already unsafe. The assumption that certain
risks are more likely to be taken by young single men does not take
into account the fact that the risks of remaining in the country of ori-
gin may be higher than those involved in migration (see also the intro-
duction to this book). This example shows clearly that it is important
to take into account where people are fleeing from, in order to truly
understand the emigration decision-making process. This is particu-
larly interesting from a gender perspective, as women face different
risks than men in their country of origin, which leads to different
choices regarding migration.
Most of the women we interviewed from the Horn of Africa travelled
with their children, whereas men travelled on their own. For instance,
Aman, a Somali woman, came to the Netherlands without her husband
and with her three children. At the moment of the interview Aman
was 43. At age fifteen she was forced to marry a man she had never
previously met and who was eight years her senior. They had been to-
gether for fifteen years and had five children, one of whom had died
during the war. Aman’s husband had been working for an under-
ground radio station until he was taken by rebels and imprisoned.
Aman did not have any information about where he had been taken.
She left Somalia in 1994, and until 1997 she knew nothing of her hus-
band’s whereabouts.
For Aman, the journey to the Netherlands represents a very emo-
tional phase in her life. This is not only because of the difficulties she
faced throughout her journey, but most importantly because it was dur-
ing the journey that she had lost one of her sons, at the border with
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Kenya. This particular border was a very hectic point, with many mi-
grants making the crossover. Suddenly the police came, and she was ar-
rested and sent back to Mogadishu with only three of her children who
were physically closest to her in that chaos. However her son was not
walking next to her at the moment of her arrest, and so she lost him.
At the moment of our interview she still did not know whether he is
alive or not, but fears the worst.
In Mogadishu, Aman and her children were imprisoned by the re-
bels and she was forced to work for them as a nurse. However her cou-
sins, members of another clan, were also rebels and liberated her and
her children from the camp. They brought them to Djibouti, where
they also managed to arrange a passport3 and a trip to Europe for
them. Her cousins had paid the US $12,000 necessary for their trip.
Aman and her children travelled by plane on somebody else’s Djibouti
passport, which bore the three children’s names. Police call this way of
travelling the ‘look-alike’ method (IAM 2000). There were no problems
at the departure or the landing gate. According to Aman, this was be-
cause the photo of the passport’s original owner was quite similar to
hers. The man who provided the passport also accompanied Aman and
her children on the plane, and together they travelled via France to the
Netherlands. Upon arrival in Paris, the man asked Aman where she
wanted to go. She said the Netherlands, because she had a niece there.
They then took the Thalys train to the Netherlands.
It was only in the Netherlands that Aman found out about her hus-
band. After having asked almost everybody she knew about his situa-
tion, she finally found someone who had seen him at the border be-
tween Somalia and Kenya, being helped by people to cross. One day in
1997 he called her. She and her children were very happy to know that
he was still alive. At that time, Aman had received refugee status and
was working twenty hours a week at minimum wage, and thus had
trouble merely surviving. In order to bring her husband to the Nether-
lands she had to meet certain criteria. One of these is a permanent
working contract and a certain level of income (120 per cent of the
Dutch minimum wage) in order to support one’s spouse. For Aman
these requirements were not easy to meet. An alternative would have
been to hire a smuggler in order to bring her husband over, but she
could not afford that either. Like many other migrant women, she has
found it difficult to reunite with her family: at the time of the interview
she was still searching for the means to bring her husband to the Neth-
erlands. Studies bear this out, showing that it is more difficult for wo-
men than for men to meet the criteria for family reunification (De
Boer & Wijers 2006).
Aman’s story reveals that perceptions of safety differ from region to
region. From the Horn of Africa it was perceived to be safer for women
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and children to travel to Europe through ‘illegal’ means rather than
stay behind in a region at war. The ‘illegal’ journey itself was also safer
than, for example, the journey of those who came on land from Iraq to
Europe. Most of our respondents from the Horn of Africa travelled by
plane on forged documents, a relatively safe option.
4.3.4 ‘Tourists’ from the former Soviet Union
For our respondents from the former Soviet Union, eight men and five
women, it was relatively easy to enter the Netherlands. They either
came on a visa obtained with the help of a travel agency or they ar-
ranged their journey themselves. The migrants’ experiences with ob-
taining visas from agencies clearly show that it is difficult to make a
clear-cut division between legal and ‘illegal’ forms of migration.
Anna is a 24-year-old Russian woman from Ukraine who entered
the Netherlands as a tourist in 2000. She came to join her boyfriend
Boris, who had already been residing and working in the Netherlands
for a couple of months. They both planned to work abroad, but because
neither had relatives outside Ukraine who could help them migrate
they decided to travel as ‘tourists’. It should be noted that it is difficult
to come up with the correct details of a story to back the application for
a tourist visa. It can demand a lot of effort, time and money, and things
can go wrong unexpectedly. Moreover, the assumptions of the visa
authorities as to whether the applicant is a ‘real’ tourist are also gen-
dered.
When Anna wanted to join Boris in September 2000, she tried to
obtain a visa through the same agency he had used, with the same
story to back her application. However, for her, things did not work out
as planned.
I decided to go to the same agency Boris had gone to. It was in
Kiev. One day I went there with my suitcase, ready to leave. I
had already made a reservation for the bus to Germany, for the
next day. But when I went to the agency to pick up my passport
with the visa in it, hoping it wouldn’t be a problem, just as it
had not been for Boris, I found out that my visa was rejected!
This was a real shock for me. I really did not expect this could
happen. I had already quit my job and told everybody that I was
leaving for the Netherlands.
The lady at the agency told Anna that she could try again, but Anna
did not want to stay in Kiev waiting. The same evening, at her home in
Donetsk, she saw an advertisement in the newspaper for an agency
that offered German Schengen visas (a Schengen visa is valid through-
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out the whole Schengen zone). Local newspapers in former Soviet
countries openly advertise travel visas and job opportunities, and advise
readers on the best emigration options to Western Europe. This is the
case in many other developing countries (Kuptsch 2006).
The next morning Anna called the agency in Kiev and asked to be
sent back her visa application file. In order to apply for the German
visa, she needed a short biography stating her marital status, the rea-
son for travelling, and her salary in Ukraine. The rule was that a pro-
spective traveller had to earn at least US $450 a month. When she ap-
plied for the Dutch visa, Anna had brought a false document stating
that she worked as a secretary, because her real income (as a teacher)
did not meet the minimum level. Boris had done the same, and she
thought of using that document again. However, the woman from the
travel agency in Donetsk told her that such certificates were not good
enough and that she could provide better ones, more believable, at the
cost of US $10 each. Anna agreed, and the document showing her in-
come was made before her eyes as she waited.
The woman at the agency looked at Anna doubtfully, noting that she
was too young, not to mention unmarried, which would make it more
difficult to get a visa. She checked the records of the people she was
processing visa applications for in order to find a couple old enough
for Anna to pass as their daughter. Thus, the story emerged: Anna was
travelling with her parents, the older couple, on whose application
form Anna was cross-referenced as a daughter. She also made a copy
of Anna’s national passport and applied a stamp to it, which stated that
she was married. On another page she wrote that Anna had a baby sev-
eral months old. Being married and having a baby would guarantee
her return as far as the embassy authorities were concerned, she ex-
plained. Anna could pick up her visa within two weeks. All that she
had to do was buy a return ticket to Cologne (in order to prevent any
suspicion of overstaying) and finally she could go. From Germany,
Anna travelled to the Netherlands on her own. Both Anna and Boris
have overstayed their visas, working and living ‘illegally’ in the Nether-
lands at the time of the interview.
This example shows that legal migration processes may have illegal
components, such as changing one’s biography in order to meet the
criteria for a tourist visa, or illegal payments for forged documents. In
a sense, these travel agencies can also be seen as part of the smuggling
industry (Van Liempt 2004). It also shows that travel agencies can take
advantage of social gender roles, and that this may have positive out-
comes for women’s mobility. Apparently it is not expected that women
would leave their children behind for a period longer than the three
months that a Schengen tourist visa lasts.
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4.3.5 ‘Mail-order brides’ from the former Soviet Union
There are more women than men from the former Soviet Union leg-
ally residing in the Netherlands. In 2006 the numbers were 27,459
women and 18,542 men. These figures include immigrants and their
offspring. The difference in numbers between men and women can be
explained by the fact that an increasing number of Dutch men are mar-
rying women from the former Soviet Union (600 in 2003) (De Beer &
Harmsen 2003).
Some of our female respondents from Russia came to the Nether-
lands with the help of a ‘mail-order bride’ agency. This is a legal op-
tion, but a clearly gendered one; there are no agencies that function as
intermediates between Western women and ‘mail-order grooms’. Mi-
grating with the help of such an agency implies risks. For instance, wo-
men may end up in slavery-like conditions, as some mail-order bride
businesses act as facades for trafficking and prostitution. Worried
about the possibility of such forms of abuse, the US passed a law in
2005 authorizing consulates to share information with would-be brides
regarding their future husbands (UNFPA 2006: 31). Besides the risk of
ending up in slavery-like conditions, foreign women are also depen-
dent on their Dutch husbands for their legal status, which renders
them the vulnerable party in the marriage.
4.3.6 Tamara
Tamara is a 30-year-old schoolteacher and photojournalist from Mos-
cow. She is divorced and has a son from that marriage. Immediately
after her divorce, she started to think about finding a ‘good’ father for
her son. Tamara did not see any opportunities to find a ‘good’ husband
and father for her son in Russia. As she explained:
It is not easy in Russia; all the good men were killed or deported
in the Soviet period. The ones left are alcoholics, and they’re
very conservative.
In 2000 Tamara decided to start searching the Internet for Russian
marriage agencies, and registered with one. As she recounted:
I had a lot of responses from Western men. Some of them re-
plied immediately with replies such as, ‘Come to my country
and I’ll be willing to marry you.’ I did not buy into these kinds
of things. These men just want to get you into their beds.
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Because her mother’s best friend from school lives in the Netherlands,
Tamara decided to concentrate her search for a husband there. She
bought a ticket to the Netherlands and informed the marriage agency
of her imminent trip. She had made arrangements to stay with her
mother’s friend, from whom she had already received an invitation.
The agency informed all its male clients in the Netherlands that Ta-
mara was coming.
From that moment on, I started to get more letters from Dutch
guys. I fell in love with one of the candidates, Jan. I fell in love
with him from his second letter on. He was very romantic. He
is 22 years older than I am, but I didn’t care. When I would go
to the mail order bride agency to check my mail (Tamara did not
have an internet connection at home), I always immediately
asked for my favourite guy, so everybody knew I liked him the
most. And at night we used to talk for four or five hours on the
phone, when my son was already in bed.
The agency advised Tamara not to focus on just one person, but it soon
became clear that she did not want to see other men.
Jan had been clever enough to pick me up from the airport and
to show me the beach, and from the second day on I did not
stay at my mother’s friend’s place any longer, but at his place.
Together we cancelled all the other dates I had.
After Tamara went back to Russia, Jan started to visit her and her son
in Moscow.
He came almost every month. And one day he suggested that
we should come to Holland, so that we could finally all live to-
gether.
Tamara and her son travelled on a three-month visa, but before return-
ing to Russia they decided to apply for a residence permit. Jan had a
fixed contract as a teacher and could meet the income requirements.
He earned enough money to support her. In 2001 Tamara came to the
Netherlands with her son to settle. Today, the three of them live to-
gether in the Netherlands. Tamara will soon receive her own residence
permit.
This example shows that the ‘mail order bride’ option can be used
by women as a strategy to improve their lives despite the risk of ending
up as a victim of trafficking. It also demonstrates that migration op-
tions differ by country as well as by gender. Besides connecting women
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with possible husbands, mail-order bride agencies also provide women
(in this case from the former Soviet Union) with the possibility of tra-
velling in a legal and relatively cheap way.
4.4 Conclusion
This analysis of the experiences of women and men who were assisted
in the migration process first demonstrates that migrants have differ-
ent reasons for migrating through ‘illegal’ channels. Sometimes people
choose this route despite the availability of legal options. For instance,
it may be quicker or safer to leave a refugee camp through ‘illegal’
channels than to wait for an official resettlement. The degree of risk in
the country of origin may lessen the comparative risks of migration. In
times of civil war, for example, it is often safer to move than to stay be-
hind. When looking at differences between regions, it becomes clear
that options are not the same across countries and moreover are af-
fected by state policies. Migrants from the former Soviet Union have
the opportunity to travel legally, with visas, more than people from the
other countries presented here. Those in Iraq and the Horn of Africa
find it more difficult to get a visa. This is further complicated by the
fact that people in these areas often may not even possess a passport.
Thus these migrants are more dependent on smugglers who are able
to organise journeys through ‘illegal’ channels. Most of our respon-
dents from the Horn of Africa travelled with smugglers by plane, using
forged, stolen or borrowed documents. This is a relatively safe mode of
travel because it gives ‘illegal’ journeys the appearance of legal ones.
It is also important to note that it is impossible to leave certain coun-
tries in a legal way, and that therefore it is not only the policies of the
receiving countries, but also those of the sending countries that have an
impact on the construction of illegality. Layla’s story shows that in or-
der to get out of the northern part of Iraq an exit visa is needed, which
is almost impossible to get. This aspect is often overlooked, since the
focus of researchers and policymakers lies with the perception of ‘illeg-
ality’ at the receiving end of the migration process.
Moreover, legal and ‘illegal’ types of migration cannot be separated
easily, since what may have started as legal migration can turn easily
into ‘illegal’ migration. For instance, in the case of Anna and Boris,
even though they knew beforehand that they wanted to overstay and
become ‘illegal’ residents, they both entered the Netherlands legally as
‘tourists’. These forms of assistance are usually not considered in dis-
cussions of smuggling. Media images usually show those who enter on
shipwrecked boats. This ignores the fact that the majority of ‘illegal’
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immigrants actually employ other methods, such as using tourist visas
and false documents (see also De Haas 2006).
Besides regional differences, migration opportunities can be differ-
ent for men and women. Layla’s story shows that there are smugglers
who refuse to take women and children because they walk too slowly
or make too much noise. This limits women’s migration options. Ta-
mara’s story, in contrast, is a positive example of a gendered migration
opportunity. She travelled to the Netherlands as a ‘mail-order bride’.
This option is available only to women as there are no ‘mail-order
grooms’. The roles ascribed to women by society may also have an im-
pact on how they move. It was shown that in Iraq, it is not perceived
as fitting for women to travel on their own. Layla had to pretend she
was visiting an uncle in order to find a man who would drive her to
the Iranian border. Furthermore, upon arrival her asylum story about
political resistance was not acknowledged as a credible claim. This si-
tuation connects with the fact that women are more often considered
victims in the migration discourse than active agents. The narrative of
victimhood has lead to protective measures, which do not always help
but can restrict women’s options and expose them to greater danger
(see also the introduction to this book).
However, it was also shown that women can actively make use of
these gendered perceptions and opportunities. Anna’s story shows that
a single woman with no children is more easily suspected of overstay-
ing a visa and thus becoming an ‘illegal’ immigrant, as compared with
a married mother who leaves her children behind. Both Anna and the
woman working at the travel agency actively used these gender percep-
tions. Layla also benefited to a certain extent from the fact that the
smuggler had a crush on her. However, this could also have had nega-
tive effects. Some women are afraid to travel with a smuggler because
of the danger of being sexually abused. These gender-specific dangers
do exist and should not be denied. Yet at the same time it is important
to acknowledge the complexities involved in assisted forms of migra-
tion and the different levels of agency that are at play.
Notes
1 I would like to thank Linnet Taylor for editing this chapter and I gratefully acknowledge
the useful comments of the editors of the book as well as the anonymous referees.
2 A pseudonym is used here to guarantee anonymity.
3 Since 1991, no official Somali passports have been issued, which means no one can get
a visa to travel abroad. As a result there is a lively trade in forged and stolen passports.
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5 Old and new labour migration to Malaysia:
From colonial times to the present1
Blanca Garce´s-Mascaren˜as
Anyone visiting Malaysia from the 1880s onwards would be struck by
the presence of foreign workers in the country. At the end of the nine-
teenth century and the beginning of the twentieth a visitor could ob-
serve Chinese workers in tin mines and Indian workers at sugar, coffee
and later rubber plantations. Indian workers also constructed roads
and railways and worked in supporting public services. Most of these
Chinese and Indian workers were men. One hundred years later, from
the 1980s onwards, a visitor would again find many foreign workers.
This time, however, these workers mainly come from Indonesia as well
as Nepal, India, Myanmar, Vietnam and Bangladesh. As in the past,
male foreign workers are prominent at plantations and construction
sites. However, in contrast to the past, female foreign workers are
found in manufacturing and domestic service.
If we compare past and present, many similarities become apparent.
To mention a few, foreign workers in Malaysia have always taken up
jobs that were rejected by local workers. Moreover, they have been asso-
ciated with temporary labour. Many Chinese, Indian and Indonesian
workers have returned to their countries of origin after some years.
Their stay in Malaysia has thus been shaped by their desire to save as
much money as possible in the shortest period of time. In this regard,
their lives are not much different from those of Spanish, Italian, Turk-
ish or Moroccan guest workers who came to Western Europe during
the 1950s and 1960s. In the case of Malaysian foreign workers, how-
ever, their dependence on employers has been increased and institutio-
nalised by specific contracts, debts and work permits. Furthermore, in
contrast to European guest workers, their recruitment has always been
organised by private agencies.
By comparing old and new labour migration in Malaysia, this chap-
ter has three objectives. First of all, it aims to explain present migration
policies. In particular, by relating the present to the past, my purpose
is to understand why Malaysian migration policies have tried to create
a temporary labour force, why they have tied foreign workers to parti-
cular employers and how private recruitment agencies have organised
the immigration process (to and from Malaysia) from the beginning.
Secondly, this chapter aims to show how the rigidities underlying mi-
gration policies have tended to make non-regulated migration an ad-
vantage both in colonial and present times. Since these rigidities might
be different for women and men, I will examine to what extent and
how the specific position of female migrants determines other forms
of non-regulation. Thirdly and finally, the analysis of migration flows
outside the state-regulated migrant system will enable me to distin-
guish between different meanings of non-regulation. In particular, a
distinction can be made between non-regulation, illegality and deporta-
ble illegality.2 Here again I will consider to what extent the implications
of being illegal are different for women and men. The final goal of this
research is to link illegality to the nature of the state and therefore to
denaturalise the concept of illegality and insist on its historical specifi-
city.
This research is based on secondary literature as well as on data
obtained from my fieldwork in Kuala Lumpur from June to November
2006. Since the comparison between old and new labour migration in
Malaysia arises from the need to explain and relate the present situa-
tion to the past, the historical part is exclusively based on secondary
literature. Regarding my research on labour migration to Malaysia
from the 1980s onwards, one of the main difficulties I encountered
was that migration policies in Malaysia are considered confidential. As
a member of the Cabinet Committee for Foreign Workers stated, ‘Mi-
gration policies are somewhere in the Ministry of Home Affairs but
they are confidential, they are not accessible to the public’ (interview
20/10/2006, Putrajaya). I therefore focused on the press as the main
source of analysis. More specifically, I went through the Malaysian
newspapers The New Straits Times, Bernana Times, New Sunday Times,
The Malay Mail and Malaysiakini from 1985 to 2006. Moreover, I con-
ducted about 30 interviews with representatives of employers’ organisa-
tions and trade unions, government officials, recruitment agents and
members of NGOs.
In this chapter I will first explain why foreign workers have been so
fundamental to the Malaysian economy since colonial times. I will then
analyse the main characteristics and practices of state-regulated labour
migration. In the following section I will examine migration flows out-
side regulated labour migration and highlight how these have been
promoted by migration regulations. Finally, I will consider the various
means of non-regulated migration from colonial times to the present.
In the conclusion, I will make some theoretical observations to position
this chapter within the whole book as well as in relation to the para-
digm of historical migration studies.
106 BLANCA GARCÉS-MASCAREÑAS
5.1 Exporting goods, importing labour
In the early nineteenth century, before the British came into control
(direct or indirect) of the Malay States, the family functioned as the ba-
sic unit of the economy, which was based on rice production, horticul-
ture and fishing. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the British developed rubber and tin industries in contrast to the pre-
vious subsistence economy. These so called ‘twin’ pillars of the colonial
economy were meant to serve the growing demands of US and British
commercial and industrial interests (especially for war material). With-
in the next few decades, colonial Malaya became a producer and expor-
ter of primary products and an importer of manufactured goods (Kaur
1999: 8; Chin 1998: 34). A foreign-owned export-oriented sector
emerged that ran parallel to the subsistence, peasant agricultural sector
represented by local Malays and that was directly linked to the British
metropolis.
In the 1890s government officials concluded that the Malay States
had not attracted more British capital because labour was difficult to
mobilise (Parmer 1960: 18). The colonial government blamed its in-
ability to attract local Malays either on the Malays’ laziness (Emerson
1964: 18) or on their value system, which, the British argued, discour-
aged the pursuit of individual gain (Silcock 1965: 183). Most likely,
Malays were economically self-sufficient in the communal (village) set-
tings, so there was no need for them to work under the strenuous con-
ditions, strict discipline and regulations demanded by waged employ-
ment in mines and plantations (Ramachandran 1994: 42). Unable to
attract local Malays to support the colonial economy, the British turned
to migrant labour from China and India.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mainly Chinese
labourers worked in the Malaysian mines and plantations. In 1911
Chinese workers represented 96.2 per cent of the total mining labour
force (Kaur 1999: 8-9). To neutralise the threat posed by an over-
concentration of Chinese workers, the colonial administration con-
sciously sponsored East Indian (Tamil) immigration into the then
rapidly expanding rubber plantation sector (Halim 1982 261). This led
to a clear predominance of Indian labour in the plantations. Indians
also worked on the construction of roads, railways and public utilities
services. In 1940 the Chinese represented 34.2 per cent and Indians
10 per cent of the total population of Malaya (see Table 5.1). The pro-
portion of women in the total migration flow has been estimated at
less than 20 per cent (Sandhu 1969: 82).
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Table 5.1 Population of Malaya, 1911-1944 (total numbers and percentages)
Origin 1911 1921 1931 1940
Malays and other Malaysians 1,416,796
(52.1)
1,651,051
(48.8)
1,962,021
(44.4)
2,286,459
(41.5)
Chinese 915,883
(34.2)
1,174,777
(35.2)
1,709,392
(39.2)
2,358,335
(42.8)
Indians 267,159
(10.0)
471,666
(14.2)
624,009
(14.3)
748,829
(13.6)
Others 72,916
(3.7)
60,560
(1.8)
89,924
(2.1)
112,471
(2.1)
Total 2,672,754 3,358,054 4,385,346 5,504,094
Source: Sandhu 1969: 275
After independence in 1957, the Malaysian economy continued to be
based primarily on commodity exports under the control of foreign cor-
porations. In terms of the migrant presence, the main difference was
that those workers who had been foreigners became recognised citi-
zens of the new nation-state and hence settled permanently in the
country. Moreover, in the mid-1960s the switch from traditional rubber
plantations to palm oil and cocoa production (less labour intensive) re-
duced the demand for labour. In the 1960s these changes created a
temporary labour surplus that generated migration flows from the old
to the new plantations and to urban areas (Navamukundan 1988: 217).
However, this labour surplus represented only a short interlude in a
country characterised by large labour shortages.
In the early 1970s the economic inequalities between the Malays
and the Chinese, and the related growing conflict within and between
them, led the Malaysian government to implement the New Economic
Policy (NEP 1971-1990), which was designed to eliminate poverty and
to restructure society by dismantling the identification of ethnicity with
economic function and geographic space. The NEP marked the transi-
tion from unregulated to planned capitalism and led to unprecedented
economic growth characterised by the shift from a reliance primarily
on commodity exports to exports in manufactured goods. For instance,
while agriculture and other raw materials decreased from 50 per cent
in 1970 to 11.3 per cent of the total national exports in 1990, manufac-
tured goods increased from 6.5 per cent to 54.2 per cent in the same
period (Chin 1998: 57). This economic shift was facilitated by foreign
capital and the relocation of production plants from Western to devel-
oping countries (Froebel, Kreye & Heinrichs 1980, quoted in Chin
1997: 358), together with the rise of commodity and oil prices (Chin
2000: 1043).
The NEP had contradictory effects in the country’s labour market.
On the one hand, the emphasis on urbanisation and industrialisation
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promoted Malays to a better position in the labour market. For in-
stance, while Malays represented 30.8 per cent and 37.9 per cent re-
spectively of the total labour force in the secondary and tertiary sector
in 1970, after the NEP these percentages increased to 48.0 and 51.0
per cent (Chin 1998: 56). On the other hand, unlike in South Korea
and Taiwan, economic growth depended on foreign investments that
were attracted by emphasising the low labour costs (Jomo 2003: 203).
In short, while urbanisation and employment policies sought to and
did improve the socio-economic position of Malaysian citizens regard-
less of their ethnicity, economic growth continued to be dependent on
a continuing supply of cheap labour. In this context, the employment
of both legal and illegal migrant workers from neighbouring countries
was quickly perceived as necessary for economic growth and prosperity.
Despite the state’s attempt to reduce the migrant worker population
and its increasing emphasis on high-tech and less labour-intensive in-
dustries, in the last two decades there has been an unabated increase
in the inflow of migrant workers. In 1995 there were about 1.2 million
foreign workers (of which 500-700,000 were estimated to be illegally
in the country) and in 2000 there were about 2 million (1.2 million le-
gal and about 800,000 illegal) (Jones 2000: 54; Wong & Anwar 2003:
172). In 2006 the number of legal foreign workers reached 1.8 million
plus an estimated one million illegal workers (Syed & Syed 2006). Le-
gal foreign workers are mainly found in manufacturing, plantations,
domestic services and construction (see Table 5.2). Most of them come
from Indonesia, but there are also foreign workers from Nepal, India,
Myanmar, Vietnam, Bangladesh, the Philippines and Pakistan (see
Table 5.3).
Table 5.2 Documented foreign workers in Malaysia by economic sector (x 1,000)
Year Agriculture Manufacturing Mining Construction Services Total
1991 126.5 38.9 1.9 42.1 86.2 295.6
1992 137.2 54.1 2.3 59.1 96.5 349.2
1993 176.1 103.9 2.1 51.4 107.5 441.0
1994 179.5 109.8 2.0 58.1 110.9 460.3
1995 173.0 115.7 1.8 64.8 124.0 479.3
1996 271.6 264.8 3.5 131.2 229.0 900.1
1997 265.2 283.0 6.1 150.1 240.9 945.3
1998 317.6 250.1 2.6 151.4 278.0 999.7
1999 363.6 250.6 6.0 131.1 301.9 1,053.7
2000 415.4 262.5 2.9 163.5 326.7 1,171.0
2001 281.4 213.0 2.1 99.0 265.6 861.1
2006* 412.0 614.0 n.a. 101.0 160.0 1,800.0
Source: Ministry of Finance (2005)
* Data obtained from The New Straits Times 19 July 2006
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Despite growing demand for female foreign workers in sectors such as
manufacturing and domestic service, women continue to be underre-
presented in comparison with the number of male foreign workers. In
1994 it was estimated that female foreign workers represented 29 per
cent of the total number of foreign workers in the country (Kassim
1994: 5). However, it is difficult to break down data according to gen-
der as official statistics and reports do not provide this information.
While official reports distinguish the proportion of foreign workers in
domestic service – in June 2006 workers in domestic service repre-
sented 17.5 per cent of the total number of foreign workers (The New
Straits Times 8 September 2006) – the percentage of women in manu-
facturing and service remain unrecorded.
Table 5.3 Distribution of foreign workers by country of origin
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2006*
Indonesia 50.4 53.3 65.7 69.4 68.4 64.7 67.5
Bangladesh 39.4 37.1 27.0 24.6 17.1 9.7 3.2
India 3.1 3.6 3.2 3.0 4.0 4.6 7.7
Myanmar 2.2 1.3 0.9 0.5 1.0 3.3 5.1
Thailand 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 2.4 0.4
Philippines 2.7 2.7 1.8 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.2
Pakistan 1.7 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.8
Nepal 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 7.3 9.7 11.1
Others 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 4.6 5.5
Source: Ministry of Finance (2005)
* Data obtained from The New Straits Times 19 July 2006
5.2 State-regulated migration
Both in colonial times and in the present migration, regulations in Ma-
laysia have aimed to create a cheap foreign labour force. This has been
done by enforcing labour circulation, restricting labour mobility and
maintaining the powerlessness of the migrant. In this section, I will
analyse each of these aspects in colonial times and at present. Since
Chinese migration to Malaysia during colonial times was not regulated
by the government, I will refer exclusively to Indian labour migration.
5.2.1 Labour circulation
Both in colonial times and in the late twentieth century, labour mi-
grants were young individuals without dependents. The main differ-
ence is that while in the colonial period most of them were men, from
the 1980s onwards there were both men and women. All of them,
however, came to Malaysia for a limited period of time. Their aim was
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to make money and return to their country of origin after some years.
This viewpoint was also held by officials. Both British and Malaysian
authorities saw migrant workers as sojourners who could be repa-
triated when the demand for their services no longer existed. In this re-
gard, the supply of labour increased when they were needed and de-
creased during recessions. Examples are the mass repatriation pro-
grammes organised by the government after the economic depressions
of 1929 and 1997.
Although in both cases the temporality of foreign workers func-
tioned as a regulatory mechanism to soften the impact of economic
crises, it was different in each case. Indian workers came to colonial
Malaya with an initial contract of three to five years as indentured la-
bour (Arasaratnam 1979: 11) or with an invitation letter to work for a
particular employer under the kangany system. Although they arrived
as temporary migrants, their stay in Malaysia could last as long as they
were needed. They were only expected to return in case of unemploy-
ment or health problems. At the same time, since the predominantly
single male migrant population in Malaysia was seen as a potential
threat to social stability and public order, various attempts were made
by the colonial government to encourage entire Indian families to
migrate.
Female migration was thus seen as a way of ensuring the stability of
the Indian migrant community and providing a constant supply of
low-wage labour. Although they were invited to colonial Malaya as wi-
ves and mothers, women were also expected to work, since Indian
men’s wages could not support a family. In this regard, colonial policy
constructed dual roles for Indian women in Malaya. On the one hand,
they reproduced the future low-wage workforce and ensured stable en-
vironments for Indian men. On the other hand, they worked alongside
men on the plantations (Chin 1998: 37). As a result of this policy, the
percentage of Indian women living on plantations for 1911, 1921 and
1931 increased from 26.1 per cent to 35.1 per cent and 39.9 per cent re-
spectively (Chin 1998: 37). The main consequence was that many of
these families settled in colonial Malaya. At the time of independence
in 1957, Indian Malaysians represented 11.1 per cent of the total popula-
tion.
Since the early 1990s foreign workers have come to Malaysia on
short-term contracts that could be extended for a maximum period of
five to seven years. As most of my informants pointed out, this is be-
cause ‘they are foreign workers, but not migrants’ or ‘they came here
to work, not to get permanent residence permits’ (interviews of 13 Sep-
tember 2006 and 20 October 2006, Kuala Lumpur). In other words,
the temporality of new migrants has been a strategy not only to reduce
social security costs, but also to prevent the incorporation of the mi-
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grants into Malaysian society. These new restrictions on the temporal-
ity of migrant workers have had a huge impact on the position of fe-
male migrants. In order to avoid costs for families and health care and
to keep foreign workers from settling in the country, female foreign
workers are obliged to undergo annual gynaecological tests. If they are
found to be pregnant they are immediately deported. This means that
in contrast to the past, foreign women are only welcome as workers.
Their position in the labour market (mainly as domestic workers),
however, continues to emphasise their reproductive role. In other
words, although they are not allowed to have children, their work is
still seen as unproductive and reproductive at the same time. As was
said by a representative of Malaysian employers, ‘they are not normal
workers, they are part of the family’. Although this perception is not
unusual (Schrover, Van der Leun & Quispel 2007), it is nonetheless
striking if we take into account that their presence is fundamental for
economic growth as it permits and sustains the participation of Malay-
sian women in the more productive sectors of the economy and re-
duces political pressure on the state elite to provide public childcare
centres or to encourage Malaysian employers’ patronage of privately
owned childcare (Chin 1998: 109; Chin 1997: 329).
Since they are perceived as family members and non-workers, do-
mestic workers are the only foreign workers who are allowed to stay in
Malaysia for longer than seven years. According to the government
guidelines for foreign domestic workers, they can renew their work
permit until they are 45 years old. However, as many interviewees told
me, in practice they can stay in Malaysia as long as they are required
since their birth certificates can easily be forged. Hence domestic work-
ers are the only foreign workers who can stay in Malaysia almost inde-
finitely. This does not mean that they get a permanent residence per-
mit. As explained by an agent for domestic workers, ‘The government
is not obliged to give you a permanent residence permit. It depends on
what you have done. What is your contribution to the nation as a
maid? I don’t see any reason to give them a permanent residence per-
mit. That is for engineers’ (interview of 16 September 2006, Kuala
Lumpur). In other words, domestic workers, in contrast to other for-
eign workers, can be ‘temporary’ migrants forever in Malaysia.
5.2.2 Labour immobility
In both the past and the present, restricted labour mobility in the la-
bour market has been achieved by tying the worker to a particular em-
ployer. Indentured workers were paid in advance for the passage to Ma-
laysia and signed a contract that obliged them to work for a particular
employer until they had paid off their debt. Under the kangany system,
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the labourers were no longer expected to sign a contract, but they were
again expected to pay back the cost of their passage with wages earned
after arrival. In this regard, although they were free workers, they con-
tinued to be tied to a particular employer (Jackson 1961: 124). This si-
tuation was resolved in 1910 by the introduction of the Indian Immi-
gration Fund, set up by the colonial government and based on a levy
imposed on a per capita basis on all planters who used Indian labour.
Its purpose was to provide free passage for labourers to Malaysia.3
However, the cost of living on the plantations was often higher than
their income and therefore many of them continued to be deeply in-
debted to their employers (Netto 1961: 46).
Since the beginning of the 1990s the mobility of foreign workers
has been limited by work permit conditions and debts (Garce´s-Mascar-
en˜as 2006). First of all, work permits do not allow foreign workers to
change employers. If a foreign worker seeks a better job, he or she
immediately becomes ‘illegal’. Secondly, debts (recruitment costs)
continue to tie workers to their current employers. This is particularly
the case for domestic workers and Indonesian workers in general.
Although this practice is not allowed, it is tolerated by the authorities.
As observed by a recruitment agent, ‘If recruitment agencies don’t cov-
er their trip to Malaysia, who will do it? Who is going to bring the maid
here? Who is going to pay for all the initial costs?’ (interview of 26 Sep-
tember 2006, Kuala Lumpur). Apart from recruitment costs, other ex-
penses such as an annual insurance and levy increase the initial debt.
The main effect is not only that foreign workers are tied by contract
to a particular employer, but also that the termination of their contracts
depends on the advance payment of such expenses. As observed by the
representative of a trade union, ‘Because employers advance the costs,
they consider that they have the right of ownership’ (interview of 9 Oc-
tober 2006, Kuala Lumpur). In order to prevent workers from ‘run-
ning away’ or ‘absconding’, employers usually hold foreign workers’
passports. Since it is widely believed that domestic workers ‘run away
easily’, many recruitment agents and even government officials suggest
that employers not give them a weekly day off.
5.2.3 Powerless position
Besides their status as non-citizens, the powerlessness of foreign work-
ers is part and parcel of the two aspects mentioned before, that is, their
temporality and their restricted mobility. Regular migrants in particular
have to accept the terms and conditions of their contracts since their la-
bour rights are restricted and they do not have the freedom to move
from job to job.
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In recent years, the immobilisation of foreign workers has been criti-
cised by most Malaysian and international NGOs. Although foreign
workers are protected under the Employment Act, their reliance on a
particular employer prevents them from going to the labour or indus-
trial courts. In particular, the Immigration Act clearly states that a for-
eign worker is only allowed to be employed and stay in the country
within the premises of the enterprise as stated on the work permit. If
the migrant worker wants to discontinue his or her employment due
to abuse or exploitative working conditions or if the employer cancels
the work permit, the foreign worker has to return to the country of ori-
gin. Sometimes a special pass is issued if the case is taken to court,
but this pass has to be renewed monthly and does not give permission
to work. Since court cases can take months or even years, this means
that in practice most foreign workers are forced to return home before
the end of the trial (Tenaganita 2005: 26-34).
Regarded as family members and non-workers, domestic workers
are not included in the Employment Act and there is no minimum
wage or regulation of working conditions. In this regard, their power-
lessness vis-a`-vis their employers is even greater. What can they do if
they are not paid, if they have to work twenty hours a day, do not have
a day off as stipulated by their contracts or if they are paid much less
than previously promised? In practice, as many of my informants told
me, they have few legal means to change their situation.
5.3 Managing the labour migrant system
One of the major characteristics of labour migration to Malaysia and
South-East Asia in general has been the privatisation and commerciali-
sation of recruitment. Again this applies to the past and the present.
Most old and new foreign workers have come to Malaysia through a re-
cruitment agent, who went to the countryside in India, Indonesia, Ne-
pal or Bangladesh to look for prospective migrants, offer them a job on
behalf of a particular employer and organise the trip to Malaysia. In
contrast to European guest worker programmes, where recruitment
was mainly directly organised by employers, the whole recruitment
process has been determined by the presence of these middlemen
whose business depended on the number of migrant workers they
were able to send to Malaysia.
Under the indentured labour system, the usual procedure followed
by employers to obtain Indian labour was to place orders for workers
with certain recruiting firms in Southern India. These firms would
contact a professional recruiter, who could use ‘his greater knowledge
of the world and of the need for labour in lands abroad to induce his
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less sophisticated countrymen to emigrate’ (Parmer 1960: 17). Apart
from recruiting expenses and the labourer’s passage, both the recruit-
ing firm and the professional recruiter charged a fee per worker sent to
Malaysia. These fees not only represented extra costs for the employer
(and later on for the migrant worker), but also induced many abuses in
order to increase the number of recruited workers. In this regard, a
contractor reported to an enquiry commission in 1908:
I was sent over to India in 1886 to recruit coolies for the govern-
ment, and from the experiences then gained I can confidently
assert that not one single coolie who leaves India knows the real
value of the rupee in this country, nor the cost of living here.
The recruiters are scoundrels to a man; they not only make
gross misrepresentations to the intending emigrants, but even
employ force to bring them over. (quoted in Netto 1961: 24)
Under the kangany system, the recruiter worked for Malay employers
and was sent to India to recruit labour from his own village. Officially,
the kangany had to restrict his recruiting to relatives and friends and
could only leave his village with the recruited labourer after getting the
consent of the village’s headman. This system presented two major ad-
vantages for employers. First of all, it broke the monopoly of the Indian
recruiting firms, who were believed to have restricted labour supply
and increased recruitment costs. Secondly, the commissions paid un-
der the kangany system were much lower since, unlike the profits paid
to professional recruiters, they fluctuated less with the demand for la-
bour (Ramachandran 1994: 59). Although it was thought that the kan-
gany system would reduce some of the abuses mentioned above, in the
1920s and 1930s many critics argued that kanganies used bribery to sti-
mulate workers to migrate, forged the signatures of village headmen,
promised young people a guaranteed good future, exploited family
quarrels to induce people to migrate and gave false information about
wages and living conditions in Malaysia (Parmer 1960: 58; Sandhu
1969: 100). As Mohapatra (2007) has described, a distinction can be
made between the relatively free recruitment phase and repression
after arrival on the plantation.
Since the 1980s, recruitment agencies have reappeared on the mi-
gration scene. In fact, one of the first measures to regulate labour mi-
gration was an act introduced in 1981 to allow the establishment of le-
gal recruitment agencies for foreign workers. Since then regular migra-
tion flows into Malaysia have been characterised by the presence of a
huge network of intermediaries: the sub-agent who recruits the work-
ers in the countryside, the agent who organises the trip to Malaysia,
the agent in Malaysia who receives the workers at the airport and the
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sub-agent who brings the agent in Kuala Lumpur in touch with the
employer somewhere else. All these agents increase the costs of migra-
tion. As mentioned before, the migrant worker pays them either before
coming to Malaysia or from his or her first wages after arriving in Ma-
laysia. As in the past, apart from the extra costs that such a system im-
plies, the commercialisation of the recruitment process has led to
abuse. For instance, promises before departure do not correspond to
working and wage conditions in Malaysia. Formal employers (accord-
ing to the work permit pass) do not exist and hence foreign workers be-
come illegal, or agencies process one-month or three-month visas in-
stead of the required two-year visa in order to get the workers into Ma-
laysia as fast as possible (see Rudnick 1996; Jones 2000; Wong &
Anwar 2003; Tenaganita 2006).
5.4 Beyond state-regulated migration
In both the colonial period and at present, migration to Malaysia has
not been limited to state-regulated migration. Besides Indian labour,
Chinese workers also came to colonial Malaya. They started coming
even before Indian workers did, and their presence has been just as
significant (see Table 5.1). However, the government of Malaya had lim-
ited knowledge about Chinese labour and their community in Malaya
and little control over them (Beeman 1985: 141). In recent decades, in
addition to government regulated migration, illegal migration has also
been an important channel of labour migration to Malaysia. Although
it is impossible to assess the number of illegal migrants in the country,
it has been estimated that by the mid-1980s there were over 500,000
illegal migrants and by the mid-1990s close to one million (Liow
2004: 14; Chin 2002: 21). In 2006, after new and more refined migra-
tion policies to regulate labour migration to Malaysia and reduce illegal
migration were introduced, the number of illegal migrants was esti-
mated to be more than one million (Syed & Syed 2006). The popula-
tion of illegal migrants consists mainly of Indonesians, but migrants
from other Asian countries are also found. Some of them have come to
Malaysia illegally and some of them later became illegal while in Ma-
laysia.
On the basis of Beeman’s work (1985), Wong and Anwar (2003: 217-
218) observe striking similarities when comparing old Chinese migra-
tion with current illegal migration to Malaysia. First of all, Chinese la-
bour migration to colonial Malaya is comparable to illegal migration in
its spontaneous character. Although agents played an important role in
the transportation and job placement of Chinese in the past and illegal
migrants today, in both cases most migrants paid their own passage to
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Malaysia and the whole migrant experience was organised by their
own social networks. Secondly, partially as a consequence of the impact
of social networks, both Chinese and illegal migrants were mainly re-
cruited locally by local employers. The main effect was a high rate of
job mobility and a greater capacity (in comparison with migrant work-
ers within the migrant labour system) to negotiate their work and wage
conditions (see also Kassim 1995).
In colonial times Chinese migrants stayed much longer than their
Indian migrant contemporaries since they were not repatriated as part
of unemployment policy (Beeman 1985: 154). Moreover, Chinese wages
were consistently and significantly higher than the wages of the Indian
migrants. Whereas the wages of Chinese workers tended to reflect the
conditions of the market, the regulated supply of Indian labour kept
the Indians’ wages low (Beeman 1985: 266). This difference in wages
should also be explained by the fact that alternatives beyond estate la-
bour were much more open to the Chinese. For instance, while from
1911 to 1931 between 55.9 and 65.0 per cent of the Indian working po-
pulation found employment on plantations, by 1921 less than 20 per
cent of the working Chinese population were employed in the mining
sector and by 1931 about 25 per cent were employed as plantation la-
bourers (Beeman 1985: 29-30).
At present, illegality seems to be an advantage to the migrant worker
as having a legal status might increase rather than diminish the exploi-
tation of foreign workers by their employers (Kassim 1995). This is a
common conclusion drawn by many Malaysian scholars (Kassim
1993a: 5-6, 1993b: 6, 1994: 3-4, 1995: 7, 1996: 2; Hugo 1995: 277;
Ruppert 1999: 33; Bagoes Mantra 1999: 63; Pillai 2000: 142; Jones
2000; Battistella 2002: 363; Wong & Anwar 2003: 192-198). Three
main reasons are given. First of all, illegal migration permits an escape
from the long and cumbersome official procedures needed for entering
Malaysia. Secondly, illegal migration cuts down the costs of migration
since exit, entry and renewal taxes and fees are avoided. Thirdly, once
in Malaysia the illegal migrant is not bound to a particular employer
and a specific job. Illegal migration is thus faster, cheaper and less con-
strained than legal migration to Malaysia.
At this point it is worthwhile to refer to some more specific situa-
tions. Kassim (1995: 12-15) gives two examples that illustrate the differ-
ence between legal and illegal migrants. The first example refers to do-
mestic workers. Most legal domestic workers live with their employers.
In many cases, they do not have any days off and they work much
longer than stipulated in their contracts. At the end of the month, they
are paid a fixed salary that in most cases does not correspond to the
hours they have been working. In contrast, many illegal domestic
workers do not live with their employers. Instead they live in rented ac-
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commodation in cheap neighbourhoods such as the squatter areas.
They work for six or eight households, they are paid per hour and they
can rest at night and in the weekends. The second example refers to le-
gal factory workers. They are tied to their employers and cannot negoti-
ate or improve their wages and working conditions, while illegal work-
ers at petrol pumps, restaurants and construction sites seem to enjoy
better conditions. Their salaries are higher, they have more contact
with people outside the workplace and they can leave for better employ-
ment (for instance in sectors with large labour shortages) whenever
they want (Kassim 1995: 12-15).
Given these differences and the impossibility to improve their labour
situation by legal means, many legal foreign workers decide to become
illegal by leaving their employers. This is what in the Malaysian news-
papers is described daily as cases of ‘absconding’ or ‘running away’.
Although there are no data on the total number of absconding cases, it
seems that this is a common phenomenon. For instance, in 1997 an
immigration official declared in a Malaysian newspaper that most ille-
gal migrants at the new international airport had run away from plan-
tations in search of better wages (The Malay Mail, 12 June 1997). A
member of the Malaysian Palm Oil Plantation observed similarly that
plantation workers ‘easily’ run away as soon as they have a friend in
the construction sector (interview of 21 September 2006, Kuala Lum-
pur).
Data on cases of ‘running away’ refer exclusively to domestic work-
ers. In 2005, out of a total of about 300,000 foreign domestic workers,
19,406 cases of running away were reported to the Immigration De-
partment (New Sunday Times, 2 July 2006). However, the real number
of cases of running away might be much higher. As a representative of
an employer organisation observed, many employers do not notify the
police when their workers escape from their workplace since it implies
losing their security bond (interview of 21 September 2006, Kuala
Lumpur). Many agents and politicians explain the phenomenon of ab-
sconding among domestic workers by arguing that they ‘easily fall in
love’ or they are ‘easily manipulated’. If we go back to our comparative
historical perspective, we immediately realise that this was also a com-
mon practice among Indian workers. From 1912 to 1922, for instance,
almost one third of the total Indian workers deserted plantations. They
were mainly men and, in contrast to the present, no employer argued
that they were in love or had been manipulated.
Probably the point on which the female domestic workers of today
are most similar to the Indian workers in the past is in their powerless
position. In both cases, as Beeman (1985: 173) argued regarding Indian
workers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, since they
do not have any means of bargaining, ‘running away’ or ‘absconding’
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might be a way to improve the situation. This practice is not very dif-
ferent from the ordinary everyday means of resistance used by Malay-
sian peasants (like boycotting the introduction of combine harvesters
or the killing of animals), as described by James Scott in his famous
book Weapons of the Weak (1985). In both cases resistance against the
state, employers or landowners is rooted in everyday material goals
rather than in a revolutionary consciousness. In contrast to common
definitions of resistance, these practices are not collective and orga-
nised, nor are they principled and selfless. However, by absconding or
running away from their employers, foreign workers and particularly
domestic workers might improve their working conditions while dis-
rupting production and increasing the general costs of recruitment.
5.5 Meanings of non-regulation
Chinese migration to colonial Malaya was not planned or directed by
the colonial authorities. However, non-regulation did not mean illegal-
ity, as labour migration to Malaya was not restricted until the 1930s. In
other words, Chinese migrants could migrate to and move within colo-
nial Malaya without much control. Indian migrants who had escaped
from plantations did not become illegal either. In fact, with the end of
indentured servitude, foreign workers were in principle free to leave
and choose an employer who offered a higher wage or better working
conditions. Although employers asked for their immobilisation, colo-
nial authorities were very reluctant to comply. As stated by a colonial
officer in 1915, ‘I think it would be a retrograde step if we passed a
clause which would interfere with the freedom of the labourer. [...] We
should have no indentured labour, and I would prefer myself to go the
other way, and that is to tell the labourer he is not tied for a month
and can go off any day’ (quoted in Parmer 1960: 149). In contrast to
the present, absconding was thus not associated with illegality.
In the 1930s labour migration to Malaysia was restricted for the first
time. In 1933 and 1938 a monthly quota was introduced for male and
female Chinese workers respectively to limit their entry ‘in accordance
with the political, social and economic needs for the moment of the
various administrators of Malaya’ (quoted in Blythe 1947: 102). More-
over, in 1938 the Indian government banned assisted Indian emigra-
tion to Malaya. In this case, the ban was imposed to respond to the de-
mands of Indian nationalists. After independence in 1957, one of the
first pieces of legislation passed by the new nation-state was an Immi-
gration Act (1959), which regulated the entry and movement of non-ci-
tizens in Malaysian territory. It was followed by an Employment Re-
striction Act (1968), which made access to the labour market for non-
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citizens contingent upon possession of a work permit. As Wong has
observed, the institution of the new nation-state was thus made legally
coterminous with that of a closed labour market. Citizenship conferred
both the right of residence in a nationally defined territory and the
right of unhindered entry to the labour market. Non-citizens were
barred from both (Wong 2002: 4).
Although this legislation referred to citizenship, ethnicity also played
a role in the implementation of these policies. In particular, the pre-
sence of thousands of illegal Indonesians working in rubber and oil
palm plantations and on construction sites did not attract much public
attention, as they were perceived to be similar to Malays. This border
became more blurred, however, when most illegal Indonesian migrants
received a permanent status within two or three years, some even with-
in months, and thus became legal residents. Some of them obtained
these documents legally, others illegally (see Pillai 2006). The main re-
sult of this selective border permeability was that most Indonesians
who arrived before the late 1980s could settle in Malaysia. This had a
second effect: their children could obtain Malaysian citizenship and, in
consequence, qualify as Malays under the so called Bumiputera policy,
which gives indigenous people (particularly Malays) privileged rights
by virtue of their historical attachments.
However, as Indonesian migrants started to move to urban areas and
particularly to those economic sectors reserved for local workers, they
were seen as competing with these workers in the labour market and
particularly as challenging the re-distribution of wealth and employ-
ment among the different ethnic groups. For instance, in the mid- and
late 1980s petty Malay traders in the major cities protested heavily
against illegal Indonesian workers, as they feared economic displace-
ment. Moreover, non-Malay communities accused the state of turning
a blind eye to the inflow of Indonesian migrants and hence increasing
the Malay portion of the overall population (due to the ethnic similari-
ties between Indonesians and Malays). Although Dorall (1989) argues
that ethnic politics correlate with migration policies, this should be
more nuanced since the main importers (including recruiting agen-
cies) and employers of foreign workers, particularly the Chinese, have
been non-Malay (Kassim 1997: 23). The reaction to illegal (Indonesian)
migration in the late 1980s should thus be understood not only in eth-
nic terms, but also – and above all – from a social-class perspective: it
was the Chinese low urban class (mainly represented by the Demo-
cratic Action Party) who, like low-class Malays, felt threatened by their
presence.
The need to protect the national labour market finally displaced eth-
nicity as a component of the implementation of migration policies and
therefore placed citizenship as the unquestioned threshold to the free
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entry to the labour market. This gradual closure of Malaysian borders
led to the state-regulated labour migration as described above and gra-
dually changed the position of the illegal migrant. Since then, illegal
migrants have been stripped of all rights. This shift towards a ‘deporta-
ble illegality’ should be explained in relation to two parallel processes.
First of all, illegal migrants started to be seen as a threat to the social
and economic stability of the country. In particular, there were increas-
ing concerns about their impact on crime, housing, health care and
the labour market. As observed by Chin (2002: 33), the main issue is
that such negative representations have become a key management
strategy in identifying migrant workers’ as ‘outsiders’ or foreigners
whose movement in society must be kept under surveillance, if not
overtly contained.
Secondly, through amendments to the Immigration Act and highly
publicised deportation campaigns the new contours of illegality have
been defined. Under the amended Immigration Act (2002), illegal mi-
grants can be sentenced to mandatory jail terms for up to five years, re-
ceive up to six strokes of the cane and be fined up to RM 10,000. At
the same time, widely publicised detention and deportation campaigns
or the so-called ‘crack-downs on illegal aliens’ have sought to reduce
the number of illegal migrants. Since 2004 the People’s Volunteer
Corps (Ikatan Relawan Rakyat Malaysia, known as Rela) assists the po-
lice in arresting and detaining illegal migrants. Their participation in
detention campaigns has aroused concern among non-governmental
and human rights organisations. Physical and mental abuse in de-
tention camps has also been denounced. For instance, in August 1995
the non-governmental organisation Tenaganita reported ‘abuse, torture
and dehumanised treatment of migrant workers in detention camps’
(Tenaganita 1995). In 1997 Amnesty International reported that from
1992 to 1997, 71 illegal migrants died in detention camps in Malaysia
(Amnesty International 1997).
Further research is needed to see whether the even more powerless
position of female foreign workers and their extended though ‘tempor-
ary’ permits create other incidences or other forms of ‘deportable illeg-
ality’. Although I do not have conclusive data on this issue, I would like
to advance three possible hypotheses. First of all, domestic workers are
the only foreign workers who have not been ‘repatriated’ to their coun-
tries of origin in periods of economic downturn. In this regard, their
central role within Malaysian families and within the Malaysian econo-
my in general may have prevented them from being as likely to be de-
ported as other foreign workers. Secondly, as the presence of many do-
mestic workers is exclusively limited to the private sphere of the house-
hold, in practice they may be less likely to be detained. In other words,
since migration enforcement takes place in public space, and since it is
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therefore in the public realm that illegality is ascribed both to regular
and illegal workers, it may be easier for foreign domestic workers to es-
cape apprehension. Thirdly and finally, while they may be less likely to
be deported and detained, they may suffer more easily from exploita-
tion and abuse since they are often confined within the walls of Malay-
sian families.
5.6 Conclusion
On the question whether labour migration in South-East Asia during
the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth was free or
unfree migration, McKeown (2004) and Mohapatra (2007) disagree.
According to McKeown, most migrants were free and moved through
personal networks of family and friends. In contrast, Mohapatra argues
that most migrants moved in systems of debt and to destinations
where they were controlled by employers and forced to accept low
wages and bad working conditions. My own analysis seems to suggest
that their degree of freedom depends on specific circumstances. While
Indian migration was regulated by the state and their presence in Ma-
laya depended on their employers, Chinese migrated without much
control and were able to move from job to job and negotiate their work
and wage conditions. In this regard, the starting point of this discus-
sion should be that labour migration in South-East Asia was not a un-
ique and homogeneous phenomenon, but rather consisted of two dif-
ferent realities characterised by different kinds of state intervention.
By comparing old and new labour migration, we can also see that
differences persist into the present. As I showed in this chapter, legal
migrants face constraints similar to those confronted by the earlier In-
dian migrants. Their migration is regulated by the state and therefore
their presence is restricted to particular economic sectors and tied to a
particular employer for a limited period of time. In contrast, illegal mi-
grants – like old Chinese migrants – are free to change their jobs and
can stay in Malaysia even in face of economic downturn, illness or
pregnancy. In this regard, as in the past, the situation of labour immi-
grants in Malaysia is not homogeneous. However, in contrast to the
past, non-regulated labour migration has become illegal and subse-
quently an object of sanction, detention and expulsion. That is what I
called deportable illegality.
This shift in the meaning of non-regulated migration results from
the new borders imposed by the nation-state. In particular, the rise of
the nation-state has brought with it a new dilemma: while labour mi-
gration is necessary for economic growth, it challenges the social and
political bases of the new Malaysian nation-state. For instance, labour
122 BLANCA GARCÉS-MASCAREÑAS
migration is seen as a threat to the position of local workers in the la-
bour market, to the ethnic balance between Malay, Chinese and In-
dians and, in the last years, to national security. The main result, as in
many other countries, has been the gradual exclusion of the migrant:
while the presence of legal migrants has been increasingly regulated
and limited, illegal migrants have become an object of detention and
deportation.
When we link illegality to the nature of the state, the question is no
longer how illegal migration occurs, but rather how it is produced by the
state and its migration policies. In this regard, we could conclude that,
in contrast to what many scholars assume, the ‘illegal’ can only be un-
derstood as part or a product of particular contexts (see the introduc-
tion to this volume). As pointed out by De Genova, illegality is ‘mu-
tually constituted by particular migrations within the respective immi-
gration regimes of specific nation-states’ (2002: 424). When analysing
illegality, we should thus start with the questions of how migrants are
or become illegal and what the exact meanings and implications are of
illegality. In short, any research demands a detailed analysis of the le-
gal production of illegality. This means examining not only how laws
and policies produce illegal migration, but also how they construct it
differently depending on various classifications such as gender, ethni-
city and class.
Notes
1 This research was financed by the Agencia Espan˜ola de Cooperacio´n Internacional
(AECI) and the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). I would
like to thank Pieter C. Emmer, Melody Lu Chia Wen, Sandra Ezquerra and the edi-
tors of this book for their comments on this chapter. I am particularly thankful to Ai-
mee Rindoks for her English language revision and comments.
2 In my PhD thesis I distinguish between non-regulation, irregularity and illegality. I
use the term ‘irregularity’ to refer to migrants without proper documentation and the
term ‘illegality’ when irregularity is perceived as a threat and irregular migrants are
excluded from the normal limits of the law and the state.
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6 The romantic appeal of illegal migration:
Gender, masculinity and human smuggling
from Pakistan1
Ali Nobil Ahmad
Despite the growing prominence of gender within the field of migra-
tion studies (testified to by this volume and many others), there exists
an unmistakeable scarcity of empirical research dealing with the con-
struction and performance of masculinities in the process of interna-
tional migration. Apart from a handful of notable exceptions (e.g.
Charsley 2005; Gallo 2006) the critical study of men represents some-
thing of a lacuna in an otherwise burgeoning literature. This is partly
due to the fact that scholars are understandably preoccupied with new
forms of female agency in a world where the ‘lone male bread-winning
migrant’ is increasingly seen to be an ideological distortion or a thing
of the past (Morokvasic-Mu¨ller, Erel & Shinozaki 2003: 9; Pessar &
Mahler 2003: 822). Whatever the broader realities behind the apparent
feminisation of international labour flows, however, some sending con-
texts are still characterised by vast discrepancies in power between the
sexes which continue to structure the gendered makeup of indepen-
dent out-migration. Indeed, the rising tide of restrictionist legislation
in Europe to curb legal entry options is making family reunification
more difficult, a fact which in turn appears to be reinforcing the male-
ness of migratory flows from some parts of the world, in terms of both
the ratios of men to women who compose those flows and the kinds of
ideologies in which they become entrenched.
Labour flows from (and indeed within) Pakistan, for instance, re-
main almost exclusively male, suggesting that, within some migration
systems at least, understanding masculinity and male agency is likely
to be of considerable importance in making sense of why migration oc-
curs.
The forces that drive such all-male migratory configurations cannot
be explained by recourse to mainstream migration theories on social
networks and kinship alone, particularly whilst historians and social
scientists deploy these in a manner that is largely gender-blind and
economistic. Building upon feminist critiques of these theories and the
concepts upon which they are based (Agarwal 1997; Phizacklea 2003),
this chapter interrogates the oft assumed status of the household as a
homogenous income-pooling unit and the primary force behind emi-
gration decisions, and explores the role of alternative spheres in which
decisions to migrate are fostered. A key concern is to break open the
analytical dichotomy between ‘economic’ and ‘cultural’ push factors be-
hind labour migration, along with unhelpful assumptions about the
nature of migrant rationality that characterise typical explanations of
decision-making. Discussion is restricted to the sending context, and
accords special attention to illegal forms of migration and the issue of
human smuggling, since the role of masculine subjectivity is especially
visible in the agential forces that drive them. Migration, it will be
shown, is imbued with a male ideology of travel which thrives off ex-
changes of information within all male networks. This ideology has
been further masculinised by restrictionist migration policies and the
resulting difficulty of family-reunification, which have made travel
abroad ever more expensive, risky, attractive to youth and inaccessible
to women of all backgrounds.
6.1 Theoretical framework
Mainstream theories of migration have undergone considerable revi-
sion in recent years, with mid-level units replacing the abstract indivi-
dual and structural forces that, respectively, dominated neoclassical
economics and Marxist theories of migration in the first three quarters
of the twentieth century (Hoerder 1997). Whilst scholars of migration
have always taken a keen interest in ‘chain migration’, more impor-
tance than ever is currently being attributed to social networks in gen-
erating migration, facilitating the spread of information on labour mar-
ket opportunities and driving the migration process. Summarising the
present state of affairs, a leading theorist of migration recently wrote,
‘The importance of social networks for migration can hardly be over-
stated’ (Arango 2004: 28). Foner (2001: 3-4) has claimed that migra-
tion itself can be conceptualised as a process of ‘network building’.
Tilly has gone as far as stating that it is not individuals but networks
that migrate, which should therefore be the primary unit of analysis in
migration (1990: 84).
Related to this unprecedented prominence of social networks in mi-
gration theory is the pivotal role of kinship and the household, which,
following Becker (1976) and other proponents of ‘social choice theory’
(Agarwal 1997), are frequently stressed as the most powerful driving
forces of international migration from the developing world. Anthro-
pologies of migration from Pakistan and South Asia to the United
Kingdom are good examples of this tendency, as they emphasise the
centrality of household, family and clan to the virtual exclusion of the
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individual (Dahya 1974; Khan 1977; Ballard & Ballard 1977; Shaw
1994, 2000). Though it is seldom stated explicitly, motivation is often
presumed to be driven by unexamined ‘economic’ forces that are taken
to be exclusively ‘rational’ in that migration is invariably portrayed as
the product of consciously calculated strategies designed to reduce risk
and facilitate commercial gain for the household. Shaw’s (2000: 13)
study of Pakistanis in Oxford, typically, states that ‘the primary motive
for migration from Pakistan to Britain in the late 1950s and early
1960s was socio-economic’ without explaining what this means. Foner,
in the introduction to an influential volume, states categorically that
networks ‘reduce the risks of migration’ (2001: 3-4). Many historical ac-
counts of migration are similarly economistic, despite the existence of
important exceptions (e.g. Henkes 2001). Gabaccia, for instance, ar-
gues that Latin patriarchy (‘international family economies’) developed
out of ‘rational, shrewd choices’ based purely on the fact that there
were work options for women at home (Gabaccia 2001: 203). ‘Separa-
tion,’ she suggests, ‘made economic sense’ (ibid.: 195-197). Where his-
torians of migration do touch on ‘socio-cultural’ issues, these get men-
tioned in passing before the author inevitably falls back on economic
reductionism (e.g. Delaney 2001: 217).
Such accounts tend to overlook the contexts in which networks other
than those involving kin drive and facilitate migration. Ties of associa-
tion located outside the household and commercial networks, both of
which are important in the context of illegal migration from Pakistan,
are barely mentioned in their representation of the migration process.
Such links, which do not necessarily reduce the risks of migration, are
unexplored because they do not fit in with the dominant, largely be-
nign portrayal of migration networks that currently prevails. The qual-
ity of the information transmitted through networks is unexamined in
existing literature; the opacity of the objectives of actors within the net-
work is left unanalysed or treated as irrelevant. Only rarely is it men-
tioned that various kinds of migration networks are predominantly or
exclusively made up of men, which, as Van Liempt (this volume) points
out, sometimes actively exclude women and children. Indeed, the gen-
dered particularity of networks, institutions, economic culture and indi-
vidual actors within households is often simply overlooked in studies
of migration (Phizacklea 2003: 83-86).
This chapter seeks to give gender its due centrality in the study of
Pakistani migration networks. It does so by abandoning the exclusive
preoccupation with mid-level units preached by many exponents of so-
cial network theory in the conviction that excessive stress on ties be-
tween migrants on the move can lead to neglect of the very agential
forces and motivations that drive movement in the first place. Above
all, it scrutinises the ties between migrants and other units such as the
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household and the family through an analysis of individual testimo-
nies. The framework is thus integrative and focuses on the multi-level
interaction of the micro-level (individual motivations and experiences)
with processes that take place at the meso-level (social relations and
ties between two or more individuals) and macro level (the role of the
state). As will be seen, such an approach facilitates examination of so-
cial networks in a manner that takes into account those realms of hu-
man experience, such as gender and sexuality, which cannot be easily
compartmentalised as either ‘cultural’ or ‘economic’.
6.2 Methodology
The empirical material presented here is based upon research con-
ducted between 2003 and 2006 in London, Italy and Pakistan. A small
number of in-depth interviews in Pakistan were conducted during a
short research visit of three weeks with immigration officers and state
officials from the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation (three), journalists
(one), NGO employees and social workers (two), smugglers (one), mi-
grant sending households (two), internal migrants (four) and prospec-
tive smuggled migrants who had been deported or apprehended during
previous failed attempts to reach Europe (three). Local and national
press sources were also consulted and anthropological participant ob-
servation was conducted in travel agents, bazaars and town centres in
both Lahore and Islamabad.
My main source of data, however, consists of 60 life stories narrated
in Urdu by Pakistani migrants from Punjab, NWFP (North-West Fron-
tier Province) and Mirpur. This qualitative material can be divided into
three data sets, each of which is based on the testimonies of twenty re-
spondents. The first cohort is made up of ‘old’ migrants: middle-aged
or senior British citizens who migrated to Britain between 1960 and
1980. Of these, the testimonies of ten men who migrated mostly leg-
ally as young adults in their twenties, interviewed in their London
homes, are of particular interest in this chapter. Of the second cohort,
all but two are men currently in their twenties and thirties who mi-
grated to Britain between 1991 and 2004 (the other two are women,
who migrated as dependents). These ‘new migrants’ were interviewed
at work or in nearby cafes. The Italian cohort was composed entirely of
men between the ages twenty and 54, interviewed in Florence and Pra-
to, all but one of whom had first left Pakistan in their twenties and
thirties (the average age of emigration was in fact 26). These men were
interviewed in their workplaces, cafe´s and other public spaces.
Given the diversity of ages, classes and marital backgrounds of mi-
grants at the time of emigration, some of the arguments advanced in
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this article are unlikely to be uniformly applicable. Those relating to
youthful subversion and sexual adventure, for instance, barely affect
married e´migre´s in their thirties and beyond. Others, such as the per-
vasive influence of consumerism, apply universally. Others still, such
as the appeal of travel, apply to some more than others. In view of this
diversity, it is important to bear in mind that the general masculine
ideology sanctioning pursuit of selfhood and transgression that I high-
light encompasses broad strata of men in different ways.
Particular kinds of sensitivity were required to broach issues of sexu-
ality and illegality with elder men, in whose presence I was expected to
be respectful and deferential as a younger person. For this reason, I
was not always able to probe them extensively on certain topics; the
suggestion that they migrated for anything other than self-betterment
and to sacrifice their own happiness for their families was controversial
and potentially offensive. Equally, to ask old and new migrants about
lawbreaking they have been involved in was problematic for obvious
reasons. Lengthy processes of trust-building and the adoption of a flex-
ible approach was thus necessary; questions could not be posed me-
chanically in the same order to all respondents as part of a rigid socio-
logical questionnaire. Interviews were semi-structured and took differ-
ing formats and lengths. Half were tape-recorded; the remainder were
simultaneously translated and transcribed in note form.
Only ten interviewees were women. These were all within the Lon-
don cohorts. Unlike the men, many of whom had experienced some
form of illegality (particularly recent arrivals), none of the women en-
tered illegally. Indeed, I did not hear of women being smuggled from
Pakistan to the West except in very exceptional cases. This was to be ex-
pected: the vast majority of persons smuggled into Europe from Paki-
stan are male. A more serious problem lies in the absence of inter-
views with female (or indeed male) family members of smuggled mi-
grants. This was unavoidable due to my positionality as a young, single
male of Pakistani origin and due to the fact that the research was con-
ducted primarily in destination countries. This particular shortcoming
threatened to reproduce, in my research, a key weakness of many exist-
ing studies of masculinity: ‘internalism’ – the abstraction of men’s iden-
tities and relations from those of women, a tendency which has turned
much of men’s studies into a field that, perversely, occludes women
and obscures men’s dominant relations with and over them (Ditz
2004: 17).
The antidote to internalism is juxtaposing men’s experiences with
women wherever possible, so that the respective experiences of the
sexes develop in parallel rather than in dialogue. In research such as
my own, which suffers from an absence of symmetrical data sets on
men and women, partly due to methodological issues of access, though
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mainly due to the fact that men’s and women’s experiences are so dif-
ferent, any ‘comparison’ is likely to be based on secondary material.
Nonetheless, highlighting the relative position of women, if only by
stressing their absence in certain strata of the migratory population,
plays an important role in contextualisation. It is also achieved through
counter-reading silences and absences in men’s testimonies. These
yielded information both on the experiences of women and the nature
of lived social relations between and among men and women, as will
be seen below.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the findings, it is necessary to
say a brief word on terminology, as this has important implications. Il-
legality refers to a status into and out of which individual migrants can
move over time throughout the migration process (see the introduction
to this volume). It can, of course, occur at the sending context if the
bureaucratic procedures stipulated as necessary by the sending state in
order to emigrate are not respected (Ghosh 1998: 1-4). It may also refer
to migrants whose status is illegal from the perspective of destination
countries due to the fact that they either enter without complying with
the legal procedures required by the reception country, or they do not
comply with the legal conditions attached to their residency or employ-
ment. Within Third World cities such as Karachi, rural-urban move-
ments can also produce, in some contexts, a sort of illegal status de-
rived from illegal residence in ‘unauthorised’ settlements (Shahnaz
2004).
As Ghosh (1998) underlines, the relations between all these different
sorts of illegality are complex: they are not mutually exclusive, nor does
the existence of one imply that any of the others will necessarily follow;
migrants may move from legality to illegality and vice-versa over time.
This chapter is about just one small constellation of illegal migrants
within the Pakistani migration system, whose illegality derives from
being smuggled into the West:2 for instance, from unauthorised transit
through and illegal entry into European and other Western countries,
where they reside and work, often illegally (though some eventually
manage to legalise their status).
Just under half of the respondents had migrated illegally, though
more than that had been involved in illegal (or rather informal) work.
My sample also includes a number of men who migrated legally
(though often using the services of agents and brokers who facilitate il-
legal migration) and then entered into situations of illegality by over-
staying their visit visas, working without permission or travelling to
subsequent destinations for which they did not have legal authorisa-
tion. It even draws upon the testimonies of some ‘legal’ migrants. This
is because there is no absolute distinction between what motivates dif-
ferent categories of migrants in illegal situations, or even between
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those who are smuggled as opposed to those who migrate legally.
Nonetheless, for heuristic purposes, I have sought to retain an empha-
sis on the intersecting dynamics of gender and smuggling from Paki-
stan to the West.
6.3 Who makes the decision to migrate?
Sociologists of migration who focus on transnationalism and global
networks, then, frequently ignore the question of individual migrant
motivation, treating the primacy of collective material betterment of
the household as a given. If anthropological accounts cannot be
charged with quite the economic bias that characterises these works
and do address the issue of what drives migration, they suffer from a
similar tendency to rule out the importance of individual desire in fa-
vour of calculating collective agency. Shaw, for instance, claims that
migration ‘never involved individuals leaving their families to seek
fame and fortune’ and is a ‘means by which the kinship group as a
whole could improve its lot’. ‘The impetus for departure,’ she goes
on, is ‘provided by the entire extended family’ (Shaw 1994: 36). This
argument, based on the testimonies of migrants from Mirpur, sits
squarely within the paradigm set by others before her, above all,
Khan, who asserts:
The primary social unit is […] the household […] roles are pre-
cisely and clearly defined into a pattern of […] individual subordi-
nation to the group (Khan 1977: 60-61). The decision to emigrate
is made by family and kin […] The head of the household, or of
the immediate biraderi grouping selects the emigrant and makes
the preparations. The joint decision reinforces the ties with kin
and community, thus cementing feelings of affection and deter-
mination. The migrant knows he has support. (ibid.: 70)
The impression given in such accounts, consistent with conventional
writings on the economic history of developing societies and strategies
of the poor, is that ‘the household is an unproblematic unit that allo-
cates time and labour, pools income and distributes it fairly evenly
among its members’ (Fontaine & Schlumbohm 2000: 3), a portrait that
has been shown to be highly problematic in different times and places
throughout history (ibid.: 5). The analyses quoted above make no men-
tion of the fact that the migrants (and prospective migrants) they are
discussing are men whose impulses to migrate are often generated in
spheres beyond the household. My examination of the testimonies of
illegal male migrants, in particular, reveals that the decision to migrate
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is, in fact, often highly contentious. This is perhaps hardly surprising,
given that it involves the spending of a sum of cash that may be greater
than the annual household income (Koser 2006) on a risky venture
undertaken by a single member of the household. Most respondents
who migrated illegally left Pakistan between the mid-1990s and 2003.
They paid over seven thousand pounds to agents in order to secure
passage to the West, though the exact sums differ due to changes over
time, variations in route and the highly unregulated nature of the
smuggling business.
Several of the newly arrived migrants I interviewed belong to fa-
milies that benefited from the vast, continuing migration to the Middle
East that has sucked in and transformed the lives of millions across
South Asia since the 1970s when the Pakistani state began to adopt a
policy of encouraging international emigration as a means of alleviat-
ing the country’s intensifying economic woes (five of the six Pathans
interviewed in London had fathers who had either been to or were still
in the Middle East, which suggests the Gulf migration has had a parti-
cularly pronounced impact in NWFP, where the tradition of interna-
tional emigration before the 1970s had been relatively weaker than in
other parts of Pakistan such Punjab). Throughout NWFP and Punjab,
Gulf remittances have kept the economy afloat though they have had
conservative effects, given the absence of structural, institutional and
industrial development (Sayeed 2002: 232-236; Naseem 2002: 251).
The deteriorating socio-economic position of women, reinforced by po-
litical developments, is indicative of this. The Hudood Ordinances, a
series of ‘Islamic’ laws introduced in the 1980s under the military dic-
tatorship of General Zia, effectively criminalised female rape victims
and legitimised violence against the most vulnerable females (children,
the poor) of an already patriarchal society. A survey conducted with 139
households towards the end of the Zia era reported that women ex-
press ‘no identity except that of their families’ (Shaheed 2002: 353).
‘One of the most common complaints’ they had, it went on, was that
‘they had very little freedom of movement’ (ibid.: 364). Indeed, a report
published in 2004 noted that, based on the results of the 1998 popula-
tion census, 84 per cent of women who migrate within Pakistan do so
for marriage or move with the head of the household (Shahnaz 2004:
22). Female labour market participation rates in Pakistan are amongst
the lowest in the world (ibid.: 34).
It is against this backdrop that we must view the attitudes and beha-
viour of illegal Pakistani male migrants in the West, a relatively privi-
leged group within their own country. Many of the smuggled migrants
I encountered had grown up with fathers leading transnational exis-
tences between home and the Gulf, and saw it as quite normal for
men to live and work abroad. Twenty-four-year-old Khan Saab, from
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Kohat in the NWFP, explains the gendered, international geography by
which households in his area are connected to foreign destinations
through a single male migrant:
The lifestyle there is different – joint families. We live together
with four of my father’s brothers. One has two wives. I’m one of
seven siblings. We’re 40 people in one house. [...] Every family
has someone outside. A guy who leaves feeds 40 people. […] My
father and three of his brothers are in Qatar. They drove trailers
there. They have been there since before I was born.
Khan Saab’s silence on women, who barely feature in his life story, was
broken only when I asked him how the migration process affects them.
Pointing to his shoe, he told me that in his village, a woman’s worth is
no greater than the height of a man’s foot; that a brother shoots his
own sister if she dares even suggest a preference for a marriage part-
ner to her male relatives. He expressed opposition to education for wo-
men, yet sees it as entirely natural for him that men should want to
improve themselves over generations: ‘My dad said: “I don’t want you
to do that [drive tractors]”. I decided I’d come here. I liked the idea of
coming here rather than Qatar.’
His testimony would appear to confirm what we already know from
extant literature on the impact of remittances from the Middle East
(and indeed the West) upon gender relations in Pakistan, most of which
demonstrates conclusively that the ‘capital-rich’ developmental conse-
quences of emigration are at best ambivalent (Ballard 2003: 72). If any-
thing, it is not uncommon for women to experience greater seclusion
and confinement to their homes when their households are lifted out
of material poverty by overseas male migrants, who tend to deploy their
resources to impose stricter purdah and increase their own social stand-
ing within patriarchal communities, in which confining womenfolk to
the home confers prestige upon the household (Gardezi 1995: 100).
Perhaps this goes some way towards explaining why some Pakistani
women express such ambiguous sentiments about the decisions of
their male household members to migrate. Despite having little say in
the matter, wives are well aware of the fact that they are directly af-
fected by the risk entailed in the process. Often they contribute to rais-
ing the requisite capital through the sale of their jewellery, and often
they express mixed feelings about the venture (Koser 2006). Their
scepticism may well derive from the distinct possibility that, where
benefits do accrue from migration, they are seldom distributed equally
within the household. Saif, a Punjabi textile worker in Prato, admitted:
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No wife wants her husband to go away. Sensible women don’t
want their husbands to leave the country. If he makes money, it
stays with him. As far as women are concerned, money stays
within the hands of men.
Leaving aside material issues, the departure of a husband can weaken
the position of wives of migrants within the extended household.
When asked what his wife said about his coming to Italy illegally, Fai-
zal told me that ‘wives in Pakistan say nothing. They say, “You know
what’s best”.’ When probed, however, it emerged that his wife had
been against his emigrating, but that he had ignored her wishes.
‘When a man leaves,’ he explained, ‘he goes for two years at a time,’
leaving his wife living alone with her in-laws, ‘not knowing when he’ll
be coming back’. This state of uncertainty is heightened in illegal mi-
gration, which does not afford migrants or their wives the luxury of
knowing when (or if) they will return (or indeed arrive).
Attitudes within households are not simply carved up along the lines
of sex, of course. Age and generation also play a role. It is not unusual
for other male members of the household to be unenthusiastic about
the risks that come with human smuggling. The following fairly typical
accounts of parental reactions are revealing; in two cases, parents were
not consulted by sons at the time they enlisted the services of an agent
and were only told at the last minute, when the fee had to be paid, at
which point they had to be cajoled into supporting what they regarded
as an unnecessary and irrational endeavour that would jeopardise their
son’s physical safety:
Asad: I decided myself to leave, a long time before I did. […] My
father told me not to go. He said: ‘It’s very dangerous, come to
Qatar and look after my business with me.‘ I didn’t listen to
him. I wanted to come here.
Chima: From the beginning Dad said, ‘What’s the need to go
outside? What do you lack here?‘ I told him three days before
leaving. When he found out he swore at me!
Anjum: I got the money off my parents and paid an agent. It
was difficult to get them to agree. We don’t have that much
money. I made a fuss and they had to give in the end. Parents
do their best to fulfil their children’s wishes.
A number of important messages emerge in the narratives of these mi-
grants, the first of which is that the decision to migrate illegally is, in
some cases, an individual one that is sometimes made outside of, and of-
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ten against the wishes of the household. The second is that it is not ne-
cessarily a product of collectively made, economically rational calcula-
tions geared towards increasing family well-being and elevating the clan’s
social status. This raises the question of what it is, exactly, that drives mi-
grants to take up the mortal risks that are involved in illegal migration.
6.4 The romantic appeal of illegal migration
Anthropological accounts of the migration process have long alluded to
the fact that perceived inequality or ‘relative deprivation’ play a key role
in triggering further emigration in competitive rural communities. By
flaunting commodities purchased from abroad and ostentatiously con-
veying their newly acquired wealth, returnees and their families are
thought to have given themselves and vilayat [England] a kind of
mythical, elevated status. Ballard and Ballard (1977: 27), for instance,
argued that ‘symbols of success (e.g. clothes, watches, suitcases) and
reports of the new life create a half-picture, a distorted image. The diffi-
culties encountered in vilayat […] are minimised to ensure the delight
and pride of family and kin (ibid.: 69)’. Khan, likewise, wrote of the
‘glamour’ conferred upon Mirpuri returnees (ibid.: 71).
However, such accounts treat the sending context simplistically as a
site where the diffusion of a ‘distorted’ misconception of what migrat-
ing entails proliferates (as if there existed a single ‘true’ picture), and
do not explore the phenomenological complexities that surround the
attraction of returnees’ possessions. Interviews with migrants who wit-
nessed events in the periphery during the 1960s and 1970s suggest
that smuggling grew organically from the initial small-scale acts of UK
returnees who brought goods with them and then actively spread the
word and recruited individuals and groups of men to be transported
overland (illegally) to the UK for payment of a fee. The importance of
this two-way exchange of commodities, people and information along
overland smuggling routes in the lives of young men is clearly evident
in the testimony of Nadir, whose village of origin (Dinga) lies in Gujrat
district, where (together with neighbouring Mandi Bahauddin) human
smuggling rates to the West are purported to be the highest in the
whole of Pakistan by the Pakistani officials I interviewed:
They would come in transit vans purchased in the UK and bring
consumables and gadgets, and on the way back take family
members. They’d make them wait in France and Holland, make
a trip to the UK and return for them – a different route. Or they
would brief them on how to get through to the UK, beat immi-
gration laws, and they’d come independently. […] Someone cle-
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ver would take ten to twelve [men], and work out a way to get
them to the UK. This was the early Sixties.
Remittances and the introduction of commodities, it seems, ushered in
ever more market-based social relations, consumerist ideologies and in-
dividualistic desires, which stimulated further demand for the services
of human smugglers. Indeed, as the 1970s wore on, state sponsored
capital-rich development in areas with high rates of emigration gave
rise to patterns of conspicuous consumption which developed to the
point where Pakistan, one of the poorest countries on earth, had by the
1980s acquired a penchant for imported luxury goods, despite its sub-
Saharan African levels of development and appalling social indicators.
The formation of a powerful, ever more widely diffused consumerist
ideology of migration took hold in rural Punjab in this period, as is
clear from the recollections of Faizal, a middle-aged migrant I inter-
viewed in Italy who also grew up in a village in Gujrat in the 1970s
and 1980s. His testimony sheds further light on the importance of the
‘gadgets’ mentioned in this last account. The appeal these held is vi-
vidly remembered decades on, in a telling account of the manner in
which he and his friends would covet the material possessions of retur-
nees. Asked why he first migrated to Kuwait at the age of seventeen in
1980, he stressed that financially, ‘we were comfortable’. His parents
pleaded with him to stay put, but he and his friends had other ideas:
Our thinking was this: whichever guy comes from outside, you
see them wearing white clothes. He’s holding a good suitcase in
his hand […] he’ll wear white clothes, and be wearing a gold
watch.
Do you remember seeing these guys?
Absolutely. When I passed my matric I thought I should go:
‘What’s the point in staying here, working the land with your
parents. You’ll get nothing. I’ll go outside and make good
money. I’ll come back wearing watches and stuff.’ […]
When we would see them, it felt as though we should go as
well. We felt stuck there. We thought we should go, too.
Where would you see them?
We would see them when we were going around in the bazaar.
So you would know they were from outside just by looking at them?
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Everyone knows what everyone is doing there. You know so-and-
so is back from England; so-and-so is back from Saudi or an
Arab country.
Several respondents referred to returnees’ ‘white’ clothes. Whiteness,
in their minds, appears to have denoted novelty and newness, and was
associated with commodities, affluence, power and exclusivity – all
signs of having left behind the unglamorous world of agriculture
where people have to work for a living. Faizal explains, ‘A man who
works and lives in Pakistan, he’ll work. Sometimes he might wear good
clothes. Sometimes he won’t. But if a man returns from abroad – he
won’t go to work.’ Those who had been abroad, it seems, were asso-
ciated with various kinds of elevated social distinction from the com-
munities to which they belonged in rural Punjab. The latter came to be
perceived as the domain of the socially (and spatially) immobile – those
condemned to a dull and mediocre existence, bound to families and
households: ‘stuck’, to use Faizal’s words.
The insights of Cambell (1987) in his analysis of the romantic ethic
and the spirit of modern consumerism in the West are worth reflecting
on here, since they highlight some of the core values of modern consu-
merism and the way in which these can transform perceptions of what
constitutes a desirable existence. Defined by him as a kind of ‘illusory
hedonism’ that emerged after the industrial revolution with the forma-
tion of middle-class living above the subsistence level, it is distinct
from ‘traditional’ hedonism in that ‘the joys of longing rival those of ac-
tual gratification’ (Cambell 1987: 203). Modern consumerism is asso-
ciated by Cambell with a ‘dissatisfaction with real life and eagerness
for new experiences’ that have come to shape modern life, which is
characterised by ‘the ceaseless consumption of novelty’ (ibid.: 205) and
a tendency to ‘create desire’ (ibid.: 222). The attraction to migration of
youth in rural Pakistan since the 1960s has been characterised increas-
ingly by this sort of modern romantic spirit: taunted with glimpses of
the pleasures that consumerism has to offer, they daydream of acquir-
ing the riches necessary to purchase and experience them through mi-
gration. Like illusory hedonists in pursuit of new experiences, they
imagine the adventure and novelty migration promises to bring.
But how does all this relate to issues of illegality, given that succes-
sive and parallel waves of legal and illegal migration have been and
continue to be immersed within the same romantic consumer migra-
tory culture? Clearly it would make little sense to posit a radical distinc-
tion between processes that enmesh diverse modes of labour migration
from given localities and social contexts. The consequences of illegality
in migration are too bound up with those that result from legal migra-
tory flows, to be discussed in isolation. What seems certain, however, is
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that they do accentuate and direct existing trends and processes in im-
portant ways: if international labour migration from rural contexts is
(and has always often been) by its very nature the preserve of the
young, the ambitious and those with a penchant for risk-taking, my
data suggest that migration control intensifies the romantic appeal be-
hind decision-making, reinforcing these tendencies and pushing them,
in some cases, to extremes. It is no coincidence that, despite unprece-
dented levels of restrictionism, migration more than ever holds the
imagined promise of material and experiential novelty to Pakistani
youth, despite the fact that, in objective terms, it offers fewer obviously
identifiable rewards than it did in say, the 1970s. Indeed the two aug-
mentations – in restrictionism and the desire to migrate – are arguably
related. Certainly historically, the mystique surrounding migration has
been greatly intensified by the increase of restrictive measures taken by
the British government since the beginning of the 1960s. Only a small
number of people from South Asia had taken up the opportunity to
migrate following the British Nationality Act of 1948, which left some-
thing of an open door for Commonwealth populations to enter the UK.
The passing of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act changed
this instantaneously: by subjecting New Commonwealth labour migra-
tion to Britain to reduced strict quotas, the British state unwittingly sti-
mulated the immigration to hitherto unseen numbers as thousands
rushed to ‘beat the ban’, a number of whom may never have migrated
had it not been introduced (Hiro 1973: 106-109; see also Shaw 2000:
15-20). In 1960, migration from the subcontinent was still only 7,500.
In 1961, 48,000 entered Britain as rumours of impending anti-immi-
gration legislation circulated (Hiro 1973: 108). It was at that very mo-
ment, my research findings reveal, that human smuggling in its mod-
ern form from South Asia to the West began, not, as is often assumed,
in the 1990s, the 1980s or even the 1970s.
Several migrants I interviewed, by their own admission, were lured
by the forbidden nature of migration as young men and cited wanting
‘to see’ what lies behind the purdah [curtain] as their main purpose.
Tanvir, a 38-year-old self-employed grocer from Jhelum who migrated
to London in 1984 explained, ‘There’s a purdah. You always want to
know what’s behind that – to see it for yourself. Even if the next man
tells you there’s nothing there, you will want to see for yourself.’ One
of nine boys in his FA class of eleven who migrated at the same mo-
ment in the early 1980s, attributed his actions to impulsive ‘young
blood’ and lust for adventure, issues to which I turn in more detail in
the next section.
Beyond the issue of creating mystique, moreover, migration control
has blurred the relationship between migration and consumerism,
with important consequences. Restrictionism has spawned the growth
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of a vast modern ‘business’ in facilitation (Salt & Stein 1997). The busi-
ness in human smuggling gives return migrants and smugglers a
stake in continuing to perpetuate myths about life abroad as part of a
marketing strategy. This process of commodification and marketing
has effectively transformed migration itself into a commodity that can
and must be purchased at any cost. If migration once facilitated consu-
merism, its commodification through the rise of human smuggling
has ensured that the two have now become synonymous in sending
contexts. Migration, that is to say, is no longer simply a means to accu-
mulate capital and consume; it is an end in itself, the realisation of
which requires considerable levels of accumulation and significant le-
vels of material investment and risk. For certain constellations of
young Pakistani men who now live above subsistence, migration is it-
self the ultimate product and status symbol. This development, which
is arguably bringing about a fundamental reversal in the very nature of
labour migration, is reflected in the rising costs of smuggling, which
went up by around a thousand pounds a year during the period of my
conducting this research, raising ever more serious question marks
over the treatment of migration as a calculated, ‘rational’ economic
strategy.
6.5 Sexuality and youth cultures in communities of men
One particularly intriguing passage of Nadir’s earlier quoted testimony
introduces a hitherto neglected aspect of the history of labour flows
from Pakistan, legal and illegal. The transit vans that transported Pun-
jabis from Gujrat district to the UK illegally in the 1960s, he explains,
were part of a broader phenomenon: the traffic in cultural ideas and
experiences between the West and the global South that belongs to an
unwritten history of post-war globalisation. By virtue of its proximity to
the major highway connecting the East to the West within the subcon-
tinent, his village in Gujrat district was heavily exposed to the tourist
trail travelled by considerable numbers of Westerners in the 1960s. Ac-
cording to Indian government estimates there were ten thousand
‘youthful foreigners’ in the country in 1967. Five years after the Beatles
had popularised the route, the same number crossed the Wagah border
from Pakistan in a single week. In 1973, there were 250,000 French
nationals in India alone (MacLean 2006: 205). This period coincides
with the emergence of mass migration and human smuggling from
South Asia to the UK. The travellers and the way they lived their ‘free
style of life’ as they passed through the subcontinent in their thou-
sands at the height of the sexual revolution appear to have had quite
an impact on some of the young men whose field of vision they en-
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tered along the GT (‘Grand Trunk’) road which, built by the Mughals,
acquired legendary status under the British, who coined its modern
name:
I remember European people would go by road through Iran,
Afghanistan and the Khyber Pass through Pindi and Lahore,
from the UK. We would see them on the GT road – the motor-
way starting from Peshawar, Pindi, Jhelum, Gujrat, Gujuranwala
and Lahore. From there they would go to Delhi. These were
small vans. We saw their free style of life, their capacity to spend
money and enjoy life. They were hippies, tourists. Hundreds
would pass through daily. Americans, English, French. They
would stop in Karian, Jhelum and Gujrat, and stay there, wher-
ever night fell. They would stay in hotels and use tents. We had
a fascination to meet them. You would go and talk to them in
bars, cafe´s and tea places on the GT roadside. We were fasci-
nated [...] by the women. ‘What sort of people are they?’ we won-
dered. This was the early Sixties. They were individual tourists.
Also we’d see them in the trains, up until the 1970s. For youth,
this inspired one to leave.
This passage suggests that the sight of youngsters fulfilling their own
desires to travel and discover what they thought of as ‘India’, enjoying
their ‘spending power’ as well as sexual and other forms of freedom
may well have played an important, as yet unstudied, role in stimulat-
ing interest in the Occident. A recently published journalistic account
of the hippy trail presents much anecdotal evidence of its impact upon
locals in countries as diverse as Turkey, Iran and India (MacLean
2006). The indelible impression left by the ‘intrepids’ and their ‘liberal
values’ on youngsters is apparent throughout. A man in Turkey is
quoted as saying, ‘Their liberal values […] spread in a soft way through-
out Turkish society. Our women began to feel they had the freedom to
act as they wished’ (ibid.: 13). Another recounts, ‘I remember the par-
ties most of all […] drinking wine, playing guitars […] our mothers told
us, ‘Don’t go near the […] infidels‘ (ibid.: 51). A former Iranian con-
script remembers spying on a young woman through binoculars as she
crouched behind a small bush to relieve herself in 1967 at the Afghan
border: ‘That sight was like the first bite of a forbidden fruit. Next I
heard about an oasis […] where hippies stopped to sunbathe and swim’.
He spied on them there, too (ibid.: 107).
The significance of all this lies in the interconnections it underlines
between early human smuggling and cultural exchange rooted in the
largely forgotten journeys of unthinking Western tourists. None of this
early smuggling was reliant on social networks or new technologies of
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travel. Human smuggling emerged with roots in the two-way historical
process of material and cultural exchange between Europe and South
Asia – low tech, overland travel in both directions. As early as the
1960s and for much of the 1970s, pioneering returnees from Mirpur
and Punjab were making return car journeys alongside of intrepid
young Westerners travelling along the hippy trail. Both sets of actors
spread news of a different, appealing and seductive way of life, and
thus made an important contribution to the exchanges of information
we hear so much about in discussions of globalisation.
In the age of mass advertising, digital television and information (in-
ternet) technology, the diffusion of sexualised images and commodified
youth cultures has unsurprisingly increased. So, too, has the seductive
appeal of migration, with which these cultural trends are firmly asso-
ciated. The importance of youthful adventure in his own motivations
was stressed by Chima, a 31-year-old Punjabi chef in Florence who
made his decision to migrate in 1996 at the age of 21:
I had a desire to go outside from early on. I thought I, too,
wanted to live in a free setting. There was a desire to come, even
if it harms me. I thought, ‘I’ll make my own money and spend
it however I want. I’ll get my kicks.‘
Can’t you do that in Pakistan?
You can, but there are some restrictions. Parents say, ‘Don’t go
here, don’t go there!’ You have to do what they say.
The professed desire to experience ‘freedom’ here aligns migration with
subversion and the assertion of one’s youthful, generational identity.
Making money is about autonomy rather than commercial gain. When I
pressed Chima about another vague reference to ‘getting one’s kicks’, he
casually mentioned leaving Italy to travel around Europe during a period
of unemployment, and responded with surprise that I would assume he
and other migrant workers should be any different than any other tour-
ist or traveller in their desire and heterogeneity of interests and wants:
Nothing much was happening on the work front anyway. I went
to roam around. […] I don’t stress. I had a good roam. I stayed
with Yasir in Belgium – that was good. Then a friend in Ger-
many, and then another friend in Germany. Then I went to Aus-
tria, then to another one in Slovakia, and then I came back to
Italy.
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What do you do when you travel, why do you enjoy it?
Why does anyone go to Italy from Germany and Britain?
Some people say Pakistanis only leave [migrate] to work, for money.
Some people leave just for money. Some are passionate about
money. Some, like me, like to roam. Like to get their kicks.
Some like to get their kicks with girls. They like to fuck round.
Some like to see things, to see what things are like, to see differ-
ent people and countries – they see that as getting their kicks.
Some get their kicks from cooking and eating with friends.
Everyone has their own way of getting their kicks.
The casual association of labour migration with travel, transgression
and hedonistic exploration of various kinds (including sexual adven-
ture) was alluded to by other migrants as well. Thirty-one year old Sar-
fraz, whom I interviewed in Florence, had no hesitation in confirming
that aiashi [hedonism] can be factor in many young men’s decision-
making, pointing out that the oppressive regime of conservative reli-
gious, social and moral control of individual behaviour in Pakistan it-
self makes it impossible for young men in villages to indulge in the
kinds of pleasures that are routine for teenagers in the West:
Young men absolutely have it [aiashi] in mind. In Pakistan if
you want to drink, you can get alcohol but it’s not allowed. If
the police catch you they’ll put you in jail. The consequences are
serious. Living with your family too is an issue. […] If a man
likes to drink, even if he can afford to, what enjoyment will he
get doing it when any moment he could get caught.
And women?
Yes. If you do anything like that over there, the chance of getting
beaten up is high. The risk is such that you could get shot if you
[…] someone’s sister or someone’s daughter. That sort of thing
happens all the time – you only need to read the newspapers.
And so it’s not easy to enjoy it.
The notion of illegal labour migration as a form of youthful subversion
is a controversial argument, but one that has a basis in previous
anthropologies of Pakistani migration. Werbner (1996: 88-91) has
pointed to the fact that, despite its surface level solemnity and religious
character, Pakistani culture is in fact composed of diverse strands, its
144 ALI NOBIL AHMAD
meaning contested by genders and generations. Positing a dialectical
tension between the overt piety of elders who espouse high ‘Islamic’
ideals and a more subversive, sensuous South Asian youth sub-culture
that seeks to carve out spaces of fun, celebrating the body and various
sorts of transgression, Werbner cites the cult of cricket as a prime ex-
ample of ‘masculine glamour’ that transgresses national boundaries
(ibid.: 94). Illegal migration, in sending contexts, it is argued here, can
be seen as another.
Indeed evidence suggests that most returnees understand this fact
and the elevated status it brings them over men who have not been
abroad. They swagger around town, basking in the glory it brings
them. Several migrants I met confessed to putting on their ‘whitest’
clothes and deriving satisfaction from splashing money around in front
of the immobile, deliberately giving the impression that their disposa-
ble income is greater than it in fact is. The rumours they disseminate
inspire men of all sorts of ages and social backgrounds to find a way
‘to see’ for themselves what all the fuss was about. This underlines the
centrality of relations between and among men to the dynamics of mi-
gration, which, in the communities of men under discussion, is driven
by a need to enter the ranks of those who have seen and not merely
heard what it is to go abroad. It amounts to masculine rejection of de-
pendency upon others for knowledge of the world; a rejection of relega-
tion to the lowly status, within one’s community, of one who relies
upon the testimonies of others for his understanding of the Occident.
To remain dependent in this way is to share the status of women, for
whom travelling is out of the question: international migration is, in
this sense, a typically masculine, symbolic repudiation of femininity
(Ditz 2004: 18).
This is not to reduce migration to the outcome of a psychological
game; these processes of establishing status are embedded in a materi-
al context and have real experiential consequences. For instance, migra-
tion impacts on inter-male competition for access to women within Pa-
kistan itself, which is central to the gender order. Within the sectors of
rural middle-class society that these men occupy, marriage possibilities
(the sole means of sexual and emotional development for single men)
are rigidly structured by a man’s social status. To be excluded from the
ranks of the returnees restricts one’s choice of bride and extends the
wait for a suitable match, particularly in a district such as Gujrat where
rates of emigration are high. For men in their twenties, this wait can
be a passage of intense sexual frustration. Whilst the pleasures of sex
remain tauntingly visible in the lives of the country’s elites and on tele-
vision through advertising and the global media, they are firmly out of
their grasp in what remains a conservative society. Nor can their frus-
trations be easily alleviated through marriage whilst they remain un-
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employed, unless they accept a match that brings downward social mo-
bility. When asked what it is that motivates men to migrate illegally,
Shahid, a social worker I interviewed whilst doing fieldwork in Lahore,
explained that what appears to be a purely materially driven phenom-
enon is in fact linked in complex ways to the possibilities of sex, espe-
cially for the young men of lower middle-class backgrounds who make
up the bulk of Pakistan’s illegal migration to the West:
They have no access to women, to sex. No access to upper-class
women. They just play cricket and video games. Marriage is the
only way for them to have sex. Because upward mobility for
them is blocked, they feel a terrible frustration, especially those
who want to see more of the world and experience what they see
plastered on TVs.
6.6 Conclusion
The research presented here, in line with feminist interventions (e.g.
Agarwal 1997), confirms that scholars of international migration from
Pakistan (and by implication elsewhere in the global South) have likely
exaggerated the unity of the household and underestimated the impor-
tance of expressions of selfhood in motivating migration among the
privileged circles of men whose family commitments appear to conflict
with their own personal aspirations. If women in Pakistan express ‘no
identity except that of their families’ (Shaheed 2002: 353) and have
‘very little freedom of movement’ (ibid.: 364), some men are clearly
able to pursue their own comparatively ambitious migratory agendas,
irrespective of the ambiguous sentiments expressed by other members
of their households – even where scepticism comes from elderly males
who end up financing the expedition.
Smuggling in its modern form emerged as a consequence of British
policy, which, having induced labour flows in 1948, suddenly restricted
them with the act of 1962. Smugglers operated overland along the Silk
Route, transferring people, commodities and information about the
West and how to get there, carefully cultivating demand for their ser-
vices. The desire to migrate however, reached new levels as emigration
fever gripped the whole country in the late 1970s, a development rein-
forced by policies of the Pakistani state. Gulf remittances and the intro-
duction of commodities, it seems, ushered in ever more market-based
social relations, consumerist ideologies and individualistic desires
which stimulated further demand for the services of smugglers as des-
tination states began tightening up their borders. Migration itself be-
came a commodity, promising all the pleasures of ‘modern illusory he-
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donism’: novel experiences that could be imagined and romanticised
from afar. Its mystique has been compounded by its forbidden status
in an age of growing controls and restrictions. Its association with exo-
tic alterity and cultural difference gives it an emancipatory, subversive
and youthful appeal to men of various backgrounds, in whose minds it
is associated with adventure, sexual freedom, power and elevated sta-
tus. More generally, it confers glamour on returnees and thus affects
social relations between and among men, above all by mediating access
to women in the marriage market.
What drives the will to migrate, it seems, is often the experience of
deprivation and inadequacy that comes with immobility within com-
munities of men where the cult of the ‘globe-trotter’ gets established as
a locally entrenched hegemonic masculinity. In such instances, ironi-
cally, it is not networks themselves that drive migration. The ‘informa-
tion’ that circulates throughout such communities is hardly ‘social capi-
tal’; returnees trigger the desire to migrate beyond their own ‘networks’
by wilfully instilling a sense of marginalised exclusion amongst those
who are external to them. Some of the sentiments which motivate
them have in fact been observed in other labour migrations throughout
history, including those of young women: the desire to ‘see more of
the world’, for example, is identified by Henkes in her study of Ger-
man maids migrating to the Netherlands during the interwar period
(2001: 225-226). This suggests that a desire ‘to see’ more of the world
is not exclusive to men and in fact is typical amongst young people in
all sorts of contexts. On a further comparative note, when juxtaposed
with Van Liempt’s findings, my research underlines just how different
the motivations of smuggled migrants from different places and con-
texts can be, despite the fact that they often use the exact same chan-
nels to reach Europe from the global South. Illegal migration for some
young male labour migrants is a risk-taking activity embarked upon
from a position of relative security. The reverse may well be true for
many refugees and asylum seekers – especially women, for whom
smuggling routes are likely to be perceived as a way of attaining great-
er security from positions that are anything but secure. Viewed over a
long period of time, all migratory outflows from Pakistan remain en-
duringly gendered, and owing to illegal migration have become more
male-dominated.
The role of the state in reinforcing conservative ‘religious’ attitudes
appears to have been crucial in the gendering of migration from Paki-
stan, just as it was in other times and places. In Portugal (Brettell
1986: 136) and Spain (Sarasu´a 2001: 31-33), women were forbidden by
law to migrate; the Irish ‘tradition’ (Delaney 2001: 220) of independent
female labour migration, conversely, is arguably a reflection of the fact
that the state did not outlaw female emigration, despite the efforts of
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the church. In Pakistan, no such laws explicitly prohibit women from
emigrating from Pakistan, but the effect of laws such as the Hudood
Ordinances on attitudes, along with the impact of growth-oriented poli-
cies that sacrifice social and human development, have contributed to
reinforcing the breadwinner model and producing very little in the way
of tangibly progressive social change. Indeed, even in the absence of
explicit discriminatory laws, the position of Pakistani women is in
some respects more subordinate than that of Portuguese women in the
nineteenth century, who, despite living under a similarly patriarchal
migratory regime, had always been able to preserve their status in so-
ciety by virtue of their pivotal role in the agricultural economy. This
was reflected in the fact that there was little stigma attached to spin-
sterhood (Brettell 1986: 139) and in high rates of illegitimacy, which
were in turn an index of interaction between the sexes (‘mingling in
the fields’), suggesting that women were never fully confined to the pri-
vate sphere (ibid.: 211, 249-250).
Note
1 Some of the research drawn upon here was conducted at the Migration Research
Unit of UCL Geography Department as part of the Leverhulme Project on Smuggling
and Trafficking. Thanks to the editors of this book, Richard Staring, Pnina Werbner
and Kaveri Harris for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
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7 Migrant domestic workers in the Middle East
Annelies Moors and Marina de Regt
This chapter sets out to contribute to ongoing debates on gender and
illegal migration by focusing on migrant domestic labour in the Middle
East.1 Whereas in the course of the last decade gender has been taken
up as an analytical category in migration research and the trend to-
wards the feminisation of migration has been acknowledged (see Do-
nato, Gabaccia, Holdaway, Manalansan & Pessar, 2006; Mahler & Pes-
sar 2006), little academic research has been published on the migra-
tion of women to the Middle East, the large majority of whom are
migrant domestic workers. Moreover, if attention has been paid to the
migration of women this has by and large been limited to journalistic
writings and reports of international and non-governmental organisa-
tions that focus on trafficking and abuse (some examples are Beasley
1992 and Bou Habib 1998; for a critique of the ‘victim’ perspective see
Moors 2003). Such a one-dimensional approach runs the risk of negat-
ing the agency of female migrants and may even result in attempts at
regulation that may further restrict their field of possibilities rather
than strengthen their position.
In this chapter we argue not only that the boundaries between legal
and illegal migration are blurred, but also that the effects of being legal
or illegal need to be identified for particular categories of people. Not
only are processes of migration gendered (including their legal as-
pects), but there are also major differences between female migrants,
depending upon the nature of their employment. In this chapter we fo-
cus on how gender intersects with legal/illegal forms of migration for
one particular category of female migrants: migrant domestic workers.
Whereas gender is crucially important with respect both to state poli-
cies and to what the public finds acceptable, the ways in which this
works can only be understood when taking into account the particulari-
ties of the female migrants’ employment as domestics. Before analys-
ing how gender is at stake at various moments in the migration pro-
cess, we will start with an introductory note on the feminisation of mi-
gration in the Middle East, legal and illegal migration, and the gender
of paid domestic work.
The chapter is based on research done in a number of countries in
the Middle East. Annelies Moors conducted life-story research on wo-
men domestic workers and cleaners among Palestinian women on the
West Bank in the early 1990s and in 2003, and took part in the SSRC
programme ‘Migrant Domestic Workers in the Middle East: Becoming
Visible in the Public Sphere’, which included research visits to Istan-
bul, Beirut, Dubai, Amman and Indonesia (Moors, Jureidini, O¨zbay &
Sabban, forthcoming). Marina de Regt did extensive anthropological
fieldwork among domestic workers in two cities in Yemen and in
Ethiopia in the period 2003-2006. The main research methods used
were observations at work and at home, informal interviews with do-
mestic workers and employers and topical life story interviews with do-
mestic workers. In addition, in-depth interviews were carried out with
key informants working at government institutions, embassies, non-
governmental organisations, and newspapers, in order to investigate
public debates. Where no sources are mentioned we are referring to
our own research.
7.1 The feminisation of migration to the Middle East
Although the mobility of people in the Middle East has a long history,
it is especially after the sharp rise in oil prices in the early 1970s and
the rapid increase of wealth in the oil exporting countries that labour
migration became crucially important to these countries.2 Most studies
about migration to the Middle East, and particularly to the Gulf coun-
tries, argue that up until the 1980s the large majority of labour mi-
grants were male and that only in the 1980s and 1990s did migration
trends start to become more diverse (see for example McMurray 1999).
Whereas it is true that female migration increased rapidly in the late
1980s, it was not a completely new phenomenon. From the 1950s on,
women had started to migrate from the poorer Arab countries to the
wealthier ones. Large numbers of Palestinian, Syrian and Egyptian tea-
chers were hired to work on the Arabian Peninsula to set up an educa-
tional system for girls. This type of labour migration was strongly sti-
mulated by a combination of factors: a very low female literacy rate in
the Gulf countries, a strong preference for women teachers in girls’
schools and the fact that Modern Standard Arabic is the written lan-
guage in the entire Arab world, which created a transnational Arab la-
bour market for teachers.
Whereas teaching is generally considered one of the most respect-
able types of employment for women in the Middle East, this was not
so in the case of nursing, which is far more often considered a low-sta-
tus profession (see El-Sanabary 1993; De Regt 2007a). So nurses were
mainly recruited from low-income countries outside the Arab world,
such as the Philippines and India (see for example Percot 2006). More
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recently, both teaching and to a lesser extent nursing have become the
targets of projects that aim at ‘nationalising’ the labour force. Young
women from the Arabian Peninsula have replaced foreign Arab tea-
chers, while in poorer countries local women have also replaced for-
eign nurses. In Lebanon and Jordan, for instance, Filipina women
turned to working as domestic workers when they were no longer
being hired as nurses.3 Indeed, since the 1970s the employment of for-
eign women as domestic workers has rapidly grown, at first in the
wealthier Gulf states and later also amongst the new middle classes in
countries such as Lebanon, Jordan and Yemen. In other words, the par-
tial feminisation of labour migration to the Middle East is first and
foremost due to the large influx of migrant domestic workers from
Asia and, to a lesser extent, Africa.
7.2 Legal versus illegal migration?
While terms such as ‘legal’ versus ‘illegal’ or ‘regular’ versus ‘irregular’
are easily used to categorise migrants, they are, in fact, far from self-
evident. Rather than representing a dichotomy, the categories legal/ille-
gal and regular/irregular refer to a wide variety of positions migrants
take up in the course of their migratory trajectory. One issue at stake is
that migrants move in and out of legality/illegality because labour mi-
gration is differently legalised in countries of origin and countries of
employment. Whereas it is true that the number of international con-
ventions that are relevant to issues of migration and migrant domestic
labour is increasing, legislation is still first and foremost national legis-
lation (for a similar situation in the Netherlands see Van Eijl’s chapter
in this volume).
Discussions about legal versus illegal migration would benefit from
a broader scope, to go beyond legal rules and regulations and include
normative notions. Abraham and Van Schendel (2005) differentiate be-
tween (il)legality and (il)licitness: that is, the differences between the
formally legal and the socially acceptable. Certain illegal practices may
well be considered acceptable (at least in the eyes of some), while prac-
tices that are technically legal may be deemed unacceptable. Including
such normative notions would further stimulate a more developmental
and process-focused approach. Legal activities that are considered unac-
ceptable may in due time be criminalised, while activities that are tech-
nically illegal but widely considered acceptable may be legalised.
One major issue at stake is then in whose eyes certain practices are
acceptable or not. While in debates about legal versus illegal migration
the focus has generally been on state actors, in this chapter we intend
to widen the focus not only by looking at state actors and their desire
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to control and regulate, but also by including the perspectives of mi-
grant domestic workers. The latter are a particularly interesting cate-
gory because of the specificities of their position. They are not only fe-
male migrants but are employees in what is referred to as the private
sphere, which is not recognised as a site of employment.4 Because of
this, migrant domestic workers face particularly strong tensions be-
tween what is legally allowed and what is deemed socially acceptable.
7.3 The gendering of women’s paid domestic work
In focusing on gender we will not systematically compare male and fe-
male migrant domestic workers. This is not only because few men in
the Middle East are engaged in this form of employment (and if they
are, it is usually in specific tasks such as driving and gardening), but
also because it is quite possible to analyse gender by focusing on either
men or women. It has been taken for granted that paid domestic work
is women’s work par excellence, both because it entails house and care
work and because it is conducted in the domestic sphere. Historical
studies show, however, that in parts of the world where women’s labour
currently predominates in paid domestic work, a large number of men
have previously been employed (Rollins 1985; Moya 2007), while in
some areas such as Zambia (Hansen 1986; 1991) and India (Ray
2000; Tolen 2000) men continue to be employed.
Still, even if the large majority of present-day migrant domestic
workers are indeed women (and sometimes children), women’s em-
ployment in this field is far from ‘natural’. As Hansen (1991) has ar-
gued, the gendered nature of paid domestic labour has remained un-
der-theorised. In many settings there are strong tensions between wo-
men’s employment as migrant domestic workers and existing gendered
divisions of labour, centring on the ideals of motherhood and notions
of sexuality (see for example Constable 1997b; Lan 2006). Moreover, it
is important to recognise that gender is only one aspect of a person’s
positionality. Gender always articulates with multiple axes of differen-
tiation, such as class, age, religion, nationality and so; while gender
does transform the meaning of class, for instance, the opposite is also
true (Mahler & Pessar 2006: 28 ff). When analysing the restrictions
migrant domestic workers face, it is important to untangle whether
and how this relates to their class position, to their gender, to their
being migrants or to their field of employment.
The following section will discuss the gendering of migrant domes-
tic labour for the five ‘moments’ in the migration process at which il-
legality may occur: leaving, travelling, residing, working and returning
home. Our main argument is that whether being legal or illegal is an
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advantage or disadvantage to migrant domestic workers depends very
much upon the rights and duties this entails.
7.4 Leaving the country of origin: Intentions, debates
and policies
Most literature on migrant domestic workers assumes that they cross
borders as labour migrants to improve the economic conditions of
themselves or their families or to get away from situations of abuse.
However, in many countries, in the Middle East and elsewhere, women
who work as domestics may have crossed borders for other reasons. It
is striking that it is often refugee women who work as domestics, such
as Sudanese women in Egypt (Ahmed 2003), Kurdish women in Leba-
non (Jureidini & Moukarbel 2004), Palestinian refugee women in the
West Bank (Moors 1995) and Somali women in Yemen (De Regt
2007b). Whereas domestic workers who came as labour migrants to
the Middle East usually see their employment as part of a life project,
women refugees may well end up working as domestics as an unin-
tended consequence of their expulsion or flight, as this is the only field
of employment open to them. Since they do not leave their country of
origin as labour migrants, a discussion of the particularities of their po-
sition falls outside the scope of this chapter.
The countries of origin of migrants working as domestics in the
Middle East have divergent policies with respect to migration. Some,
such as the Philippines, where remittances from migrants have be-
come a major source of income, have a history of actively encouraging
and controlling labour migration, including that of migrant domestic
workers (Parren˜as 2001). The Filipino embassies organise activities for
migrant workers, provide facilities for them and more generally at-
tempt to keep migrant workers tied to their country of origin, where
they are welcomed as ‘economic heroes’ (Constable 1997a). Filipina mi-
grant domestic workers are required to go through private government
licensed agencies and to participate in pre-departure orientation. In fact
all women who migrate as domestics are supposed to do so through
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. They are also
not allowed to work below a certain wage level, which is contractually
arranged before leaving (however, these contracts are not enforceable
in the country of employment).5
Other states are far more hesitant about migration. Some ban all mi-
gration, such as Egypt before 1971, but more often they target particu-
lar categories of labour migrants. For instance, Pakistan does not allow
women to go and work abroad on their own as domestics, while India
only allows women over 30 years of age to do so. In 2004, Ethiopia no
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longer allowed the migration of domestic workers to Lebanon after a
number of very serious cases of abuse. Moreover, in countries that try
to follow the model of the Philippines and have become important
sending countries of migrant domestic workers, such as Sri Lanka and
Indonesia, there are major tensions and debates about the desirability
of women migrating abroad as domestic workers (Gamburd 2000; Ro-
binson 2000). Such debates may also be played out in the field of reli-
gious politics, such as in Indonesia, where Islamic groups have heavily
criticised the government for allowing women to migrate on their own
(rather than accompanied by a mahram, a closely related male or hus-
band).
Public debate has in some cases resulted in regulating the migration
of domestic workers. One striking feature is that women’s work as do-
mestics is not in itself considered problematic; all these countries have
large numbers of poor women who are locally employed as domestics.
It is only when women do the same work abroad that it becomes an is-
sue of public concern.6 This relates to the notion that women embody
the nation, while men are the real citizens of the state. A particular no-
tion of femininity, which centres on morality, motherhood and sexual-
ity, is at stake here, as is a particular construction of masculinity, with
men as the protectors of women (see for example Gamburd 2000:
229). The bottom line is the power imbalance between the sending
and receiving countries, with the former far more dependent on the
latter than vice versa.7 The end result is that sending countries have
few means to protect their nationals – male or female – in the country
of employment.
There are many reasons why public debate focuses on abuse and vic-
timhood. It is certainly the case that there are serious cases of abuse.
Yet migrant domestic workers may also feel the need to emphasise the
many hardships they face abroad, since otherwise they run the risk of
being portrayed as having left their families to their own devices while
they themselves are having an easy time (see for example Gamburd
2000). The circulation of such stories of abuse and victimhood may in
turn pressure state institutions to restrict the migration of women do-
mestic workers. States may then either prohibit women from migrat-
ing as domestic workers altogether or only allow them to do so under
strict conditions (being above a certain age, going through particular
channels, having the permission of their husbands and so on). Migrant
domestic workers who are unable or unwilling to cope with these re-
quirements then either have to give up on their migration project or
proceed through illegal means.
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7.5 Travelling and entering the country of destination
There are two major means by which migrant domestics move from
their country of origin to the country of employment: via recruitment
agencies or via relatives and friends. Although it is difficult to draw a
sharp line between the two, the ways in which women migrate may in-
dicate the extent to which they have been actively involved in designing
their migration project. Also, when labour migration is presented as
voluntary or as the ‘natural’ outcome of market mechanisms drawing
poor women to rich countries, people are, in fact, often induced into la-
bour migration. Yet once a migration link has been established it may
well take on a life of its own, with friends, acquaintances and kin invit-
ing and urging women to come and join them abroad. Since migrant
domestic labour has become an established practice, it is also trans-
mitted over generations, with some following in the footsteps of their
mothers. Migration has, in fact, become such a generalised phenomen-
on that women themselves actively turn to agents to join those who
show the results of their work abroad by wearing gold jewellery, buying
land and building houses.
7.5.1 Agencies
Agencies work in both sending and receiving countries. In sending
countries, recruitment agencies organise women’s migration and ac-
tively search for women who may be interested in migration abroad. In
the Philippines, state institutions have been heavily involved in stimu-
lating migration abroad (see Parren˜as 2001). In Indonesia brokers em-
ployed by agencies visit poor rural families and convince young women
to migrate abroad in order to help their families (see Surtees 2003). In
Ethiopia brokers actively approach young women from poor families
and persuade them to migrate to the Middle East (Kebede 2001; De
Regt 2007a). In receiving countries employment agencies function as
intermediaries between families looking for migrant domestic workers
and women willing to migrate abroad. Agencies in sending and receiv-
ing countries often work together, with agencies in sending countries
‘supplying’ agencies in receiving countries with migrant domestic
workers. Women who migrate via agencies are always employed as
live-in domestic workers, with the length of the contracts generally
varying between one and three years.
Some sending and receiving countries have policies to regulate the
activities of recruitment agencies through a system of licenses. Yet the
fact that many agencies use sub-contractors interested in benefiting
from the migration business makes it difficult to control them, as Jaber
(2005) shows for those involved in the Philippines-Jordan connection.
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Moreover, the policies of sending and receiving countries may diverge
substantially. In Yemen there were until recently two agencies licensed
by the Yemeni Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour that recruited
Ethiopian women as domestic workers, but neither of these was recog-
nised as a legal agent in Ethiopia. Both lost their licenses after serious
human rights violations including the withholding of passports, the de-
lay of the payment of salaries and physical abuse, but they continue
their activities without a license, as do many other agents. The Yemeni
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour lacks the facilities to systemati-
cally control the activities of illegal recruitment agents, while the finan-
cial and political interests that accompany the illegal immigration and
employment of young women workers also hamper attempts to regu-
late it (De Regt 2007a). Some migrant women themselves prefer to
make use of agents who do not work according to the law because the
bureaucratic procedures that are involved in legal migration take so
long.
Many formally legal (that is licensed) agencies actually employ illegal
recruitment practices that amount to trafficking. Whereas trafficking is
generally equated with forcing women into prostitution, according to
the UN definition recruiting migrant workers by means of deception is
also a form of trafficking. As migrant domestic workers are commonly
deceived about the conditions of employment and the wage levels,
much migrant domestic work would fall in the category of trafficking
(see Jureidini & Moukarbel 2004). For instance, the contracts migrant
domestic workers sign in their home country are often not valid in
their country of employment, where they are then coerced into accept-
ing another, far less favourable contract. Another problem is that many
women are not aware of the fact that they will find themselves in a si-
tuation of illegality. Indonesian women migrating to Saudi Arabia, for
example, may do so via agencies that arrange their visas under the pre-
text that they are going to perform the hajj. As soon as they arrive in
Saudi Arabia, they are employed as domestic workers although they do
not have a residence or a work permit. In some cases they may be able
to perform hajj during their stay in Saudi Arabia, but in other cases
this was only a way to obtain an entry visa.
Licensed, formally legal agencies may engage in other illegal prac-
tices such as asking high recruitment fees from employees, withhold-
ing passports and delaying the payment of salaries. Employers are sup-
posed to pay the plane tickets and the costs of residence and work per-
mits, and workers are supposed to be responsible only for the visa
costs and health tests (see ILO 2004). Yet in many cases both the em-
ployers and the workers have to pay fees to the agencies for their assis-
tance in arranging the migration and employment (see Jureidini &
Moukarbel 2004: 594). Some migrant workers may borrow money
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from relatives or friends, but others fall victim to some form of ‘debt
bondage’. Having borrowed money from their agents, they conse-
quently are forced to work without receiving their salaries for consider-
able periods of time.
Women who migrate via agencies are also at a disadvantage because
many agencies offer employers a domestic worker for a trial period of
three months; if the employer is not satisfied, the agent is obliged to
find a replacement. In practice this may well mean that the agency se-
verely disciplines and punishes the domestic worker in order to ‘con-
vince’ her to return to the family as a better, more submissive worker.
Some agencies also strongly advise employers to restrict the mobility of
the migrant domestic workers and tell them not to allow domestics to
leave the house on their own (see Jureidini & Moukarbel 2004; De
Regt 2007a).
7.5.2 Friends and relatives
Women who migrate via relatives or friends arrive on tourist visas
which they then overstay, or come on individual contracts that their re-
latives or friends have arranged. Networks of relatives and friends facil-
itate their arrival in the destination country and their access to housing
and work (see Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Hagan 1998; Beyene 2005).
Sometimes women who intend to migrate as domestic workers take
the initiative and ask relatives or friends to find work for them and
help organise their migration, while in other cases employers ask their
domestic workers if they have relatives or friends who would want to
come and work for relatives or friends of the employers. Having a net-
work of relatives or friends – and hence some support – is an impor-
tant reason why women decide to migrate to a particular country.
Ethiopian women in Yemen cited this as the reason to come to Yemen,
even though they could have earned more elsewhere in the Middle East
(De Regt 2007b).
Migrating via relatives or friends has important advantages. Women
are better prepared for their work and life abroad, while the presence
of relatives or friends facilitates their adjustment to a new living and
working situation. Whereas networks of relatives and friends are very
important for migrants’ well-being in general (see Hagan 1998), this is
all the more so in the case of migrant domestic workers because they
work in isolated situations (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Beyene 2005).
Moreover, the fact that the families they are going to work for are
known to their friends and relatives increases the chance that they will
be treated well. Also, if they work as live-ins they are in a stronger posi-
tion to negotiate with their employers and, with a network of friends to
go to, they can more easily claim a day-off.
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7.6 Employment and residency: Rights and duties
The main countries of employment in the Middle East are located on
the Arabian Peninsula and have a long history of contact with South
Asia and Indonesia. Up until the 1950s and 1960s the mobility of peo-
ple between these regions remained largely undocumented. Only after
the oil boom did issues of residency and nationality become crucially
important, especially in those cases where the foreign labour force was
much larger than the very small yet tremendously wealthy national po-
pulation, such as in the UAE or Qatar.8 The net result is that it has be-
come progressively more difficult to gain permanent residency and
nearly impossible to gain the nationality in these countries.
Rights to nationality are strongly regulated and are based on lines of
descent rather than on duration of residency. Migrant women have an
advantage over migrant men, since in the Gulf states, and elsewhere in
the Middle East, nationality is by and large transferred through the
male line.9 Whereas migrant men cannot acquire nationality through
marriage with an Emirati national, migrant women can do so. Yet
changes are taking place here as well. Whilst it used to be quite com-
mon for Emirati men to marry young women from Bombay and else-
where in India, more recently the state has also tried to make it more
difficult for Emirati men to marry foreign women. One argument used
is that a considerable number of well-educated Emirati women have
difficulty finding a suitable partner. The aim of the state is to support
the marriages of Emirate men with Emirati women through such insti-
tutions as the marriage fund, which subsidises the costs of such mar-
riages. In Saudi Arabia there has, in fact, been quite some publicity
about men who prefer to marry women from South-East Asia, espe-
cially Indonesian women – who work in large numbers as domestics
in Saudi Arabia – since they are considered less demanding and more
submissive than Saudi wives.10
In the Gulf states, and to some extent also in Jordan and Lebanon,
migrants cannot work and reside legally without having a ‘sponsor’
(kafil), who is in most cases their employer. The sponsor is fully re-
sponsible for the employee during the contract period, which lasts be-
tween one and three years. If the sponsor decides to break the contract,
the employee immediately loses his or her residence permit and is
obliged to return home. Most migrant workers are prepared to endure
considerable hardship rather than to shorten their contract period and
return home empty-handed (Longva 1999: 23). While employers are re-
sponsible for arranging residence and work permits, migrants are
blamed (and sometimes criminalised) for not having them.
The dependency of migrant domestic workers on their sponsors is
particularly strong because they are required to reside in the house of
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their sponsor/employer. Moreover, in these households they occupy an
ambiguous position as non-family members working in a situation of
highly personalised relationships. Because they work in what is consid-
ered as the private sphere, they are not covered by labour law and find
themselves under the authority of the head of the household. Whereas
their position as domestic workers is unregulated – as is also the case
for local domestic workers and for migrant domestic workers in many
other settings – as migrants they are subject to laws about immigration
and residency that are very detailed.
In many countries of employment the presence of migrant domestic
workers has been and still is a highly contested issue. Attempts to re-
strict the number of migrant domestic workers are not only fed by the
general fear of the very small national populations of being taken over
by foreigners. Migrant domestic workers are targeted in particular be-
cause they work in the privacy of the household and are engaged in
raising the new generation of citizens. In the UAE, for instance, where
foreigners far outnumber the national population, stories abound about
young children who speak Malayalam rather than Arabic and who en-
gage in non-Muslim religious practices. Such anxieties fuel the debate
about the desirability of the presence of foreign domestics. Yet, at the
same time, the policy of ‘nationalising’ the labour market is drawing
increasing numbers of young Emirati women onto the labour market,
which is further increasing the demand for domestic workers. Hence,
measures to limit the number of domestics mainly target the foreign
middle classes, who are only allowed to bring one domestic into the
household and who have to pay far higher fees to do so, amounting to
one year’s salary (Sabban 2004).
In poorer countries where there is considerable unemployment,
such as in Jordan, other arguments are used against employing mi-
grant domestic workers. On the one hand, professional middle-class
women are blamed for bringing in foreign domestic workers because
they insist on working outside the home, while on the other hand poor
local women are blamed for not being willing to do this type of work.11
Yet, as elsewhere, it is not simply that local women are not available or
willing to do this work; employers also prefer foreign domestics since
they are either more qualified, cheaper or more submissive.12
Public debates and, in some cases, international pressure and sup-
port have led to some improvements in the working and living condi-
tions of migrant domestic workers. In the case of Jordan, a Special
Working Contract for non-Jordanian Domestic Workers has been de-
signed that must be signed by the employer, the domestic workers, the
agency and an embassy representative. The employer can only obtain a
visa, a residency and a work permit when such a contract has been ar-
ranged for. The advantage for domestic workers is that the wage level
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is acknowledged by all parties concerned. The contract also states a
number of rights for migrant domestic workers, such as the right to
hold one’s own passport, to correspond freely with others and to re-
ceive their wages monthly. It forbids employers from imposing addi-
tional tasks on their domestic workers such as working outside the em-
ployer’s residence, and obliges the employer to pay airline tickets and
government fees and to provide life insurance. It also entitles the do-
mestic worker to a weekly rest day. Only time will tell whether these
rules will be adhered to in practice. Yet it is important to realise that,
according to these contracts, the domestic worker is not allowed to
leave the house without the approval of the employer (also not on her
day off). Moreover, if the employer breaks the contract without legiti-
mate reason, he or she is obliged to send the worker back to her coun-
try of origin at the employer’s expense. In other words, the net result is
that in such cases the domestic worker loses her job (Jureidini 2004).
7.7 A trend towards freelancing
One of the main distinctions amongst migrant domestic workers is be-
tween contract workers and freelancers (see Anderson 2000; Jureidini
& Moukarbel 2004; ILO 2004). In contrast to contract workers, who
are tied to and dependent on one employer, freelancers work without
such a contract and can change employers. Local women or women
who already have some sort of residency status (such as recognised re-
fugees) usually work as freelancers or, less commonly, through house-
cleaning agencies.
In most Middle Eastern countries, migrants are officially not allowed
to work as freelancers. As mentioned before, foreign workers need a
sponsor, who arranges for work and residency permits. In countries
where the kafala system is strictly implemented, such as the Gulf
states, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon (in the case of domestic workers),
freelancers sometimes pay someone to be their sponsor even though
they are not working for him, which is technically illegal (see ILO
2004: 66). Jureidini (2004: 66) describes how some Lebanese have
seen this as a lucrative business opportunity and charge up to 1200 US
dollars to act as a sponsor for individual migrant workers. Where the
kafala system is not implemented, such as in Yemen, the majority of
freelancers work without a sponsor. They also often work without work
permits, for although control of residence status is becoming stricter,
there is only limited control of work status.
Some freelancers enter the country of employment on a tourist visa,
which they then overstay. Others, after having worked as contract work-
ers, either go home at the end of their contract to return on a tourist
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visa or leave their employers and move directly into freelancing. Many
share apartments with other freelancing domestics (see Beyene 2005;
De Regt 2007b) and work on an hourly basis for various employers.
They spend their leisure time at home, visiting friends, going shopping
or going to church.13 There are also freelancers who work as live-in do-
mestics for one family (see Ahmed 2003; De Regt 2007b). Still, the lat-
ter are also less dependent on their employers than contract workers
and, as a result, usually receive a higher salary and have more freedom
of movement. On the downside, they have to pay rent for their rooms,
buy their own clothing and, if at all possible, pay for their residence
and work permits.
An important advantage of freelancing is that these domestic work-
ers can improve their living and working conditions by resigning and
accepting new employers who offer better salaries or better working
conditions. In Yemen there is a clear career pattern visible among free-
lancers, who move from working as live-in domestics with mainly
cleaning tasks for local families to working as live-out domestics for
foreigners, particularly West Europeans. The latter not only pay better,
but may also provide work connections in Europe.
Freelancing is increasing in popularity, in spite of the fact that it is
technically illegal. This can be better understood by taking into account
the way in which migrant domestic labour is regulated. When women
follow the rules and regulations for employment as migrant domestic
workers, their workload is heavy yet their rights remain very limited.
Hence, working as illegal freelancers may well be a move for the better.
This is evident in the number of women who leave their employer and
start working as freelancers with or without the approval of their spon-
sor. Despite immigration policies that strongly discourage any form of
settlement, migrant workers have gradually gained a clear presence in
certain neighbourhoods in Beirut, Dubai and other cities in the Middle
East. Some have succeeded in remaining in the country for long peri-
ods of time, either by accumulating a number of consecutive contracts
(engaging in circular migration with in-between trips back home) or by
overstaying their visa. Still, for some sort of community to develop it is
not necessary to have the same persons present for long periods of
time; it is sufficient to have a regular influx of migrants (for instance,
through chain migration). Such neighbourhoods are attractive as sites
of residence for these freelancers, who often share a house there which
may in turn also function as a refuge for live-ins who have a day off
(Moors et al. forthcoming).
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7.8 Leaving and going ‘back home’
The last phase in the trajectory of migrants is leaving and returning
home. Many illegal workers face difficulties leaving the country of mi-
gration due to strict exit policies. These exit policies are meant as a way
of controlling illegal immigration, though can also be seen as a means
of benefiting financially from the presence of illegal migrants. Mi-
grants have to pay high fines for each day that they have been in the
country illegally. The amount of money can be so substantial that ille-
gal migrants may get stuck in the country of migration and end up in
detention centres. If an amnesty is declared – as happened in Lebanon
after the tsunami – it usually refers to migrants being allowed to leave
without having to pay this fine. It does not necessarily mean that they
can become legal and will be allowed to stay in the country.
There are considerable differences in the regulation and implemen-
tation of exit policies.14 In Lebanon illegal migrants are held in deten-
tion centres and have to wait until their employers have been located
(or their embassies or others are willing to pay their fines and tickets
home), while in Saudi Arabia illegal migrants are immediately de-
ported after they have been caught. Yemen used to have quite a lenient
system in which illegal migrants to a large extent were tolerated. At the
present time, especially as a result of anti-terror measures, the Yemeni
government has started to police its borders and airports much more
strictly and is implementing stricter measures, such as the introduc-
tion of exit visas and the imposition of fines for staying in the country
illegally. This has caused major problems for migrant women who
have been living and working in Yemen illegally for considerable peri-
ods of time. They are unable to return home since they have to pay
large fines when applying for an exit visa (see De Regt 2007b). Freelan-
cers are a particularly vulnerable group of domestics when states im-
plement strict exit policies. Whereas they have better living and work-
ing conditions than contract workers, they work in most cases without
residence and work permits and are unable to leave the country of mi-
gration because of the large fines they have to pay upon leaving.
It is not only freelancing domestic workers who have difficulties
leaving. Contract workers may also face difficulties, as in cases of those
whose employers did not arrange for their permits, tickets home or exit
visas in order to prevent them from leaving. Filipinas in Yemen, for ex-
ample, complained that some employers were so dependent on their
work, particularly when their children had got used to them, that they
attempted to delay their trip home by such means. In a similar vein,
agencies that do not work according to the rules may also create pro-
blems for workers who want to leave.
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7.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have analysed the gendered nature of illegal migra-
tion in the case of migrant domestic workers in the Middle East. It is
important to mention once more that illegal migration is intimately
connected with processes of state formation. Rights to residency and
nationality became a highly sensitive issue in the Middle East, espe-
cially after the oil boom, because of the very small size of the national
populations and the great differences in the benefits to which national
citizens and foreign labourers are entitled.
Whereas the illegal migration of women is often equated with traf-
ficking and prostitution, paid domestic labour is another very impor-
tant employment sector where gender and illegality come together. Be-
cause domestic labour takes place in the private sphere, it is relatively
invisible to outsiders. Domestic labour is therefore one of the few em-
ployment sectors open to illegal migrants (Schrover, Van der Leun &
Quispel 2007). In most countries, and especially in the Middle East,
mainly migrant women are employed as domestics. We have argued
that it is important to study not only the differences between men and
women, but also the differences between female migrants, depending
on the nature of their employment. One main conclusion is that it is
not so much gender that is the critical issue but women’s employment
as migrant domestic workers. Reflecting on the question of how gender
and illegal migration intersect in the case of migrant domestic workers
in the Middle East, it has become clear that gender is far more impor-
tant at some moments in the migration process than at other mo-
ments.
With respect to leaving one’s home country, gendered notions clearly
play a role, both in public debates and state policies. However, women
who migrate not only face more restrictions than men, but female do-
mestic workers are also confronted with far more obstacles than wo-
men who go into professional employment. Beginning at the moment
they enter the country of employment, it is again their work as domes-
tics that places women in a particularly dependent position, since la-
bour laws do not apply to them and regulations about residency are
particularly strict. Moreover, especially where migrants outnumber
small national populations, there are strong fears about the negative ef-
fects of migrant domestic workers on cultural reproduction. Neither
male migrants nor female migrants working outside households find
themselves so involved in such debates.
As has been widely recognised, there is a strong tension inherent
in paid domestic labour relations. While it is indeed a labour relation,
it is at the same time a highly personalised relation which, moreover,
is located within what is considered the employer’s private sphere.
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Although the notion that a live-in domestic worker being ‘like a fa-
mily member’ has been convincingly criticised, there are some struc-
tural similarities between live-in domestics and subordinate or depen-
dent family members.
These inherent tensions in paid domestic labour are exacerbated in
the Middle East, where there is no tradition of employing paid domes-
tic workers. Earlier patterns of non-kin household labour included
forms of domestic slavery, semi-bonded child labour and work done by
client families. Although such relations were grounded in relations of
inequality, they also entailed some level of protection. Currently wo-
men from marginalised groups or refugee women sometimes work as
domestic workers, but they do so with great reluctance and usually
work as live-out. One reason why migrant domestic workers are attrac-
tive to employers is because they agree to work as live-ins. Because
they are employed in private households, they are not considered em-
ployees but rather non-kin members of household, where relations of
authority are structured by gender and generation.
Hence employers, especially those in the Gulf countries, feel that
they are entitled to restrict the freedom of movement of female domes-
tic workers; after all, they would apply similar rules to the daughters of
the household, and, moreover, the state holds them accountable. Yet
whereas this may seem to build on earlier systems of dependent house-
hold labour, the legal regimes in which these contemporary households
function are very different. The strict rules and regulations about cross-
ing borders, residency and nationality place migrant domestic workers
outside the moral community and society as a whole, which further
contributes to the lack of protection many migrant domestic workers
experience.
From the point of view of migrant domestic workers, being legal or
illegal in itself does not mean much. The move some make towards
freelancing needs to be seen in a context in which being legal entails
few rights and many obligations. While freelancers are often illegal,
they benefit materially and in terms of freedom of movement. The
practical meaning of being illegal depends on what other resources mi-
grant domestic workers have access to, varying from a strong network
of friends, educational level (including knowledge of languages), access
to means of communication, material resources, support of NGOs and
so on. It may well be the case that the move to become ‘illegal’ is pre-
mised upon their access to such resources and hence is an indication
of a relatively strong rather than a relatively weak position. Moreover,
migrant domestic workers are not necessarily in favour of turning paid
domestic labour into a ‘purely contractual labour relation’. While some
employers would actually prefer a professional over a personalised rela-
166 ANNELIES MOORS AND MARINA DE REGT
tion, for some domestic workers it is the personalised nature of this re-
lation that gives them extra benefits, both material and non-material.
Notes
1 This chapter is based on research done as part of the research programme Migrant
Domestic Workers: Transnational Relations, Families and Identities at the Interna-
tional Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) and the Amster-
dam School for Social science Research (ASSR).
2 The highest share of migrant population is to be found in the Middle East (Baldwin-
Edwards 2005: 2).
3 Still, in countries such as the United Arab Emirates, with a very small national popu-
lation, even a strict implementation of ‘Emiratisation’ will not provide enough
nurses.
4 This is a widely recognised specificity of paid domestic labour, also in other parts of
the world. See Hansen (1991), Anderson (2000) and Lan (2006).
5 Although these contracts are generally unenforceable in the country of employment,
such regulations are currently much debated in the Gulf countries.
6 This is in contrast with the view of migrant domestic workers themselves, who in
most cases do not want to do paid domestic work in their countries of origin.
7 Labour officers employed at embassies in the countries of employment often argue
that they are afraid to complain too much about the treatment of domestic workers
because they would then run the risk of having their nationals replaced by domestics
from less demanding countries..
8 By the mid-1990s in the UAE, 75 per cent of the population and 90 per cent of the
labour force was expatriate; estimates for Dubai are even higher (Sabban 2002: 7).
9 For a similar situation in Europe see Reinecke’s chapter in this volume.
10 This is similar to developments in Europe, where men sometimes marry women
from outside the European Union because they are seen as more obedient and less
demanding.
11 This is similar to the situation in the Netherlands in the first half of the twentieth
century, when German domestics were in demand (see Henkes 1995).
12 For similar cases in other parts of the world see Bakan and Stasiulis (1995), Henkes
(1995) and Anderson (2000).
13 For similar arrangements in countries outside the Middle East see Constable (1997a:
191-193) and Parren˜as (2001: 204).
14 For an example of expulsion policies in Germany and the different effects for men
and women at the end of the nineteenth century see Reinecke’s chapter in this
volume.
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8 Illegal migration, gender and health care:
Perspectives from Germany and the United States
Heide Castan˜eda
Illegal migrants are generally excluded from social and political rights
in their host countries. The study of these exclusions – and occasional
inclusions – can contribute to debates on the role of the nation-state
and shifting forms of citizenship. Indeed, the economic need for mi-
grant labour often coexists with a political desire to create boundaries
between foreigners and full citizens, especially in relation to resources
such as health care services. The advent of illness provokes a quintes-
sential dilemma of social responsibility for states that simultaneously
condemn yet rely upon illegal immigration. In these cases, receiving
states find themselves oscillating ‘between sentiments of sympathy on
the one hand and concern for order on the other hand, between a poli-
tics of pity and policies of control’ (Fassin 2005: 366). Governments
are charged with ensuring human rights to those populations within
their borders, yet they are also obliged to protect scarce resources.
While illegal migrants do not fall under the usual social contract be-
tween the state and its citizens, most governments concede that they
should be allotted some access to basic services, especially in the form
of emergency medical care. Resulting state practices often produce
paradoxes that are especially fertile places for inquiry. These paradoxes
open up spaces in which the state can manoeuvre, while at the same
time creating the illusion that steps have been taken to discourage
further undocumented migration. Fear of the ‘pull factor’ – that is, the
fear that providing any form of benefits will encourage additional mi-
gration – means that many nations are unwilling to extend full health
care rights. However, that assumption disregards ‘empirical evidence
showing that illegal migrants do not make a rational choice of their
destination country after comparing the benefits of different welfare
systems’ (Romero-Otun˜o 2004: 250).
Nonetheless, it is analytically useful to examine how states with dif-
ferent welfare systems address the health needs of illegal migrants. To
this end, I use a comparative approach to contrast the situation in two
countries – Germany and the United States – with very different levels
of commitment to their social welfare systems. This ultimately affects
each state’s interest in controlling migration, access to resources and
policy implementation at the local level. In the following pages, I am
going to discuss the rationale for comparing migration to these coun-
tries and examine the legal and financial situation surrounding medi-
cal care for illegal migrants in each setting. I note that despite its
strong welfare state and commitment to universal health care, Ger-
many is an extreme case of exclusion compared with many of its Eur-
opean neighbours. By contrast, the US health care system is predicated
on notions of exclusion and categorisation, so that illegal migrants ac-
cess health care in much the same way as the remaining uninsured (le-
gal foreigner and citizen) population. Scholars have observed distinct
gaps between immigration policies and their implementation in many
migrant-receiving nations. As a result, seemingly restrictive yet often
ambiguous policy measures contain various loopholes that provide op-
portunities for illegal immigrants. In particular, I point to the work of
civil society organisations – such as non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and church-based charity services – that provide them with
medical aid. In both the US and Germany, these organisations play a
particularly prominent role in prenatal care and delivery. Van der Leun
(2003) refers to these types of local informal arrangements as ‘by-
passes’, which allow the law to be followed while simultaneously pre-
venting the occurrence of ethically unacceptable and inhumane situa-
tions. The existence of such ‘bypasses’ is a prime example of how state
practices adapt over time to the otherwise paradoxical circumstances
surrounding illegal migration.
The situation becomes even more complex, but also more explicable,
when gender and reproduction are added to the equation. Migrant il-
legality is constructed differentially for men and women, and the very
fact that women can become pregnant while men cannot shifts the dis-
course. It is here that moral obligations clash most significantly with
the imperatives to restrict access to the social welfare system. During
pregnancy, women must locate health care resources, which can ulti-
mately increase their visibility and deportability. Their risk is higher in
welfare states like Germany where health care is costly and more vigor-
ously protected by the state. I argue that the main concern for women
in this setting is locating medical care in a highly restrictive climate,
where internal control policies play an important role. By contrast, in
the US illegal women may be considered less vulnerable because there
are fewer instances of state aid upon which to place demands. I draw
upon examples from my research to provide a portrait of pregnant ille-
gal women’s experiences in both settings. I emphasise their vulnerabil-
ity and lack of rights, but also their agency in seeking out resources
and making decisions.
Finally, different national models of citizenship influence discus-
sions on migrant reproduction, even though these models are not di-
rectly related to health care access. Germany has retained a primarily
172 HEIDE CASTAÑEDA
descent-based system called the jus sanguinis or ‘right of blood’ model,
in which children’s citizenship is determined by their parents’. By con-
trast, the US practices a territorial jus solis, or ‘right of soil’ model,
meaning that the children’s nationality is determined by their place of
birth. As a result, debates on migrant reproduction are intimately en-
twined with efforts to restrict the outer border of the nation. This is evi-
denced by the concept of citizen so-called anchor babies as migrant wo-
men’s desperate and dangerous means of entering the US. Perhaps
more than any other scenario, pregnancy can highlight the interplay
between resources, citizenship and illegality. It offers unique insight
into migrant illegality as a nuanced and often transitory category, sub-
ject to shifting policies of exclusion and social relationship to the state.
8.1 Comparing illegal migration in Germany and the US
I collected ethnographic data in Berlin, Germany, from 2004 to 2006
as part of a dissertation study on medical care for illegal migrants. This
included six months of participant observation in an outpatient charity
clinic where prenatal care represented the primary reason for visits.
This fieldwork yielded in-depth observations of interaction between
204 patients and clinic staff. In addition, I conducted 61 interviews
with various persons, including illegal migrants, volunteer staff from
NGOs, physicians and local experts on illegal migration. Data on the si-
tuation for illegal women in the US is based on over eight years of ex-
perience working with this population as a health policy researcher in
the border states of the US South-West. The cases presented here are
derived from my experiences at university research hospitals along
with fieldwork conducted in humanitarian organisations that provide
medical assistance to migrants. Archival research and media reports
added to the understanding of both settings.
While the choice of these two nations reflects my own research ex-
periences, there are also pertinent analytical reasons for such a com-
parative study. Both Germany and the US are Western liberal democra-
cies keenly interested in regulating migration through both internal
policy efforts and external border controls. Increasingly, migration to
both countries has been characterised by restrictive measures and se-
lection bias against particular populations based on the specifics of
their social welfare systems and labour markets (Stobbe 2004). Be-
cause laws and policy measures have taken a similar restrictive trajec-
tory in both nations, it is important to direct the analytical focus on
their local implementation. As both the US and Germany are federal
systems, national-level policy must be implemented at state and local
levels (see Van der Leun 2003 for a discussion of local bureaucrats as
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‘gatekeepers’ of the welfare state). This has particular consequences for
the rights and resources available to migrants.
Despite these similarities, Germany and the US are valuable exam-
ples in their own right with at least five relevant key differences. Firstly,
as noted earlier, they have strikingly different social welfare systems.
To be sure, the emergence of the welfare state in Western Europe fol-
lowing the Second World War introduced a new concern about immi-
gration control and migrant integration (Lucassen, Feldman & Olmer
2006). One of the unforeseen effects of the guest worker migration to
Germany throughout the 1960s and early 1970s was the permanent
settlement of large numbers of migrants and their families. Coupled
with a decrease in low-skilled jobs, many legal migrants became per-
manently unemployed and dependant on state benefits, resulting in
strain of the welfare state by the mid-1970s. This is quite unlike the si-
tuation in the US, where migration has been and remains largely deter-
mined by labour market needs rather than the attraction of welfare
benefits. As a result, Germany, like many of its neighbouring states, re-
mains much more interventionist regarding immigrant incorporation
than the US.
Secondly, the US is a classic nation of immigrants, and thus much
of the current literature on illegal migration is heavily geared towards
an analysis of the US situation (De Genova 2002). Meanwhile, Ger-
many has only recently (in 2000) – and quite reluctantly – officially ac-
knowledged that it is no longer a nation of ‘zero migration’. This is de-
spite the fact that it currently ranks as the third most popular migrant
destination in the world (United Nations Population Fund 2006) and
has experienced migratory movement of peoples for centuries. Impor-
tantly, even with this acknowledgement, Germany still lags behind its
European neighbours in recognising the presence of illegal migrants
within its borders.
Third, and related to this, the scale of illegal migration is vastly dis-
similar, with Germany – admittedly a much smaller country – receiving
only a fraction of the number received by the US. There are currently
some 10.3 million illegal migrants in the US (Pew Hispanic Center
2006). Meanwhile, estimates suggest up to one and a half million in
Germany, although this depends heavily on who is counted as an ille-
gal. As noted in the introduction to this volume, there are multiple ca-
tegories of ‘illegality’ – illegal exit, entry, residency and employment –
and each manifests itself differently depending on the nation in ques-
tion. Most people enter Germany legally, either because they are citi-
zens of states that do not require visas or by using a tourist or student
visa. The visa-free entrance is intended only for short-term visits, allow-
ing the passport holder to stay for up to three months. The vast major-
ity of individuals who become illegal have done so as a result of this
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so-called ‘tourist loophole’. In addition, because the Schengen agree-
ment allows free movement between EU nations, there are no checks
at the borders of neighbouring countries. This is quite different from
the situation in the US, where only 40-45 per cent of illegal migrants,
numbering at 3.2 million, enter through legal channels and then be-
come visa-overstayers (Stobbe 2004; Cyrus 2004). Most migrants enter
the US by crossing the border illegally, often under harsh environmen-
tal conditions and facing exploitation by coyote smugglers.
Fourth, despite disparities in size of the population, the presence of
illegal migrants is often more visible in Germany than in the US. Once
migrants reach the interior of the US, it is far easier for them to ‘blend
in’, in part due to the large Latino population in the country. Fifty-seven
per cent of all US migrants come from Mexico, with much of the re-
mainder arriving from countries of Latin America (Pew Hispanic Cen-
ter 2006). In fact, the boundary between legal and illegal immigrants
is often quite blurred in the US, since amnesties and other forms of le-
galisation can improve the status of individuals more readily than in
nations such as Germany. Furthermore, it should be noted that there
are also far fewer types of population registration requirements and
other forms of bureaucratic control in the US than in Germany. Thus,
the need to stay hidden takes on a very different dimension. In Ger-
many, asking for identification documents is a typical part of any inter-
action with official agencies, and police have the authority to randomly
stop people and verify their documents. Therefore, it is important to
stay as inconspicuous as possible, especially for non-European mi-
grants. The lives of illegal migrants are characterised by the need to
blend in and avoid drawing the attention of authorities. For example,
many shy away from large gatherings, rarely invite friends over and
may be socially isolated. Strategies to reduce visibility are important,
such as making up stories of why they are in Germany and how they
got there, and avoiding places frequented by the police (such as main
train stations and certain parks).
Finally, as noted earlier, the foundation for citizenship is different in
both nations, which shapes discussions on rights for non-citizens in
particular ways. Anyone born within the borders of the US is eligible
for citizenship, based on the jus soli model. Conversely, citizenship is
not available to children of migrants born in Germany, which follows a
descent-based system, the jus sanguinis model. In January 2000, a new
German citizenship law was enacted to include some elements of the
territorial model. This shift in state practice was necessitated by years
of pressure from migrant communities (Turkish ones especially). For
decades, second- and third-generation children of former guest workers
had remained non-citizens without the right to vote, an especially frus-
trating situation since most had no ties to their parents’ homelands.
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The most important provision of the new law allows foreigners who
have lived in Germany at least eight years with legal residency status to
choose dual citizenship for their children. Thus, the law rarely affects
the situation for illegal migrants. Nonetheless, these shifting criteria
for citizenship – along with the shifting categories of illegality – are im-
portant for understanding notions of state obligation and migrant de-
servingness.
8.2 Gender, reproduction and the nation
Because of their role in biological and social reproduction, women are
pivotal members of society. Surveillance and control over women’s sex-
ual and marital behaviour has a longstanding tradition in the history of
the modern state (see also Reinecke’s chapter in this volume). In mi-
gration studies, analyses are increasingly attentive to gendered as well
as racial constructs of citizenship. Chavez (2001, 2004) examines con-
structions of Latina reproduction in the US, showing how media repre-
sentations are able to ‘produce fears about the population growth of La-
tinos in American society, which in turn positions them as a possible
threat to the “nation”, that is, the “people” as conceived in demographic
and racial terms’ (2004:173). Similarly, Sargent (2006) and Tormey
(2007) provide case studies from Western Europe to demonstrate how
immigration regulations and population policies are inscribed on the
bodies of migrant women. In her study of Malian migrants in Paris,
Sargent (2006) illustrates how anti-natalist discourse coexists with
otherwise pro-natalist French policies regarding family size. Women
considered to be authentically ‘French’ are encouraged to expand their
families, while fertility among African women is implicitly and expli-
citly discouraged by the medical practitioners. Migrant fertility is
viewed with particular suspicion because of the family allocation sti-
pend provided for each additional child under French law. Willen
(2005) also explores particular notions of national belonging in her
study on pregnant illegal women in Tel Aviv. She describes the patch-
work of reproductive and infant health services available to them, not-
ing that their availability is a surprising exception to the overall hostile
environment for migrants in otherwise pro-natalist Israel. Finally, Tor-
mey’s study of pregnant black women in Ireland (2007) is insightful
for this study because it traces the transition from a jus solis to a jus
sanguinis model of citizenship brought about by the 2004 Constitu-
tional Amendment. The Amendment was proposed amid anxieties over
women who arrived in Ireland on ‘maternity holiday’, that is, to give
birth and acquire Irish citizenship for their child. Foreign-born
mothers were considered to have ‘no real connection’ to Ireland, and
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thus to be lacking loyalty towards the nation. This ‘connection’ is ulti-
mately one of bloodline; the meaning of being ‘Irish’ implicitly draws
upon ideas of race.
The distinct jus solis and jus sanguinis citizenship models have an im-
pact on the debates on the reproduction of illegal migrant women. This
can be elucidated using a comparative approach between particular his-
torical settings. As noted earlier, in the US the fear of a pull factor and
the resulting anchor babies has led to an increasingly restrictive policy
and tougher border control. In jus soli nations, the fact that migrants
without any previous ties can arrive and claim membership to the na-
tional body may be viewed as unjust. In the US, migrant women are
often portrayed by the media and by anti-immigrant groups as calculat-
ing to strategically give birth within the country’s borders. Thus, they
face particular forms of discrimination which are directly related to
their reproduction and the perceived threat that this involves (see also
Chavez 2004). However, citizenship has a role in the debates on illegal
women in Germany as well, since it currently has one of the lowest
birth rates among wealthy nations. In 2005, the number of births
reached an all-time post-war low, and the total population has been
shrinking for several years in a row. Population movements – both by
foreigners coming into the country and by Germans fleeing poorer re-
gions – have resulted in what has been called ‘demographic theft’, in
which there is a continuing decline in the native birth rate coupled
with a simultaneous increase in the birth rate among foreign-born po-
pulations, so that these are expected one day to displace the native po-
pulation (The Economist 2006). With an average of 1.3 children per wo-
man of child-bearing age, the current birth rate is much lower than the
2.1 rate demographers suggest is needed in order to replace the popula-
tion. Nonetheless, there remains a contradictory stance towards preg-
nancy based on race and ideas of national belonging. Citizenship is not
available to the children of most migrants born in Germany. This
means that, unlike in the US, pregnant illegal women are generally
not viewed as strategically giving birth in the host country in order to
obtain citizenship rights for their children and, by extension, residency
rights for the mother. However, they are more likely to be vilified for
trying to gain access to the nation’s sophisticated social welfare system,
despite strong evidence against their alleged use of such services (Van
der Leun 2003).
8.3 Access to medical treatment: Policy situation
Romero-Ortun˜o (2004) has examined health care for illegal migrants
in the European Union and inquires whether adequate solutions do ex-
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ist. He compares six countries with two types of health care systems:
the social health insurance systems of Germany, Belgium and the
Netherlands, and the tax-financed national health services of the Uni-
ted Kingdom, Spain, and Italy. Only Spain, he concludes, has created
the legal conditions for the comprehensive health care coverage of ille-
gal persons. This is followed by the ‘generosity’ system put into place
in Italy, another tax-financed system, where migrants can remain anon-
ymous while accessing medical care. These ‘humanitarian’ models con-
trast sharply with the ‘utilitarian’ approach of Germany (and to a lesser
extent, the UK), where only emergency treatment is provided and only
then because it is justified by a desire to protect the health of the host
population.
In fact, Germany is often characterised as having the most restrictive
laws governing health care for illegal migrants. In practice, however,
access to care is limited by many other factors beyond these legal pre-
conditions. Particularly in social health insurance systems, providers
may be reluctant to treat patients who are unable to pay. Another issue
that begs analysis is how restricting access for illegal migrants can be
reconciled with the commitment to universal health care. While mi-
grants with legal residency status enjoy the same health insurance cov-
erage as German nationals, illegal migrants are left without any appar-
ent rights. Their presence has resulted in a tension between traditional
notions of universal health care for those paying into the social welfare
system and humanitarian concerns of providing at least basic medical
services for all persons, legal or not. Overall, the situation for illegal
migrants in Germany is one in which certain minimal rights are tech-
nically available. However, based on my own research findings, mi-
grants are not necessarily assured access to these rights.
Confounding the situation in Germany is a unique set of laws which
criminalises not only migrants, but also health care professionals who
offer them assistance. The Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz) contains
two specific sections that in essence criminalise the provision of medi-
cal care to illegal migrants. A section of the Act, often called the ‘De-
nunciation Law’,1 mandates that persons residing in Germany illegally
be reported to the appropriate authorities if they seek services at public
facilities. Because of their illegal residency status (though not necessa-
rily because they have sought out medical treatment), this may initiate
the deportation process. Similarly, if a private physician or hospital ad-
ministrator seeks reimbursement for the costs of treating an illegal per-
son, they can send the bill to the Social Welfare Office, which in turn
is required to report the migrant to the Foreigners’ Office. A second
law, often referred to as the ‘Trafficking Law’,2 states that ‘assisting’ il-
legal persons – including for medical purposes, depending on interpre-
tation – is a crime punishable with a fine or imprisonment up to five
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years. Doctors can be held liable if they treat illegal patients. It should
be noted that, to my knowledge, no health care workers have been pur-
sued under these laws, though some have been threatened with prose-
cution (see Castan˜eda 2007). However, there have been cases where
patients have been deported because they have been reported by hospi-
tal staff. Either way, fear, uncertainty and ambiguity work to reinforce
the current situation. Despite heavy opposition by medical and human
rights communities, both laws remain in effect in the Act’s 2005 revi-
sion.
By contrast, even though the US possesses a fraction of the social
welfare services provided in many European nations, its situation can
perhaps be assessed as better for illegal migrants. Since there are so
many Americans and legal residents who are uninsured (or under-in-
sured), the system can often accommodate illegal immigrants more ea-
sily, or at least with less visibility. In fact, the US health care system is
predicated on notions of categorisation and exclusion, making it strik-
ingly different from the German situation. At the same time, Ameri-
cans are proud of their generosity. This creates a paradoxical setting in
which ‘the impulses of exclusion and charity together drive the engine
of American health care’ (Hoffman 2006). The fact that these are
viewed as necessary features of the same system reflects a society ac-
customed to inequities.
As in Germany, a number of civil society organisations offer services
to illegal migrants. Migrants have access to emergency Medicaid ser-
vices, which reimburse hospitals for emergency care of the poor, re-
gardless of legal status. However, since there are no provisions for
other forms of care, emergency rooms are overburdened as the only
‘safety net’ for these and other uninsured persons. Beyond emergency
services, the availability of care for immigrants (legal or illegal) varies
from state to state. While over 100 migrant health centres are scattered
around the nation, they are under-utilised and designed to serve pri-
marily migrant farm workers. Over the past decade, the legal climate
has become increasingly hostile, and several proposals for restricting
and even criminalising medical assistance have appeared. In 2005
alone, some 80 bills in twenty states were proposed in order to cut
non-citizens’ access to health and other social services, or to require
that the authorities be notified when an illegal person seeks out medi-
cal care. Much of the recently proposed legislation is aimed specifically
at pregnant women and the services they require.
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8.4 Pregnant and illegal
In this section, I provide some perspective on women’s experiences in
both settings, touching upon several themes. Firstly, I will discuss the
perils associated with entering illegally as a pregnant woman (a major
concern along the US-Mexico border) versus becoming pregnant as an
illegal resident and seeking out medical care (a greater concern for wo-
men in Germany). Next, I will note that migrants and their newborns
are protected from deportation in both settings, but based on very dif-
ferent grounds.
8.4.1 Gendered border crossings
In the US, public debates around pregnancy and migration have
centred on the concept of anchor babies. This derogatory term refers to
children born on US soil who cement their illegal mother’s – and po-
tentially other family members’ – permanent residency status. In re-
cent years, the media has thrived on stories of dramatic rescues in the
desert and babies being delivered by Border Patrol officers, which, by
extension, has promoted blame and discrimination towards mothers
who would risk such a journey. There is no doubt that the journey is a
dangerous one: since 1994 there have been over 3,000 border deaths,
with the majority occurring in the state of Arizona (compare this, for
instance, with the 239 deaths in the 28-year history of the Berlin Wall)
The majority of fatalities are the result of accidents or dehydration in
the severe desert climate.
7 August 2006. Teresa Chavez, 21, of Zamora, Mexico was seven
months pregnant when she was injured in the crash of a smug-
gling vehicle carrying 21 undocumented migrants near Yuma,
Arizona. The vehicle was fleeing Border Patrol agents at a very
high speed and rolled over as a result of the driver’s risky man-
oeuvring. Eleven migrants were killed, including the unborn
baby of another 17 year old woman. An additional twelve per-
sons were injured, including Teresa’s husband, now in a coma.
She gave birth days after the accident via caesarean section in a
Phoenix hospital. The baby girl, named ‘Milagros’ (‘Miracles’),
weighed 3 pounds, 11 ounces. (Washington Post 2006, Arizona
Daily Star 2006)
For women, who estimates suggest constitute up to one-third of all en-
trants, crossing the border presents particular dangers. Rape is a dis-
tinct possibility of which many are aware, and some women report tak-
ing birth control pills immediately before, during, and after their tra-
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vels for this reason. Others align themselves with male relatives or
friends. Veronica,3 a woman I met in Sasabe, Mexico – just miles from
the US border – was waiting to cross with a group of about twenty
others. She introduced me to her boyfriend, whom she met on the trip
north from the Yucatan, confiding that ‘it’s better to have a boyfriend
to travel with, it keeps you safe’. While it is not known how many wo-
men cross while pregnant, there are most certainly a wide range of cir-
cumstances, ranging from calculated decisions to deliver in the US and
a lack of knowledge of how delivery location affects citizenship and le-
gal status to women who actually become pregnant as a result of the
journey.
8.4.2 Pregnant and seeking medical care
Another scenario plays out when women already in the host country
face exclusion from health care services. For this, we can turn to an ex-
ample from Germany.
Sarah, a 33-year-old woman from Ghana, had been living in Ger-
many for over a year when she became pregnant. She had ar-
rived with next to nothing (just ‘two pairs of trousers’) because
she was not planning on staying, but then decided to stay and
find work. When her tourist visa expired, she became illegal.
While in Germany, she met a man, Joaquim, at a party. After a
few months of dating, she discovered she was pregnant – some-
thing she had not planned. ‘Of course not,’ she told me, ‘this is
not the right time, when you’re in Europe, all alone with no pa-
pers!’
Pregnancy introduces additional costs for illegal parents, unlike their
legal counterparts. These costs are based on their need to remain in-
conspicuous and on the types of work they may perform. Children re-
quire extra resources, including out-of-pocket costs for delivery and
medical care. Parenthood may result in loss of work time and lack of
mobility, especially important for the types of ‘flexible’ labour sectors in
which many illegal migrants are employed. Also, pregnancy increases
the mother’s visibility – and subsequent deportability – because of the
need to interact with the public health care system and state offices in
order to apply for a birth certificate. While pregnancy terminations are
reportedly common for legal immigrant women as well, they are an
especially attractive option among illegal women for the reasons out-
lined above, namely their more vulnerable forms of employment and
desire to reduce visibility.
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A friend at an African organisation told Sarah to go to the Centre
for Family Planning, which offered prenatal care for many illegal
women in Berlin. They provided regular prenatal examinations
for a nominal fee. She was also sent to the Migrant Clinic (which
worked closely with the Centre for Family Planning) for all of
her blood tests and to arrange a low-cost delivery spot at a local
charity hospital.
The physicians I interviewed noted that all pregnancies among illegal
migrant women must be considered high-risk, due to socioeconomic
marginalisation and delays in seeking prenatal care. This is certainly in
line with the available literature (Bollini 2000; Gross 2005; Scott
2004; Willen 2005). In particular, epidemiological studies suggest a
high rate of miscarriage, premature birth and high infant mortality
among women with uncertain legal status. Delay is certainly a risk fac-
tor, since most women do not seek medical care until the third trime-
ster. Because medical aid to this population is criminalised under
German law, prenatal care is infrequent and women may fear entering
public hospitals. Nonetheless, women and their newborns can gener-
ally find organisations or individual physicians willing to provide care,
especially in urban areas. These types of informal local arrangements
have been observed in a number of settings (see also Verbruggen
2001; PICUM 2002; Van der Leun 2003). These organisations will as-
sist the mother or parents by arranging a delivery spot at a ‘trusted’
hospital where deportation is less likely. Neither prenatal care nor deliv-
ery is easy to finance for illegal migrants unless the father is German
and has acknowledged paternity before the child is born. In these
cases, reimbursement can occur through the social welfare system or
via the father’s insurance, although it may be retroactive and depen-
dent upon submission of a birth certificate (see more on paternity
below). Women from neighbouring countries sometimes travel home
in order to give birth, and European Union citizens (e.g. from Poland)
can often arrange some type of financial coverage if they opt to give
birth in Germany. Other women do not have these options and simply
go to the hospital when birth is imminent and pose as a tourist. A final
option is to utilise various forms of ‘anonymous’ hospital deliveries,
sometimes requiring the parents to put the child up for adoption
(Anderson 2003).
8.4.3 Protection from deportation
In both Germany and the US, illegal women and their newborns are
protected from deportation, but based on very different lines of reason-
ing. Children born on US soil have a right to citizenship, and their im-
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mediate family members can gain legal residency based on their status
as caretaker(s). While there are limitations to this principle, it is based
on notions of state obligation towards its citizens – and by extension,
family members who are constructed as also deserving protection. De-
bates over immigration reform and the popular protest they invoked
throughout 2006 and 2007 have brought issues of family unity to the
forefront. For instance, the widely publicised story of Mexican migrant
Elvira Arellano and her eight-year-old son Saul, a US citizen, high-
lighted the situation of families of mixed legal status. Prior to her ap-
prehension in August 2007, she had sought refuge in a Chicago
church for a year in order to avoid separation from her son. She thus
became a prominent figure in discussions on the rights of illegal mi-
grants, emphasising the role of US-born citizen children in the dis-
course of deservingness and opportunities for their family members.
The situation in Germany is rooted in the social welfare construction
of maternity protection, reflecting how gendered conceptualisations
continue to influence the politics of deportation (see Reinecke, this vo-
lume, for an historical example of gendered deportation policy in Ger-
many). The 1968 Maternity Protection Act established a time period
(called the Mutterschutz) six weeks before and eight weeks following
birth. During this time, all women are accorded certain protections,
such as maternity leave. For an illegal woman, this represents a crucial
period during which she cannot be deported. In order to formally take
advantage of the Mutterschutz, a pregnant woman must register at the
local courthouse and then apply for a residency permit at the Foreign-
er’s Office. She is then eligible for a Duldung (a ‘temporary suspension
of deportation’, effectively a short-term legalisation), which also
authorises access to prenatal care and covers delivery costs. If the wo-
man does not register, her child is generally born into illegality and it
may be difficult to obtain a birth certificate. Even without the registra-
tion and formal Duldung, pregnant women are entitled to the protec-
tion period. The formal paperwork entitles them to compensation for
delivery costs, so many hospitals encourage women to complete this
step. However, by availing themselves of this procedure, they draw the
attention of the authorities, who might look for them once the Mut-
terschutz period has expired. In my interviews with both NGO workers
and migrants, it became evident that many migrant women are too
scared to complete this process. In addition, there have been situations
where the Mutterschutz was not honoured by the immigration authori-
ties. Staff from an NGO working with trafficked women told me of a
recent case in which the police arrived at their safe-house looking for a
Mongolian woman and her ten-day old child (i.e. both clearly still with-
in the protection period), to arrest them for deportation. Fortunately,
the staff were able to intervene in this particular situation.
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Fatherhood is established through a formal acknowledgement of pater-
nity (Vaterschaftsanerkennung), which is ideally registered before the
child is born. Completion prior to the birth makes the entire process
less risky for all parties involved, since it also reinforces the protection
of the mother from being deported. Some of the women I spoke with
appeared to be aware of the process of paternity acknowledgement.
This is likely to have resulted from a combination of experience, word-
of-mouth and the aid of various organisations. However, not all the in-
formation that circulated was accurate or complete. Many of the wo-
men with whom I spoke were not aware of the law at all. Others as-
sumed there was no relationship between bearing a child in Germany
and any improvement in their illegal residency situation. Still others
were astounded to learn that children were not automatically German
citizens when born in Germany. Children are eligible for citizenship,
though only if the father is German. This can also result in a residency
permit for the mother and access to the social welfare system, justified
by the child’s status as a German national. Perhaps not surprisingly, a
shadow business in paternity acknowledgements has emerged. As I
discuss elsewhere (Castan˜eda 2007), there is some evidence of false pa-
ternity claims being made in exchange for money, although the extent
of this practice is debatable. It is made possible by a loophole opened
in a law of 1998 (§1592 Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch), whose aim was to ex-
pand the rights of single mothers. According to this section, the
mother has the right to declare the identity of her child’s father, which
is then backed by the father’s acknowledgement. As a result, no one –
and particularly not the state – has the right to request verification of
the claim. Thus the law intentionally allows fatherhood to exist for a
non-biological parent (the so-called ‘social father’ as opposed to the
‘biological father’).
Finally, the acquisition of the child’s birth certificate entails contact
with state officials, an anxious moment for many illegal parents. This
document is of the utmost importance – without it, the child has no
nationality and is considered to be illegal. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees has urged a resolution to this problem,
stating that the registration of a child must occur regardless of legal
status (UNHCR 2003); furthermore, under German law every birth
must be registered without delay. In some municipalities the process is
more difficult than in others. For example, during my study in Berlin,
local agencies implemented a policy in which only a valid passport
would be accepted as the mothers’ identification. Women whose pass-
ports were expired, lost or confiscated (which often happens in the case
of human trafficking) were issued generic birth certificates for their
children which did not name them as the legal parent. This can have
grave implications if mother and child become separated, for example
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during detention, and there have been cases where the separation of a
mother and her child did occur (Braun, Brzank & Wu¨rflinger 2003).
The examples provided here have highlighted illegal women’s vulner-
ability and lack of rights in their host countries. However, it is impor-
tant not to lose sight of their agency as they negotiate through this pro-
cess, lest they be cast only and always as victims. In both settings, preg-
nant women actively sought out various resources, from social support
provided by compatriots to medical care provided by NGOs, private
physicians, health departments and emergency rooms. Women made
vital decisions along the way: to migrate – even under extreme circum-
stances – in order to provide a better life for their families rather than
remain in poverty; to keep or terminate a pregnancy; to ask for help,
despite their deportability; to stay away from options that might have
afforded them adequate prenatal care for fear of being detected and
subsequently deported; to discover and draw upon various legal loop-
holes; to pay high sums for private-pay deliveries rather than approach
state offices; and to apply or not to apply for formal protection from de-
portation.
8.5 Conclusion
In debates on illegal immigration, one of the most contested issues is
whether social services should be offered to residents who do not for-
mally participate in the system. I have focused here on migrant women
because the restricted access to medical services sheds light on the con-
tradictions between the general marginalisation of illegal migrants and
ideas of moral obligation towards pregnant women and their children.
In both nations, illegal pregnant women and their children are deemed
to be particularly deserving of assistance while simultaneously being
viewed with suspicion, so that states are caught in the ‘contradictory
impulses of sympathy and exclusion’ (Hoffman 2006). Because they
may bear children in the host country, illegal migrant women are con-
fronted with different forms of discrimination as well as with poten-
tially different resources. Since the end of the nineteenth century,
states have become involved in administering systems of welfare and
are increasingly discerning as to how these services are allocated. To-
day, states with more costly and elaborate social welfare systems often
have a greater interest in controlling migration than those with a lower
level of welfare resources. This move towards ever greater discrimina-
tive features, facilitated through paradoxical and contradictory legal
guidelines, represents changing state practices evident in the case
study offered here. Germany has a sophisticated and tightly controlled
health care system, and it restricts the access of illegal residents to it.
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While premised in a commitment to universal entitlement, it effec-
tively excludes illegal migrants through a series of vague policies, crim-
inalising the provision of care. Becoming pregnant as an illegal resi-
dent is of greater concern for women in Germany than in the US since
they must seek out medical care and thereby face a relatively high risk
of exposure and deportability. In the US, by contrast, the labour market
relies heavily on millions of illegal migrants, yet there is a compara-
tively poor system of social services, which has resulted in a compara-
tively less restrictive internal policy climate. Illegal migrants are often
able to find medical aid in the same manner as other uninsured and
under-insured individuals: that is, through overburdened emergency
rooms and by relying on charity services. However, the implications of
the US citizenship model have resulted in a much more elaborate na-
tional border control policy. As a result of more restrictive and mili-
tarised borders, migrant women coming to the US often face higher
risks during entry and are portrayed as a threat to national identity. Fi-
nally, migrant women’s chances of remaining illegal can differ from
those of the men. In both Germany and the US, women can legalise
their stay in ways that men cannot – either by giving birth in the host
country (in the US) or by having a child whose father is a national or
long-term legal resident (in Germany). Even in countries with very dif-
ferent social welfare systems and notions of national belonging, mi-
grant illegality remains a highly gendered construction with different
implications for men and women.
Notes
1 § 87 of the Residence Act is often referred to as the Denunziationsparagraf.
2 § 96 of the Residence Act is often referred to as the Schlepperparagraf.
3 All participant and organisation names used herein are pseudonyms.
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